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Contrary to the mythology of authorship, the writing of a book is really a collective 
enterprise.  While invariably the names of one or two people appear on the title page, my 
own experience leads me to believe that no book would ever be finished without the help, 
love, support, and some degree of gentle authoritarianism on the part of those prodding 
the author forward in his or her work.  With this in mind, I would like to take a couple of 
pages to thank those people who have been instrumental in the completion of this work. 
 As an undergraduate at Southwest Texas State University, I made the mistake of 
taking a course in political theory being taught by Kenneth L. Grasso.  As a result of this 
error, the course of my personal history was irrevocably changed.  For this I am grateful 
to Ken and other members of the political science faculty at SWT.  It was Grasso who 
piqued my interest in political science generally (the first question of politics is not “who 
gets what, where and when?” but rather “what is a human being?”) and Eric Voegelin, in 
particular.  In addition to Ken, I would be remiss if I did not thank Robert Gorman, and 
Ted Hindson (who planted the idea that graduate school might be more interesting for me 
than law school—it turns out he was correct), in addition to the late Randall Bland.  They 
offered a burgeoning scholar a nurturing environment and opened up possibilities for me 
that I had not considered (this was in addition to the camaraderie of Notre Dame football 
on Saturdays and nearly always picking up the tab at dinner). 
 At Louisiana State University a new world was opened up and once again I found 
guidance and friendship in the Political Science Department.  In this regard, I would like 
to thank Mark Schafer for both his creative use of modern literature in class and the 
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experience of Thai and Indian food.  Thanks also go to Wayne Parent for the Friday 
afternoon “discussion group.”   
 When it began to look as if the inexorability of time was going to destroy the 
project before completion, several people assisted me in defeating the inevitability of 
deadlines.  Tara Montelaro, the graduate secretary in the department, worked many long 
hours on my behalf to help keep me on track in terms of paperwork and time 
management (I had to reformat my computer’s hard drive because of the extensive email 
correspondence).  Her assistance was invaluable in keeping me enrolled and allowing the 
project to move forward.   The office coordinator for the Eric Voegelin Institute at LSU, 
Wanda Ashley, also deserves special recognition for her help in matters academic, 
financial, and spiritual.  Always a sympathetic audience, Wanda’s patience and 
willingness to help is remarkable.  In addition, James Garand, the Director of Graduate 
Studies for the department, went out of his way to help me with scheduling and other 
matters related to the calendar requirements for the dissertation and the degree. 
 The patience and support of my doctoral committee is much appreciated.  I would 
like to thank Cecil Eubanks for opening the world of Greek tragedy to me in a 
meaningful way and for his many kind words of support.  James Stoner, the former 
director of graduate studies in the department, was helpful in both that capacity and as a 
teacher who gave some needed perspective to a scholar who needed it.  This was in 
addition to his conversations with my wife that contributed to the “gentle 
authoritarianism” previously mentioned.   Eugene Wittkopf helped me to understand the 
nuances of international relations theory and its implications for the understanding of 
political science generally.  Dr. Wittkopf was also instrumental in pointing out some of 
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the unforeseen implications of the current dissertation, thereby opening other avenues for 
future exploration.   I would also like to thank my “dean’s rep” on my committee, Kent 
Mathewson of the department of geography and anthropology for his insightful questions 
and patience.  
Deserving of special recognition is the chairman of my committee, Ellis Sandoz.  
There is no real way to thank Dr. Sandoz for his assistance in so many areas related to 
this project, be it from the perspective of Voegelin scholarship generally, the 
management of the calendar, providing insight into problems with the research project, 
even down to pointing out typographical errors that somehow persisted through the 
process.  Dr. Sandoz went out of his way to help me when I needed help for which I am 
truly grateful and appreciative.  I am sure that I frustrated him to no end, but he was 
always there pushing me forward. 
In addition to the academic assistance, this book would not have been possible 
without the support and love of my family.  I would like to thank my mother and father 
for their insistence that I finish my homework before I go outside to play.  In addition, I 
would like to express my appreciation to my wife’s parents for their help and support 
when I took their daughter and grandchildren away to the wilds of Louisiana.   
Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank my wife, Cindy, and our 
children, Jacob and Ariana.   I am sure that Jacob and Ariana, at some point, had to 
believe that their father had left the planet.  As we entered into the final phase of the 
project our time together was limited by the exigencies of dissertation writing.  However, 
they hung in there and were patient with their father and provided many fond memories 
of, and necessary diversions from, the process (all this in addition to their “help” with the 
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organization of research materials—nothing like a two-year old and a four-year old 
assisting in the organization of books and journals!). 
At the outset I mentioned the “gentle authoritarianism” required in dissertation 
writing.  No one epitomizes this quality more than my wife and partner.  Cindy sacrificed 
more than anyone in seeing this phase of my academic career to its completion.  Her 
faith, patience, understanding and love sustained me when I first left Texas for Louisiana 
to undertake my doctoral program as it does to this, the completion of it.   In the New 
Testament, 1 Corinthians 13 tells us the qualities of love.  In addition to being the gentle 
authoritarian, Cindy epitomizes those qualities in dropping everything to go with me to 
LSU to finish my graduate work.  This book is as much hers as it is mine—in many ways 
it is more hers.  For this reason, this dissertation is dedicated to her with much gratitude 
and love.   
   A dissertation is said to the “first book” written by an academic.  I can only hope 
and pray that my future academic endeavors will benefit from the same type of support 
that I have received in the composition of this one.  Needless to say, any errors or 
omissions in the text are my responsibility alone.  
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This dissertation will analyze the problem of Christian political order in light of Eric 
Voegelin’s History of Political Ideas.  The great weakness in Voegelin, according to 
many critics, was his failure to deal with the historical appearance of Jesus of Nazareth 
and to fully examine the implications of Christianity for human beings in their political 
and social existence.  The completed publication of the History of Political Ideas now 
offers the opportunity for a more complete assessment of Voegelin’s position with regard 
to the problem of Christian political order. The History contains his most comprehensive 
treatment of Christianity, in terms of both the experience of faith and the 
institutionalization of religion in the church.  It is in the inherent tension between the 
experience of faith and the institutionalization of the spirit in the church that the problem 
of Christian political order is revealed.   
 The analysis contained herein will focus upon the tension between a spiritual 
phenomena based on faith in the Pauline sense and the institutionalization of that 
experience in the immanent representative of the church.  Christian political order was 
premised upon a series of compromises with the realities of human existence, both 
spiritual and immanent, made by Paul at the inception of the Christian community.  The 
dissertation will demonstrate that it was in the retreat and abandonment of those 
compromises that Christian political order as represented by the sacrum imperium, the 
political idea that was at the heart of Western civilization until the Great Reformation, 




Western civilization owes its very existence to the existence of Christianity.  Yet, in 
many ways, the very success of Christianity was the cause of its decline as the organizing 
principle of Western civilization.  It is one of the ironies of history that the very qualities 
that enabled Christianity to expand across borders, cultures, and peoples should, in turn, 
be the underlying source of its undoing. 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze Eric Voegelin’s examination of the 
problem of Christian political order from the inception of Christianity in the person of 
Christ through the convulsion of Western civilization that is the Great Reformation as it 
is presented in the recently published History of Political Ideas.  Political theorists are 
generally familiar with the arguments of the later Voegelin regarding the inherent 
weaknesses of Christianity as they were presented in The New Science of Politics; 
however, it is only with the publication of the History of Political Ideas that the tale is 
told in full. 
 The result of this study will be a clarification Voegelin’s theory of civilizational 
foundation, the meaning of Christianity politically, and of Voegelin’s philosophy of 
history.  To this end, I will focus upon a variety of issues that are germane to studies of 
Voegelin in particular and the peculiar problem of modernity and the rise of ideological 
mass movements.  With regard to Voegelin, the study will help to illuminate Voegelin’s 
position regarding the person of Jesus himself, which, even among many ardent 
supporters and admirers of Voegelin’s scholarship, has been a matter of some 
consternation.  The History of Political Ideas contains the most extended treatment of 
Jesus in any of Voegelin’s writings and, as such, the analysis of Voegelin’s treatment of 
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Jesus will help to address the larger questions regarding Voegelin’s approach to 
Christianity in the later writings, most particularly as it relates to The Ecumenic Age and 
the almost complete absence of Jesus in that work. 
 More importantly, however, in terms of the larger question of the influence of 
Christianity upon the development and decline of the distinctly Western Christian 
civilization, the analysis will focus upon the “Pauline compromises with the world” that 
made it possible for Christianity to become the instrument by which the West itself was 
civilized.  It was the unraveling of these compromises through time that resulted in the 
Great Reformation of the sixteenth century.  The compromises made by Saint Paul with 
the realities of the world into which Christianity would take its place had, as their origin, 
a realistic assessment of reality as it can be known the human beings.  By which I mean 
the reality of human nature, the world itself, God, and the relationships among them.  It is 
no exaggeration to say that in the abandonment of the compromises made by Paul, 
Christian civilization created the conditions for its own demise.  
Furthermore, as a corollary, it is important to note that to retreat from the essential 
compromises made by Paul at the inception of Christianity was also representative of a 
retreat from a true understanding of reality itself.  The consequences of this movement 
were, of course, the age of religious wars with the horrific violence of sectarian struggle 
that was released which, in turn, was followed by the even more horrific violence that 
resulted from the rise of ideological mass movements that were, in fact, representative of 
the full retreat from the realities of human existence and which became the repositories of 
spiritual unrest. 
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 Running throughout the history of Christian political order is an inherent tension 
between the underlying sentiments and ideas embodied in Jesus’ announcement of the 
“kingdom of God” and the realization of that idea through the institution of temporal and 
spiritual authorities as the representation of that order on earth.  Voegelin’s most 
complete analysis of that tension takes place within the context of the History of Political 
Ideas.  It should not be forgotten that the rather cursory examination of the problem of 
Christian order as it appears in The New Science of Politics was not directed at the 
problem of Christian political order per se, but was rather an instrument of explanation in 
the examination of the nature of modernity.  The purpose of The New Science of Politics 
was to propose a radical reorientation of political science generally and political theory in 
particular.  The purpose of the current dissertation is not directed toward the discipline, 
but rather represents an attempt at explicating the problem that was alluded to as part of 
the justification Voegelin offered for his proposed reorientation of political science. 
 The assault upon the Pauline compromises takes many forms and emerges from 
many quarters.  It is not merely the expression of the disaffected, but also reflects the 
inability of the institutional order to respond effectively to real experiences of the human 
spirit as they occur in history.  The analysis of Voegelin’s reflections on the tensions as 
they occur in history will help to explain the interaction of various factors from the 
creation of the small community of the faithful around the person of Jesus of Nazareth 
through the crisis of the Reformation and the terrible forces of destruction that were 
unleashed as a result.  Throughout the imperium of the high Middle Ages, the 
institutional orders were able to resolve the tensions inherent in the institutionalization of 
the spirit.  However, even as that occurred, changing conceptions of history and the 
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understanding of the place of human beings in the order of the universe were creating the 
conditions for the assault upon civilization itself.  With this in mind, this dissertation will 
trace the development of Christian political order through the imperium, the confusion 
that resulted when the imperium was dissolved, and the Great Reformation as something 
of an anticlimax that resulted in the institutional realization of something that had already 
occurred, i.e. the destruction of Christian homonoia in a universal sense.  Finally, the 
implications of the Great Reformation are considered in light of the preceding analysis. 
 Christian homonoia as understood by Saint Paul was no mean achievement in 
history.1  The current study was prompted by the perception that in the Western 
democracies, and the United States in particular, the community substance, as defined by 
shared values and a common understanding of the ends of human existence that make 
community life possible, are becoming increasingly problematic.  To be sure, there is 
currently a unity of purpose with regard to the conduct of the West toward the terrorism 
brought on by fundamentalist Islam, but absent an identifiable enemy, there is some 
question as to whether or not there remains sufficient civic consciousness for the 
maintenance of community.  It is my hope that an analysis of the breakdown of Pauline 
homonoia might contribute to a more complete understanding of our own predicament. 
 Finally, the current dissertation is based on what some might claim to be a 
pessimistic attitude with regard to the ideological fervor of the past and its capacity to 
reemerge in new forms.  The tension of existence was not resolved when the Soviet 
Union imploded, and the capacity (it might be argued that it is a tendency) of human 
                                                 
1 It is important to recognize at the outset that when Voegelin uses the term “Christian homonoia,” he is not 
simply transferring the use of the Greek term as it appears in the Pauline epistles.  The term used by Paul in 
Rom. 15:5, Phil 2:2 and 2:20 is isŏpsuchos.  Unlike homonoia, which refers to the capacity to be of the 
“same mind,” isŏpsuchos refers to a unity of the spirit. 
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beings to fall into the dream world of ideological abstraction has not changed.  At the 
edge of civilized existence there always lives the danger that the past will be born anew.  
The shape of the ideological disorder of the future cannot be known, however, the 
inclination to fall from uncertain truth into certain untruth, as Voegelin put it, remain 
Chapter One:  Voegelin’s History of Political Ideas 
 
The Background to the History of Political Ideas 
In 1939, Eric Voegelin was contracted by Fritz Morstein Marx of the McGraw-Hill 
publishing house to write a “textbook of moderate size” to compete with George H. 
Sabine’s History of Political Theory.  Morstein Marx saw the project as a work of some 
“200 to 250 pages” that would recount the major thinkers and political ideas that emerged 
from the pre-Socratics to the present.  Between 1939 and 1954, Voegelin worked in starts 
and stops upon his History of Political Ideas, as the work came to be titled.  While a 
complete history of the History is beyond the scope of the current study, it is important to 
note that in the process of devoting himself to the task, Voegelin became, as he put it, 
“aware of the theoretical inadequacy of my conventional preconceptions about a history 
of ideas” (AR, 64).1   
Eventually, this awareness would lead Voegelin to propose a reformulation of the 
discipline of political theory itself.  First, in the Walgreen Lectures at the University of 
Chicago in 1951, published as The New Science of Politics, and culminating in the 
completion and publication of Order and History.  The problem Voegelin perceived in a 
history of political ideas was a problem with confusing the symbolization of reality 
through language symbols apart from the experience that engendered the use of the 
symbol to describe it.  In other words, the task of political theory, from Voegelin’s 
perspective, was to examine the experience that gave rise to the symbol, and not the other 
way around.  A history of political ideas, with that conceptual framework in mind, was an 
                                                 
1 Chapter 17, “From Political Ideas to Symbols of Experience,” and Chapter 20, “The Background of Order 
and History, offer a more detailed examination of Voegelin’s decision to abandon the History of Political 
Ideas. 
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exercise in putting the cart before the horse.  So despite all of the work and time that had 
been invested in the project, Voegelin abandoned it in favor of his new exploration into 
the philosophy of history and the theory of consciousness. 
 With that said, however, the History is instructive in a number of ways and a 
suitable object for analysis.  To begin with, there is the sheer scope of the project itself.  
The History took on a life of its own independent of the requirements of the assignment.  
When finally published as part of The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin between 1997 
and 1999, the 200 to 250 pages originally contracted by Morstein Marx had grown to a 
full eight volumes in the series, numbering nearly 2,000 pages .  Rather than a neat 
biographical précis of major thinkers and political theory proper, Voegelin had written a 
comprehensive examination of the cultural, political, and social forces that had shaped 
the modern world from the disintegration of the Hellenic polis through the modern era.   
 Secondly, there is the question of Voegelin’s conceptual breakthrough itself.  
Voegelin began the project with the notion that a history of political ideas was a viable 
approach to the problems of political order.  At some point, while composing the history 
of political ideas, Voegelin came to the understanding that such a project did not really 
get to the truth of the problem of political order but was rather, in itself, a theoretical 
derailment.  The comprehensiveness of Voegelin’s approach in the History of Political 
Ideas may offer some insight into that breakthrough and Voegelin’s own reevaluation of 
his craft and discipline.  Furthermore, that same comprehensiveness served as the 
necessary precondition for Voegelin to begin to speculate on his own theory of 
consciousness and philosophy of history. 
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 Third, and most importantly for the purposes of this examination, it is in the 
History that Voegelin most clearly and comprehensively examines the problem of 
Christian political order.   Voegelin notes, “The Christian community has been, for the 
better part of two thousand years, the most important political force in the Western world, 
and the evocative acts that created it are the basis of all later political evocations that 
occurred in Western history—as far as it is Christian” (HPI I, 164).  Indeed, it is certainly 
arguable that the single most important element in the development of “Western 
civilization” was the emergence of Christianity.  Christianity was a peculiar development 
in that it sowed the seeds of both order and disorder in the world in which it emerged.  On 
the one hand, it kept the dream of Rome alive.  On the other, it provided the complex of 
symbols that would characterize Voegelin’s examination and explication of the 
ideological movements that shaped the 20th century.  
 The later Voegelin’s approach to the question of Christianity has always been 
viewed as somewhat problematic and the source of much critical speculation.  The 
original plan for Voegelin’s Order and History was for six volumes.  As was the case 
with the History of Political Ideas, however, Voegelin became uneasy with the program 
he had set.  After completing three of the six planned volumes, Voegelin realized that he 
had created a problem related to the sheer size of the work itself.  Voegelin argues, “I 
always ran into the problem that, in order to arrive at theoretical formulations, I had first 
to present the materials on which the theoretical formulations were based as an analytical 
result” (AR, 81).  What this would have meant, had Voegelin followed his original plan, 
was not simply three more volumes, but rather six or seven to fully explore the problems 
that interested him. 
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 But an even more critical issue was calling Voegelin’s original program into 
question.  As work proceeded on Order and History, Voegelin confronted the problem of 
parallel experiences that did not conform to the notion of historical progression that had 
served as the platform for the initial undertaking.  While “(t)here was really an advance in 
time from compact to differentiated experiences of reality, and, correspondingly, an 
advance from compact to differentiated symbols of the order of being,” these occurrences 
did not, as Voegelin had initially assumed, occur among all peoples in a linear fashion.  
Ultimately, Voegelin believed his initial “conception was untenable because it had not 
taken proper account of the important lines of meaning in history that did not run along 
lines of time” (OH IV, 2). 
 What this meant was yet another abandonment.  In this instance, the three 
proposed volumes, Empire and Christianity, The Protestant Centuries, and The Crisis of 
Western Civilization were scuttled in favor of The Ecumenic Age.  And for many critics, 
this is the source of the problem with Voegelin’s approach to the question of the role of 
Christianity in his analysis of the history of order and the order of history.  Instead of an 
analysis of the emergence of Christianity and its influence upon the course of Western 
civilization that the proposed volumes might have contained, Voegelin had changed 
course and analyzed the concept of the ecumene as it emerged in two different senses.  
On the one hand, the concept was strictly an extension of the idea of Rome.  The 
universal empire that is not necessarily dependent upon a shared understanding of 
political community among its members but is rather a system of political and social 
organization that rests upon the reality of power.  The second notion, co-terminus with 
the first, was born with in the emergence of Christianity and consisted of the idea of a 
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universal humanity that already exists by virtue of human existence under God.  These 
two concepts are enigmatic in the sense that they tend to overlap, contradict, and justify 
one another throughout history.  
Voegelin’s Christian Critics:  A Review of the Literature 
It is a maxim that discussions of religion and politics are problematic.  And it should be 
noted that the later Voegelin’s work on Christianity engendered the often-violent 
emotions associated with such discussion.  Voegelin’s approach to the emergence of 
Christianity and the essence of Christian faith in Order and History left many deeply 
dissatisfied.  The content of The Ecumenic Age, in particular, caused some consternation 
among academics who were normally sympathetic to Voegelin’s scholarly pursuits.  
Michael P. Morrissey argues that far from being “an apologetic for Christian orthodoxy,” 
which many people expected, The Ecumenic Age “appeared to be a philosophical critique 
of traditional Christian thought.”  As a result of this curious turn of events, “many” of 
Voegelin’s “followers have become his worst adversaries.  A common complaint that 
many of them have voiced against his work, strange as it may sound, is that he actually 
neglected to deal with Christianity, or more precisely, with Christian faith” or “the 
historicity and uniqueness of Jesus.”2 
 The most strident critics of Voegelin’s approach to the problem of Christianity as 
it was revealed in Order and History tended to focus upon the choice Voegelin made to 
examine the emergence of Christianity through an exegesis of the experience of St. Paul 
and his encounter with the risen Christ.  Gerhart Niemeyer, generally a great admirer and 
sympathetic critic of Voegelin’s undertaking argued that in The Ecumenic Age the 
                                                 
2 Michael P. Morrissey, Consciousness and Transcendence:  The Theology of Eric Voegelin (Notre Dame:  
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 231. 
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treatment of Christianity was “deeply disappointing.”  The reason for Niemeyer’s 
consternation was Voegelin’s emphasis upon Paul’s vision on the road to Damascus 
instead of an examination of the historical reality of Christ himself.  The primary 
problem, according to Niemeyer, is that “Voegelin’s exegesis of St. Paul would not have 
to be changed if one removed Jesus Christ from it altogether.”  By equating the Pauline 
myth” with the discovery of noetic consciousness accomplished by Plato, Niemeyer 
believes that Voegelin has committed a most egregious error in his construction of reality 
itself. 
 The difference is in the origin of the reality prompted by the philosophical 
reflection on the existence of divine transcendent being and human participation in with 
divine transcendent being through the invitation of Christ.  According to Niemeyer’s 
account the Pauline myth cannot be reconciled with the Platonic account.  Niemeyer 
writes, “Myths and philosophical speculations are induced by the ubiquitous ‘mystery of 
meaning’ which Eric Voegelin has done more than anyone else to illuminate.”  However, 
Christianity, according to Niemeyer, “stems not from a sense of general wonderment 
about the world of things and the Boundless, which probably would not have been very 
sophisticated in simple fishermen, but rather from the question which Jesus himself put:  
‘Who do you say I am?’”3  The gist of Niemeyer’s argument is that Voegelin does not 
address the question of the incarnation of the divine presence in the person of Jesus 
Christ and its implications for history. 
 In a later essay, Niemeyer does point out “that Voegelin, at no time and no place, 
has ever dismissed the full reality of Jesus Christ.”  This, perhaps, is the reason that 
                                                 
3 Gerhart Niemeyer, “Eric Voegelin’s Philosophy and tbe Drama of Mankind,” Modern Age, Winter  
1976; 34—35. 
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Niemeyer also maintains that if the earlier criticism were to be rewritten it would be 
“somewhat milder.”4  However, there can be little doubt that the failure of Voegelin to 
deal with the historicity of Jesus was troubling for Niemeyer. 
 Niemeyer’s willingness to reexamine his earlier critique is in sharp distinction to 
the most vociferous critic of Voegelin’s approach to Christianity, Frederic D. 
Wilhelmsen.  Wilhelmsen, in his Christianity and Political Philosophy, takes up the 
polemicist’s pen and aims it squarely at “Professor Voegelin.”  To be fair to Wilhelmsen, 
however, it is worth noting that he is also at least as vitriolic toward another great light of 
20th century political theory, Leo Strauss.  According to Wilhelmsen, Leo Strauss and his 
followers, the so-called “Straussian school,” have actively sought to remove Christian 
political thought generally from the corpus of political theory.  “Their books and articles, 
replete with references to classical antiquity, not only span Greece but they probe the 
modern mind from Machiavelli to Locke and beyond.  We can note as well a fascination 
and peculiar reverence for the figure of Averroes.  But very little is taught us about the 
contribution, if any, of Christian thought to politics.”5 
 Be that as it may, however, Wilhelmsen’s primary concern and scorn is not with 
the Straussians, but rather Eric Voegelin and his influence on modern Christian thinkers.  
In the penultimate chapter of Christianity and Political Philosophy, Wilhelmsen writes: 
 
If Straussianism is a danger to Christian political theory, Voegelinianism 
is an even more subtle danger and more dangerous because of its very 
attractiveness to Christians who look once but fail to look twice.  Voegelin 
respects history and he respects the Lord of history, Christ—but Voegelin 
                                                 
4 Gerhart Niemeyer, “Christian Faith and Religion in Eric Voegelin’s Work, “ The Review of Politics 
(Winter 1995), 100. 
5 Frederic Wilhelmsen, Christianity and Political Philosophy (Athens:  University of Georgia Press,  
1978), 209. 
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does not believe in him, or, at least, he does not believe in him as historic 
Christianity has believed.  Hence Voegelin has not believed.6 
 
The problem, the “danger” alluded to by Wilhelmsen, is that Voegelin has engaged in his 
own peculiar sort of reductionism.  Wilhelmsen’s argument echoes Niemeyer’s in that 
through Voegelin’s use of the Pauline visions of the resurrected, Voegelin has 
circumvented both history and faith.  Wilhelmsen argues that Voegelin “represents our 
common Western religion thought the prism of the experience of Saint Paul and almost 
exclusively through that prism.  The historical figure of Jesus is totally bypassed by 
Voegelin and the only Christ to emerge in Voegelin’s pages is the resurrected Christ of 
Paul’s experience, the Christ who appeared to Paul and who transfigured his life and the 
life of all mankind as well.”  In an argument similar to that advanced by Niemeyer, 
Wilhelmsen complains that Voegelin’s analysis admits of no distinction between the 
experience of Paul, and the noetic experiences of Plato and Aristotle.  This, in turn, 
mitigates against the existence of “the Church” as an essential element in “constituting 
man’s life in history under God.”7  Ultimately, according to Wilhelmsen, Voegelin has 
failed to grasp the significance of the Christian dispensation because he is a “Platonist” 
for whom “reality does not count.”8 
 A response to Wilhelmsen’s criticism in particular is found in Eugene Webb’s 
Eric Voegelin:  Philosopher of History.  Webb notes that much of the criticism focused 
on Voegelin’s interpretation of Christianity seems to waver on the edges, and in the case 
of Wilhelmsen fall right off of it, based on the perceptions of Voegelin’s own religious 
beliefs held by his Christian critics.  To be sure, Voegelin himself supplied the 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 195. 
7 Ibid., 197—98. 
8 Ibid., 201—02. 
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ammunition.  As Webb notes, “an interpreter who wished to put together an argument to 
the effect that Voegelin is not a Christian would be able to find as much evidence for his 
position as one who argued the opposite.”  But, this being the case, does not mean that 
the question itself has real merit.  Webb maintains,  
 
The most penetrating question is not whether Voegelin is a Christian or 
not but what is the shape of his particular variety of Christian thought—for 
that his thought is Christian in at least some sense seems incontestable.  
Those of his critics who have attacked his treatment of Christianity have in 
effect been arguing not that Voegelin is not a Christian at all but that he is 
not a Christian by their standards.9 
 
 With that said, of course, there must be logical reasons that Voegelin might have 
chosen Paul as the founder of the Christian community instead of Jesus.  William M. 
Thompson observes, for example, that Voegelin was “a political theorist and philosopher 
of history” who was “chiefly interested in the quest for a rightly ordered existence.”  As 
such, “His christological studies are in the service of this larger goal….”10  Voegelin’s 
work in The New Science of Politics and most especially in Order and History was an 
exploration of human consciousness of reality.  In this examination, Voegelin conceived 
of the process of “differentiation” by which human consciousness becomes aware of 
reality—both divine and immanent.  Furthermore, if the effort is to find an adequate 
theory for the experience of human beings in political society it must do so “within the 
historical horizon of classical and Christian experiences” because those experiences 
represent the “maximum of differentiation” (NSP, 79).  Paul, in Voegelin’s account, is 
                                                 
9 Eugene Webb, Eric Voegelin:  Philosopher of History (Seattle:  University of Washington Press,  
1981), 226. 
10 William M. Thompson, “Voegelin on Jesus Christ,” in John Kirby and William M. Thompson, eds. 
Voegelin and the Theologian:  Ten Studies in Interpretation.  Vol. 10 of Toronto Studies in Theology (New 
York:  The Edwin Mellon Press, 1983), 178. 
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archetypal in his experience of the maximal differentiation of reality experienced by 
human being as a result of his encounter on the road to Damascus.  Thompson observes, 
“The fact that Voegelin concentrates on the Pauline Vision of the Resurrected as the 
experiential center of Pauline theology is an insight that increasingly wins the approval of 
Pauline scholars today.”  Furthermore, “what …seems to characterize Paul, and so 
forcefully distinguishes him from the author of Acts, is his critical attitude toward 
charismatic experience.”11  Thompson argues that it is through the work of Paul, “unlike 
in Plato,” that “we have a clearer consciousness of the source of reality’s structure (the 
eschatological state of perfection), and of the individual as the locus where reality’s 
directional movement becomes luminous.”12   
Webb agrees with Thompson on the crucial point regarding Voegelin’s own 
methodology and the requirement that it be Paul who speaks rather than Jesus.  The 
noetic investigation of the experience of reality means that the scientist is limited by 
theoretical principles to the content of the experiences of those who create the symbols 
that describe the experience of reality.  Voegelin, Webb argues, had “to investigate the 
revelation on the level of concrete experience.”  With this in mind, it was a “fundamental 
requirement of Voegelin’s own process of noetic inquiry” that he “chose Paul rather than 
Jesus as his major point of focus—since Paul left writings that speak of his experience 
directly, whereas the experience of Jesus comes to us only through the mediating 
interpretations of other writers.”13  By choosing to examine the experience of Paul, 
Voegelin was demonstrating a preference for primary source material over secondary 
accounts. 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 193. 
12 Ibid., 188. 
13 Eugene Webb, “Voegelin on Revelation,” The Thomist 42 (1978), 109. 
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 However, the objections of Thompson and Webb notwithstanding, the idea that 
Voegelin was hampered in his exploration of Christianity and the person of Jesus as the 
incarnation of the divine substance on earth is a view shared by Stephen J. Tonsor.  In 
Tonsor’s review of Published Essays, 1966—1985, the twelfth volume of The Collected 
Works of Eric Voegelin, he argues, “The great unresolved problem in Voegelin’s analysis 
of the experience of the soul and the articulation of order is the fact of revelation and the 
incarnation of God’s revelation in Jesus, the Christ.”14  The reason the problem remained 
unresolved, according to Tonsor, lay in the historic “conflict between Athens and 
Jerusalem.”15  Tonsor argues that Voegelin “believed in the God of the philosophers and 
tried again and again, unsuccessfully…to ‘put on Christ.’”16  Voegelin’s attempt to 
resolve the conflict between Athens and Jerusalem “by transforming revelation into 
noetic experience” was, in Tonsor’s opinion, a failure and, in a remarkable attempt at 
psychological profiling, the probable source of “Voegelin’s hostility to doctrinal 
Christianity.”17 
 The meaning of the incarnation is the source of another critique of Voegelin’s 
interpretation of the Gospel.  R. Bruce Douglass, while recognizing Niemeyer’s concern 
regarding the historic Jesus as a legitimate question, sees a more “subtle problem” in 
Voegelin’s analysis of the Gospels.18   According to Douglass, “From the Christian 
perspective the foremost consideration in any appraisal of what Voegelin has to say must 
                                                 
14 Stephen J. Tonsor, “The God Question,” review of Eric Voegelin, Published Essays, 1966—1985:  The 
Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, volume 12, edited with an introduction by Ellis Sandoz in Modern Age 
35 (Fall 1992); 67--68 
15 Ibid., 68. 
16 Ibid., 66. 
17 Ibid., 68. 
18 Bruce Douglass, “A Diminished Gospel:  A Critique of Voegelin’s Interpretation of Christianity,” in 
Stephen A. McKnight, ed., Eric Voegelin’s Search for Order in History (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State 
University Press, 1978), 145 
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be the meaning of the Gospel—i.e., the interpretation of Jesus, his identity and 
significance.  No issue is more central in defining Christian belief, and none is more 
important for the success of what Voegelin seeks to accomplish in his treatment of 
Christianity.”19  However, like Niemeyer, Wilhelmsen, and Tonsor, Douglass believes 
that Voegelin has not met the task that he set for himself.  Douglass maintains that 
“Voegelin’s interpretation of the Gospel…leaves something to be desired.  What is 
missing…is the sense of the Gospel as salvation.  Or, more correctly, what is missing is 
the sense of the Gospel as salvation in the specifically Christian sense.20   
 Douglass is joined in his concern regarding Voegelin’s treatment of the Gospels, 
most specifically in “The Gospel and Culture,” in which Voegelin skirts the edge of 
saying that Paul may have gone too far in his expectation of a world transformed as a 
result of his experience with the risen Christ.  Hallowell takes issue with this 
interpretation and also questions Voegelin’s general understanding of the Gospels as a 
tool for salvation.  Hallowell writes, 
 
Voegelin seems to be saying that only so long as the Gospel mirrors the 
tension of existence is it the true Gospel.  It is not clear to me what his 
response would be those who would say the Gospel is intended to be 
precisely an answer to this tension, that through the cultivation by the 
grace of God of the virtues of faith, hope, and charity one might be 
enabled better to endure the life of tension in the hope that “when the fever 
of life is over and our work is done, we may be granted a safe lodging and 
a holy rest, and peace at last.”  It is not clear if there is any sense in which 
Voegelin regards the Gospel as “good news.”21 
  
                                                 
19 Ibid., 144. 
20 Ibid., 146, emphasis in the original. 
21 John H. Hallowell, “Existence in Tension:  Man in Search of His Humanity,” in Eric Voegelin’s Search 
for Order in History (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 123. 
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Elsewhere, Douglass notes that Voegelin’s perception of modern ideological mass 
movements as gnostic deformations of Christian symbols mitigates against the contention 
that the Gospels offer a “more complete knowledge of the unknown God.”  According to 
Douglass, Voegelin’s emphasis upon the gnostic elements of Christianity detracts from 
his overall assessment of Christianity generally.22  As a result, “it would seem to be 
Voegelin’s view that only the discipline of philosophical reason can effectively challenge 
the modern predicament.”23  As a practical matter then, according to Douglass’ 
interpretation of Voegelin, Christianity serves no purpose in ordering the world, but 
rather serves as a font of disorder.  Indeed, the tension of existence is not resolved at all 
by Voegelin’s reading of the Gospels.  “In place of the biblical image of a God whose 
presence and purposes in history are made manifest we are given a divine flux whose 
direction is a mystery.”24 
 Indeed, the mystery of existence lies at the heart of Marion Montgomery’s 
critique of Voegelin’s exploration of Christianity.  Montgomery sees in Voegelin’s 
analysis the “adaptation of the resurrection to his own vision.”  Voegelin, Montgomery 
argues, “takes” the resurrection “and revises it to the purpose of his theory of 
consciousness, diminishing the importance of what he has on other occasions called 
attention to:  the particularity of the incarnation.”  Montgomery goes on to maintain,  
 
Voegelin’s adaptation of the resurrection to his own vision…is central in 
the questions raised about his friendliness toward Christianity.  Christ is 
risen only symbolically for Voegelin, it would seem—specifically in 
man’s imitations of Jesus’ radical encounters of reality in the world….  
When we consider that history has become for Voegelin the unfolding of 
                                                 
22 Bruce Douglass, “The Gospel and Political Order:  Eric Voegelin on the Political Role of Christianity,”  
The Journal of Politics 38 (February 1976), 33—37.  
23 Ibid., 27. 
24 Douglass, “A Diminished Gospel,” 149. 
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humanity in the context of reality, we begin to suspect an aberrational 
construction of the meaning of the incarnation, one which reduces the 
event of the incarnation and replaces it with the “larger” event of the 
unfolding of humanity.  It is for this reason…that Voegelin seems more 
acutely interested in the event of Paul’s encounter on the Road to 
Damascus as a transformation of Paul’s consciousness and through his, 
ours, than in the fundamental reality of the incarnation as described by 
Christian dogma….25 
 
Ultimately, it is Voegelin’s resistance to dogma and dogmatic assertions that 
Montgomery believes is the source of Voegelin’s difficulty in explicating the meaning of 
Jesus and the Christian faith generally.   
 
For the Christian, as an act of faith, it is the saviour and not the poet or 
prophet or philosopher in whom lies the promise of our return to the lost 
home.  But Voegelin is not prepared to make a surrender through faith to 
the mediator, though he honors it in others:  he sees a danger that, at this 
point in his quest at least, such a surrender is too near the surrenders to 
dogma in the medieval world which prepared the ground in which modern 
Gnostic ideologies have flourished.26 
 
However, according to Montgomery, this opposition is, in itself, a form of dogmatism.  
Montgomery argues that “the principal dogma at the heart of Voegelin’s work” is the 
commandment, “Thou shalt not rest in conclusion lest thou fall into certitude, the 
unforgivable sin against openness.”27   
 Of course, it might also be that Voegelin’s critics have simply misinterpreted his 
exploration of the incarnation.  This is the position taken by Morrissey who maintains 
that those who focus upon Voegelin’s apparent failure to discuss the incarnation of the 
                                                 
25Marion Montgomery, “Eric Voegelin and the End of Our Exploring,” Modern Age 23  
(Summer, 1979), 235—36. 
26 Ibid., 234. 
27 Ibid., 237. 
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divine presence are simply missing the point that Voegelin repeatedly tries to get across.  
Morrissey writes,  
 
Voegelin reminds us that the revelatory drama of the Gospel movement is 
situated in the larger context of the revelatory drama of Israelite history 
which in turn partakes in the same word of the Unknown God as does the 
revelatory drama of philosophy….  They are two parallel stories that 
contribute eminently to the ever-unfolding comprehensive story of the It-
reality, the universal presence of the divine beyond time.  Consequently, 
we must not dichotomize philosophy and Gospel, or Athens and 
Jerusalem, but, based on Voegelin’s theory of equivalence and 
differentiation, interpret their respective dramas as unique revelations of 
the same divine reality in different cultural contexts.  The word that 
emerges in each context belongs to the same human-divine metaxy.  While 
each story illuminates more completely one fundamental dimension of 
truth over the other, they both eminently participate in the larger untold 
story of history.  Athens and Jerusalem, philosophy and Gospel, while 
culturally and historically distinct, both join side by side as tensional 
partners in the transcendent City of God.28 
 
The concern with the historicity of Jesus is problematic to the extent that “Voegelin 
views the meaning of Christ as that event which reveals the depth of God’s presence in 
our metaxy, but this does not by any account reduce the divine to an immanent object, the 
historical person of Jesus, to be fully comprehended by our consciousness.”29  Which is, 
ultimately, what many of Voegelin’s critics attempt to accomplish. 
 What all of the literature has in common, however, is a paucity of original 
material dealing with Christianity in the later Voegelin’s work.  Stephen A. McKnight 
laments that “Voegelin has twice proposed but failed to produce a sustained analysis of 
its engendering experiences and its development as an ecumenic political order.”   For 
this reason, it is still “an area that might receive further study.”  Indeed, McKnight 
maintains, “The lack of an extended study of Christianity is puzzling in that it, in 
                                                 
28 Morrissey, 236—37. 
29 Ibid., 246. 
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principle, occupies the same pivotal role in the reorientation of Western thought and 
experience as does classical philosophy.”30  In point of fact, however, Voegelin had 
already explored the Christian experience in the History of Political Ideas, and it may 
well be that he was simply loath to return to the beginning.  A more complete analysis of 
the History and Voegelin’s reflections upon the problems of Christian political order may 
help to answer Voegelin’s critics and open up new ground for further inquiry. 
“The Crisis of Civic Consciousness” 
Another reason to examine Voegelin’s study of the problems of Christian political order 
lies in the current state of political discourse in the Western democracies generally and 
the United States in particular. 
 In one of the most moving and oft-quoted passages of The New Science of 
Politics, Voegelin makes the following observation: 
 
Human society is not merely a fact, or an event, in the external world to be 
studied by an observer like a natural phenomenon.  Though it has 
externality as one of its components, it is as a whole little world, a 
cosmion, illuminated with meaning from within by the human beings who 
continuously create and bear it as a mode and condition of their self-
realization (NSP, 27). 
 
In part, Voegelin makes this assertion as part of the ongoing debate within the discipline 
of political science about the way that politics ought to be studied.  More importantly, 
however, Voegelin is striking at the idea that political life has some meaning for human 
beings that is an essential part of their existences.  When understood in those terms, the 
question then becomes from whence does that meaning derive? 
                                                 
30 Stephen A. McKnight, “The Evolution of Voegelin’s Theory of Politics and History,” in Stephen A. 
McKnight, ed., Eric Voegelin’s Search for Order in History (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University 
Press, 1978), 45. 
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 One of the most elementary understandings of political societies in existence is 
based upon Aristotle’s notion of homonoia.  Variously translated as “concord” or “like-
mindedness,” homonoia is the transformational element that defines an aggregate of 
individuals into a political society.  Writing in The Politics, Aristotle asserts, “a state 
cannot be made out of any and every collection of people.”31  The state, in Aristotle’s 
conception of it, is civil and political society.  Furthermore, such an entity can only be 
said to exist among those people who share homonoia.  This concord is not merely an 
intellectual agreement among a few individuals within a given polity about what ought to 
be done, or who gets what, where, and when, but rather consists of a shared 
understanding among the populace about what it means to be a human being and what the 
ends of the given society or community ought to be.  Aristotle maintains, “the real 
difference between man and other animals is that humans alone have perception of good 
and evil, just and unjust, etc.  It is the sharing of a common view in these matters that 
makes a household and a state.”32 
 Of course Aristotle was not the first to make this observation.  For Plato, the 
disorder of Athens was directly related to a spiritual malaise among its people.  
According to the Platonic diagnosis of the problem, human societies are reflective of the 
human types that compose those societies.  Spiritual disorder among the members of the 
population, disagreements regarding the ends of political existence, will have a 
deleterious effect upon the polity generally.  For this reason, Plato argues, the cohesion of 
the community and the souls of the inhabitants must be nurtured.  In The Republic, the 
cohesion of the community is secured through the use of the “The Phoenician Tale” and 
                                                 
31 Aristotle, The Politics, translated by T.A. Sinclair, revised and re-presented by Trevor J. Saunders (New 
York:  Penguin Books, 1981), 304. 
32 Ibid.,  60 
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“the noble lie” by which the citizens of the polis will be told of the metals that were 
mixed into their souls.33  What Plato is pointing toward, in terms of the myth, is not 
merely an arrangement of power—a system of coercion and obedience—but rather a 
community of mutual interests secured through the recognition of a common spiritual 
core. 
 Since Aristotle and Plato, political thinkers from a variety of different 
perspectives have agreed upon the fundamental nature of the idea that the cohesion of the 
community is a necessary condition for the realization of human potential in political 
existence—although there is a great deal of disagreement regarding the term that ought to 
be used to describe the phenomena. 
 Among Alexis de Tocqueville’s many observations on the condition of human 
beings in political society is a reflection upon Aristotle’s notion of homonoia.  
Tocqueville argues that the existence of political society is premised upon the existence 
of “dogmatic beliefs” held by the individual members of the community.  Tocqueville 
asserts, “it is easy to see that no society could prosper without such belief….  For without 
ideas in common, no common action would be possible, and without common action, 
men might exist, but there could be no body social.”34  The existence of these dogmatic 
beliefs is what allows for cooperative effort that is the defining characteristic of human 
beings in political existence. 
                                                 
33 Plato, The Republic, 414b—415d.  For an examination of the function of the Phoenician Tale see 
Voegelin, OH III, 104—108; Allan Bloom, “Interpretive Essay,” in Plato, The Republic of Plato, trans. 
With notes, an interpretive essay, and a new introduction, by Allan Bloom, 2nd ed.  (New York:  Basic 
Books, 1968, 365—69; and Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press,  
1964) 101--103. 
34 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated by George Lawrence, edited by J.P. Mayer 
(New York:  Harper Perennial, 1988), 433. 
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 Voegelin’s most vociferous critic, Wilhelmsen, writing with Willmoore Kendall, 
describes “the public orthodoxy” as “that tissue of judgments, defining the good life and 
indicating the meaning of human existence which is held commonly by the members of 
any given society, who see in it the charter of their way of life and ultimate justification 
of their society.”35  Indeed, Wilhelmsen and Kendall point to the fact that while the 
public orthodoxy is amenable to evolutionary and revolutionary changes, the necessity 
for a public orthodoxy, the substance of Aristotle’s homonoia, remains constant.  “Not 
only can society not avoid having a public orthodoxy; even when it rejects an old 
orthodoxy in the name of ‘enlightenment,’ ‘progress,’ the ‘pluralist society,’ ‘the open 
society,’ and the like, it invents, however subtly, a new orthodoxy with which to replace 
the old one.”  Wilhelmsen and Kendall point out: 
 
Aristotle is always at hand to remind us, only gods and beasts can live 
alone; man, by nature, is a political animal whose very political life 
demands a politea that involves an at least implicit code of manners tacit 
agreements on the meaning of the good life, and therefore, on the meaning 
of man within the total economy of existence.  Without this political 
orthodoxy…and a theology sketched in at least broad outline—respect for 
the state withers; contracts lose their efficacy; the moral bond between 
citizens is loosened; the state opens itself to enemies from abroad; and the 
politea sheds the sacral character without which it cannot long endure.36 
 
 Kendall reaffirms this principle in his The Conservative Affirmation in America.  
Every political society, Kendall argues, “is founded upon what political philosophers call 
a consensus; that is, a hard core of shared beliefs.”  This consensus has to exist if the 
“society” is ever going to be anything more than merely an agglomeration of atomistic 
individuals held together by the coercive power of the government.  “Those beliefs that 
                                                 
35 Frederick D. Wilhelmsen and Willmoore Kendall, “Cicero and the Politics of the Public Orthodoxy,” in 
Christianity and Political Philosophy, 26. 
36 Ibid., 35—36. 
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the people share are what defines its character as a political society, what, embodies its 
meaning as a political society, what, above all perhaps, expresses its understanding of 
itself as a political society.”37   In other words, the substance of the hard core of shared 
beliefs that represent the consensus of the members of any given society is what gives the 
members of that society meaning in their political lives. 
 In using the language of “consensus,” Kendall is following in the footsteps of 
John Courtney Murray.  Murray maintains that a political society is born in “the 
constitutional consensus whereby the people acquires its identity as a people and the 
society is endowed with its vital form, its entelechy, its sense of purpose as a collectivity 
organized for action in history.”  According to Murray, this constitutional consensus is 
necessary for the existence of the polity itself because it is a necessary precondition for 
the “public argument” that is the essence of political society in a popular regime.  Murray 
writes: 
 
This consensus is come to by the people; they become a people by coming 
to it….  The consensus is not a structure of secondary rationalizations 
erected on psychological data…or on economic data….  It is not simply a 
working hypothesis whose value is pragmatic.  It is an ensemble of 
substantive truths, a structure of basic knowledge, an order of elementary 
affirmations that reflect realities inherent in the order of existence….  It 
furnishes the premises of the people’s action in history and defines the 
larger aims that actions seek in internal affairs and in external relations.38 
 
A political society in existence is thus the representational form of this constitutional 
consensus. 
                                                 
37 Willmoore Kendall, The Conservative Affirmation in America (Chicago:  Regnery Gateway, 1963), 74. 
38 John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths:  Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition (New 
York:  Sheed and Ward, 1960), 9—10. 
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 The substance of the constitutional consensus, dogmatic beliefs, or public 
orthodoxy, is about more than merely the institutional arrangements of power within any 
given regime.  As reflections of Aristotle’s notion of homonoia, each consists not of 
shared judgments about “things” generally, but shared judgments about “first things” in 
particular.  This is reflected in Ellis Sandoz’s reflections on the nature of “civil theology” 
and its relationship to political order.  According to Sandoz, “Civil theology…consists of 
propositionally stated true scientific knowledge of the divine order.  It is the theology 
discerned and validated through reason by the philosopher, on the one hand, and through 
common sense and the logique du Coeur evoked by the persuasive beauty of mythic 
narrative and imitative representations on the other hand.”39  The homonoia expressed 
through any given civil theology is thus a shared conception of reality per se.  Sandoz’s 
observation is echoed by Wilhelmsen and Kendall who argue that the “public orthodoxy 
implies…a commitment to metaphysical propositions whose claim to acceptance cannot 
be mere political utility or historical sanction, but the very structure of this as they are in 
themselves.”40 
 Douglass makes a similar point in his discussion of civil theology.  Douglass 
argues that a civil theology is that “(s)et of beliefs…through which the members of a 
political society relate their political experience to the ultimate conditions of human 
existence.”  According to Douglass, it is the mediating influence of civil theology that 
gives meaning to political existence.  It is through a civil theology that “political 
institutions are related to that which transcends the mundane conditions of life, and by 
virtue of this, they themselves acquire a measure of ultimacy.  They are interpreted as 
                                                 
39 Ellis Sandoz, A Government of Laws:  Political Theory, Religion, and the American Founding (Baton 
Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 53. 
40 Wilhelmsen and Kendall, 36. 
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being more than mere human contrivances:  they also become representative…of 
transcendent order.”41 
 In his examination of civil theology, Gerhart Niemeyer notes that it  
 
is multilayered.  At the top we find a “We hold these truths…”.  This 
common perspective of consciousness renders possible a broad and deep 
area in which action and language symbols are commonly understood; a 
rich soil of taken for granted assumptions, associations and references 
enabling people to communicate….  On this soil grow common 
aspirations, the “agreed upon objects of love” which Augustine pointed 
out.  On it also develops un-written but highly effective structures, the 
patterns of culture, conventional judgments, the do’s and don’ts usually 
more strictly obeyed then written statutes.  Above all, here flowers 
confidence, the assurance with which a person moves among his fellow 
beings, knowing what to expect and on what grounds to engage in 
cooperative effort.42 
 
The truths of any given society create the structure and meaning that are a precondition 
for that society to exist as a coherent entity organized for action in history.  They create 
the conditions that allow human beings to create cognitive maps that allow them to move 
through the social and political environment that they, in turn, help to create and define.  
Niemeyer observes that ultimately homonoia is “the capacity to be of the same mind, 
which renders possible the making of laws and taking action in history.”43 
 In the experience of the United States, just such a conception of the necessity of 
that shared tissue of judgments lay at the heart of the American experiment in self-
government with justice.  In the second outing by “Publius,” one of the few of The 
Federalist Papers written by John Jay, he notes, 
 
                                                 
41 R. Bruce Douglass, “Civil Religion and Western Christianity,” Thought 55 (June, 1980), 169. 
42 Gerhart Niemeyer, Between Nothingness and Paradise (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 
1971), 189—90. 
43 Ibid., 197. 
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that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country, to 
one united people.  A people descended from the same ancestors, speaking 
the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same 
principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and 
who, by their joint counsels, arms and efforts, fighting side by side 
throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established their general 
Liberty and Independence.44  
 
And, as Kenneth L. Grasso argues with reference to the above passage,  “The existence of 
this cultural capital is auspicious, because the political unity to be established by the 
Constitution will build upon this pre-existing cultural unity and the substantive moral 
consensus it reflects.”45 
 The substantive moral consensus and the pre-existing cultural unity of the 
American experiment is to be found in the classical and Christian conceptions of what it 
means to be a human being and the notion of reality that is informed by those 
conceptions.  As Sandoz notes: 
 
As any adequate sketch of the ground of the American founding will 
attest, to the extent that America stands for a coherent idea or vision of 
reality, it is rooted in classical and Christian philosophy of being, as 
filtered through the Enlightenment, which magnifies the individual human 
person as possessed of certain inalienable rights and properties that are 
God-given in an indelibly defining creaturely-Creator relationship.  The 
human being is imago Dei.  The political and ethical order is, thus 
surmounted by a metaphysical process-structure anchored in an order of 
truth reaching back to Moses and the prophets in Israel and to Plato 
Aristotle, and the Stoics in Hellas and Rome.  Not merely the rationalistic 
aspects of the American idea, as (say) proclaimed in the Declaration of 
Independence, but also its representative habits and customs or historicity 
partake of this general understanding of human existence:  its origin and 
destiny generally reflect this same vision of reality and truth.  The 
coherence and resilience of this vision that is representatively American 
                                                 
44 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist, ed. with an introduction by Jacob E. 
Cooke (Middletown:  Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 9. 
45 Kenneth L. Grasso, “The Transformation of American Pluralism,” in Robert P. Hunt and Kenneth L. 
Grasso, eds., John Courtney Murray and the American Civil Conversation (Grand Rapids:  William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company. 1992), 93—94. 
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and in significant degree merges with the universal vision of what it is to 
be a human being living in truth under God have shaped American civic 
consciousness.46 
 
 Unfortunately, the consensus that constitutes the homonoia of any given society in 
history, and American society in particular, is fragile to the degree that it is contingent 
upon human existence in history.   Walter Lippmann maintains,  
 
The cultural heritage which contains the whole structure and fabric of the 
good life is acquired.  It may be rejected.  It may be acquired badly.  It 
may not be acquired at all.  For we are not born with it.  If it is not 
transmitted from one generation to the next, it may be lost, indeed 
forgotten through a dark age, until somewhere and somehow men 
rediscover it, and, exploring the world again, recreate it anew. 
 The acquired culture is not transmitted in our genes, and so the 
issue is always in doubt.  The good life in the good society, though 
attainable, is never attained and possessed once and for all.  So what has 
been attained will again be lost if the wisdom of the good life in a good 
society is not transmitted.47 
 
The patrimony that is the shared consensus necessary for political life must be passed on 
generation by generation, and there is a widespread suspicion that this may in fact be the 
case in the American experiment in self-government with justice.  As Sandoz argues,  
 
like the frog placed in a pot of lukewarm water that didn’t notice the 
increase in heat until it was too late, we can react to our social 
deformations and diseases by not reacting or by denying there is anything 
really amiss.  After all, our traditions and institutions are wonderfully 
resilient and may, like youth itself, be immortal and indestructible.  Right?  
Wrong.  Free government is fragile and must be nurtured—by us.48 
 
                                                 
46 Ellis Sandoz, “The Crisis of Civic Consciousness:  Nihilism and Resistance,” in Ellis Sandoz, The 
Politics of Truth and Other Untimely Essays (Columbia:  University of Missouri Press, 1999), 127. 
47 Walter Lippman, The Public Philosophy (New York:  Mentor Books, 1956), 75. 
48 Sandoz, “The Crisis of Civic Consciousness,” 125. 
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 It is more than a little ironic that with the defeat of the Soviet Union and the 
proclamation that humanity had reached the “end of history” with the triumph of liberal 
democracy that those same democracies would become embroiled in the more intractable 
problem posed by the loss of meaning felt by their own constituencies.  However, it 
should come as no real surprise.  Harold R. Isaacs observed during the relative stability 
imposed by the Cold War that, “We are experiencing…not the shaping of new 
coherences but the world breaking into its bits and pieces, bursting like big and little stars 
from exploding galaxies, each one spinning off in its own centrifugal whirl, each one 
straining to hold its own small pieces from spinning off in their turn.”49   
What is remarkable about the American situation is the rapidity of the polarization 
that has occurred in the aftermath of the Soviet implosion.   Without the presence of a 
clearly definable “other” it is extremely problematic if there exists enough of a civic 
consciousness left in the Western democracies to stave off the disunity that lies at the 
heart of the malaise that seems to creep into the political life of democracy in the absent 
of an external threat.  The so-called “culture war” is merely an extension of the nihilism 
that seems to be final thread to be broken with the defeat of the totalitarianisms of the 
past. 
 If the way out of the current difficulty is to be found in the recovery of the 
experiences of order, then an examination of Voegelin’s contributions toward the 
understanding of Christian political order may serve a therapeutic function.  This is 
especially true if we accept Sandoz’s thesis regarding the roots of American order in the 
combination of an inherited tradition that embodies both classical and Christian elements 
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1975), 11. 
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that have somehow been driven from public discourse.   Ultimately, the foundations of 
republican democracy are rooted in an understanding of human nature that stems from 
the Christian understanding of what it means to be a human being, and an analysis of the 
changing perception of human nature in the experience of Christian political order is thus 
an ongoing enterprise that helps to revive the roots of American order and, since Jean 
Bethke Elshtain is undoubtedly correct in her assertion that the “trials and tribulations 
have a way of setting the agenda for other democratic societies,” the undertaking takes on 
a broader significance. 
The Relationship of the History of Political Ideas to the Later Works 
But even beyond the therapeutic implications of an analysis of Voegelin’s reflections on 
the problem of Christian political order, there are other reasons why an examination of 
the History is required. 
 To begin with there is its status as the “lost fragment” of Voegelin’s political 
thought.  While portions of the History have been edited and published by John H. 
Hallowell as From Enlightenment to Revolution50 the edition published as part of the 
Collected Works of Eric Voegelin completes the process and offers a full examination of 
the materials that would help to shape the thinking of the later Voegelin’s political 
thought.  David Walsh observes with regard to the History that while “it does not attain 
the analytic penetration of order that Voegelin achieved in Order and History,” it does 
provide “one of the best points of entry into the theoretical depth of the later Voegelin.  
Despite the author’s abrupt statement of discontinuity, of a break in his enterprise, it is a 
mistake to expect that this earlier effort comes from a very different mind.”  For this 
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reason, “far from being a discontinuous predecessor, History of Political Ideas is in 
fundamental continuity with Voegelin’s later work….”51  
 In addition to illuminating the work of the later Voegelin, the specific emphasis 
on the History is recommended by the insight offered by Sandoz and Thomas A. 
Hollweck in their “General Introduction to the Series.”  Sandoz and Hollweck argue, 
“Christianity is the one movement in history in which the evocative reality of cosmic 
analogy and the philosophical freedom of the person to contemplate this evocative reality 
entered into a union that achieved the greatest possible balance between the two.”52  If 
this is so, an examination of Voegelin’s analysis of the problem of Christian order would 
be a contribution to “how, past Nietzsche’s nihilism, we can regain reality without 
dogma.”53 
 Finally, an analysis of the History is recommended because of Voegelin’s 
particular conception of what constitutes a political “idea.”   In the sense of the history, 
the idea is the evocative element in the creation of political order.  It is through the 
attempt to realize the institution of the idea that communities and political societies come 
into being.  Furthermore, there is a relationship between the idea itself and the degree to 
which it can be realized in history.  This does raise the question between the idea as an 
evocation and the later Voegelin’s concern with the idea as the symbol of experience.  
However, in the context of the current work that distinction is relatively meaningless in 
that whereas the later Voegelin was primarily concerned with the revelation of order in 
history, the History of Political Ideas, especially in its consideration of the problems 
specifically related to Christian political order, is focused upon the sources of disorder. 
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53 Ibid.. 25. 
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The Plan of the Work 
In Voegelin’s account of Christian political order in the History of Political Ideas, the 
ultimate success of the Christian community, the substructure that would allow it to 
encompass the Western world is attributable to a series of “compromises” made by St. 
Paul very early in the life of the community.  However, it can also be said that Christian 
history, the decline from the maximal level of differentiation to the political ideologies 
and creeds of modernity, is the history of the failure of those compromises to sustain the 
community through time.  It is through the examination of the unraveling of these 
compromises that one can gain a greater appreciation of Christianity as the source of both 
the order and disorder that have come to characterize the existence of human beings in 
history. 
 Chapter two examines Voegelin’s discussion of the emergence of the Christian 
community as it appears in history.  As such, its primary focus will be upon the first 
volume of the History.  Voegelin’s analysis will be placed in the context of “historical 
Jesus” scholarship to be followed by a discussion of Voegelin’s methodological approach 
to the Gospel accounts of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus and Voegelin’s 
conclusions regarding the self-consciousness of Jesus from those accounts.  The chapter 
culminates with an examination of the “community substance” that actually constitutes 
the grounding of Christian order through the experience of faith and a discussion of St. 
Paul’s formulation of the constitution of the new community.  This includes the critical 
compromises made by Paul in light of the realities of the world into which Christianity 
emerged.  The history of Christian political order is largely connected to these 
compromises and their dissolution in the face of historical circumstances 
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 In chapter three, the analysis turns to the evocation of the sacrum imperium as the 
underlying rationale for the order of the medieval period.  In this regard, the historical 
construction of the imperial order will be examined in addition to the tensions that existed 
with regard to the division of temporal and spiritual power brought about by the Gelasian 
doctrine and its implications for political order.  Also a topic of analysis will be the 
association between the reformist impulse that consistently forms a part of the Christian 
experience and the role of the monastic orders as both a civilizing influence on the 
general society and as conduits for reform.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the transformation in the understanding of history that creates the conditions necessary 
for the end of the sacrum imperium itself.  
 Chapter four begins at the beginning in a metaphorical sense.  One of the primary 
obstacles to the vision of Saint Paul was the natural diversification of humanity.  This 
problem reappears in the latter half of the Middle Ages and extends through the 
Reformation into the Enlightenment.  As such, it will be the primary impetus that leads 
inexorably to the unleashing of the sectarian forces that ended the Catholic church’s 
monopoly as the representative institution of transcendent order.  Indeed, the church itself 
will help to create the conditions for its own undoing by adopting a reductionist 
epistemology and an increasing concern with being “in the world” to the neglect of 
remaining “not of the world.”  In this activity, the church committed suicide by adopting 
a position that was incapable of reforming from within which led to the Reformation 
without.     
 The concluding chapter will explore Voegelin’s treatment of Martin Luther and 
John Calvin in the context of the political, social, and religious convulsion of the Great 
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Reformation.  As part of this undertaking we will examine the implications of the 
spiritual forces released as a result of the Reformation and the transformative effect that it 
had upon the political and social existence of human beings.  In addition, we will 
examine the sectarian underpinnings that resulted in the general conflagration of the 
Great Reformation.  This will involve Voegelin’s discussion of modernity to be found 
especially in The New Science of Politics and Science, Politics, and Gnosticism, the two 
works that have the most direct bearing upon the discussion in the History.  Finally, we 
will recommend future lines of investigation to which the History might make significant 
contributions.   
Chapter Two:  Voegelin and the Emergence of the Christian Community 
 
Voegelin and the “Jesus of History” 
The closest that Voegelin ever came to exploring the “historical Jesus” was in the History 
of Political Ideas.   However, at the outset, Voegelin notes a problem that is particular to 
the understanding of the Jesus of history in that the Gospels, the first person accounts of 
the life of Jesus, are not “history” at all.  Voegelin observes, “The Gospels, and 
particularly the Gospel according to Saint Mark, which created the type, are admittedly 
not historical reports but belong to a class of literature that is generally called 
hagiographic—though it might be more cautious to rank the Gospels as a genus by itself.  
It does not seem particularly fruitful to treat a source of this type as if it were a work by 
Polybius or Tacitus.”  In other words, to treat the Gospels as if they represent a historical 
rendering of the events they recount is an exercise in missing the point.   As Voegelin 
maintains on the question of interpreting the Gospels: “I cannot see much sense in 
treating the Gospel text as if it were a stenographic report of events and sayings and to 
draw from the obvious contradictions concerning the point the conclusion that only one 
version can be the correct one” (HPI I, 152—53). 
 Indeed, the notion that the Gospels ought to be treated as accurate historical 
renderings of events is a relatively new phenomenon that has more to do with an 
ideological position than recognition of their purpose.  Furthermore, there is something to 
be said for Voegelin’s contention that they ought to be treated as a genre unto 
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themselves.1  Eusebius recounts Peter’s ministry and describes how the first Gospel came 
to be written: 
 
So brightly shone the light of true religion on the minds of Peter’s hearers 
that, not satisfied with a single hearing or with the oral teaching of the 
divine message, they resorted to appeals to every kind to induce Mark…as 
he was a follower of Peter, to leave them in writing a summary of the 
instruction they had received by word of mouth, nor did they let him go 
until they had persuaded him, and thus became responsible for the writing 
of what is known as the Gospel according to Mark.2  
 
If Eusebius’ account is correct, then the Gospels were intended to serve two purposes.  
First of all, they were intended to provide a record of the events to which they attest.  In 
other words they are a codification of oral history.  Secondly, the Gospels are theological 
tools to be used to spread the Christian message of “the good news.” 
 However, even if the Gospels are not first person accounts of events witnessed it 
would be a mistake to assume that one cannot gain insight into the personality of Jesus 
and his sense of mission through the Gospel accounts of his life, death and life after 
death.  The premise of “form criticism” was precisely this; that no insight into the life of 
Jesus was possible because they were a continuation of an oral tradition intended to 
literally proclaim the good news and to establish the doctrinal authority of the early 
church, not to describe the life of Christ.  As a result, “we can now know almost nothing 
concerning the life and personality of Jesus, since the early Christian sources show no 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Philip L. Shuler, “The Genre of the Gospels and the Two Gospel Hypothesis,” in E.P. 
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interest in either,” as Rudolf Bultmann put it in the introduction to his Jesus and the 
Word.3   The Gospels existed solely to promulgate the doctrines of the early Church 
communities. 
 The form school has an internal problem to be found in the form of the Gospels 
themselves, however.  If the intent was solely to proclaim the good news and establish 
the doctrinal authority of the community of the faithful, how can one account for the 
particular form of the medium chosen?  Geza Vermes notes: 
 
If the evangelists were primarily preoccupied with teaching Christian 
doctrine, how are we to explain their choice of biography as the medium?  
They cannot have been influenced by tradition; no Jewish convention 
exists that they sayings of the sages should be transmitted in this way…. 
 Again, if the raison d’être of the Gospels was to provide for the 
doctrinal needs of the churches, how are we to understand the insertion 
into them of sayings of Jesus, and attitudes of mind, which actually 
conflict with the essential teachings of primitive Christianity?  The 
evangelists note that Jesus made disparaging comments about Gentiles.  
They observe that he was apparently unwilling to allow his followers to 
announce him as the awaited Messiah.  Neither of these matters can have 
greatly suited the first promulgators of the Gospels, whose main task was 
to convince non-Jews of the truth that “Jesus is the Christ.” 
 It is consequently difficult to avoid concluding that if the 
evangelists chose to tell the story of Jesus’s life, it was because, whatever 
else they may have intended, they also wished to recount history, however 
unprofessionally.4 
                                                 
3 Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus and the Word, translated by Lousie Pettibone Smith and Erminie Huntress 
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John Bowden (Minneapolis:  Fortress Press, 1998), 1—15; Nihls Alstrup Dahl, “The Problem of the 
Historical Jesus,” Jesus the Christ:  The Historical Origins of Christological Doctrine, ed. Donald H. Juel 
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Thus, the form of the Gospels themselves gives evidence of a primitive historiography 
that the form school claimed was lacking. 
 One of the more interesting intellectual diversions of modern times, the search for 
the historic Jesus, has a long history.  As Charlotte Allen notes in The Human Christ, 
“During the first centuries of Christianity, the disputes among pagans, Jews, and 
Christians over the identity of Jesus had a curiously modern flavor.  Many of the 
objections that Jews and pagans raised about the believability of the Gospels were exactly 
the same as those voiced by many searchers for the historical Jesus today.”5  The 
distinctly “modern” debate, however, has its roots in Enlightenment rationalism that 
reached its apex in the publication of Albert Schweitzer’s Quest of the Historical Jesus in 
1906. 6  As Allen argues, 
 
Christianity’s oldest and most puzzling paradox is that of the crucified 
man who was celebrated in song as being “in the form of God.”…  
Throughout nearly 2,000 years of Christian history, his dual identity has 
been a source of mystery, meditation, theological investigation, and 
troubling inquiry.  In our own theoretically post-Christian age (at least in 
the industrialized West), Jesus is still the ur-icon of civilization, the 
enigmatic figure who continues to fascinate our imagination.  Because we 
live in an age when science and scholarly research is supposed to supply 
answers to all our questions, for the most part we are unwilling to accept 
such a paradox.  The search for the “historical” Jesus—the human being 
who walked the roads of Galilee 2,000 years ago—has thus become the 
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hallmark of modernity, an obsession that has gripped the minds of 
intellectuals for nearly three centuries.7 
 
 This may be a key to answering Niemeyer and Wilhelmsen’s questions regarding 
the lack of an “historical Jesus” in Voegelin’s later works.  Indeed, between the 
composition of the History of Political Ideas and his subsequent work on Order and 
History, Voegelin seemed to become hostile to the notion that there could be a 
meaningful discussion regarding the historicity of Jesus.  As Voegelin writes in The 
Ecumenic Age, “the debate about the ‘historicity of Christ’ is not concerned with a 
problem in reality; it rather is a symptom of the modern state of deculturation” (OH IV, 
265).   By deculturation, Voegelin was referring to the loss of openness to the experience 
of transcendence that lay at the core of Paul’s experience of the risen Christ that is the 
core of Voegelin’s exegesis of Paul in “The Pauline Vision of the Resurrected” in The 
Ecumenic Age. 
 In describing The Voegelinian Revolution, Ellis Sandoz argues that among the 
reasons for Voegelin’s “relative obscurity” is his “revolutionary originality.”  Voegelin, 
according to Sandoz, “is (in varying degrees) at odds with all schools of thought.  He 
does not fit any of the convenient intellectual pigeonholes.”  Furthermore, Sandoz notes 
that Voegelin “is a genuinely independent thinker.  His work is strikingly free of 
polemics, yet it clearly entails a rejection of all the dearest idols of the Cave of modern 
intellectuals here and abroad….”8 And the “search for the historic Jesus” has proven itself 
to be remarkable in its capacity to insinuate itself into the ideological and intellectual 
pigeonholes of the day.  As Allen observes: 
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Jesus scholarship has been shaped by nearly every intellectual fashion of 
the past three centuries:  English deism, Enlightenment rationalism, 
philosophical Idealism, Romanticism, Darwinism, existentialism, 
Marxism, and feminism.  The liberal Protestant outlook of the 19th 
Century, the “social gospel” of the early 20th century, the “God is Dead” 
movement of the 1960s, and the liberation theology of the 1970s and 
1980s have all cast long shadows on the search for Jesus.  In 1909, the 
Modernist Catholic theologian George Tyrell complained that the liberal 
German Bible scholars of his day had reconstructed a historical Jesus who 
was no more than “the reflection of a liberal Protestant face, at the bottom 
of a deep well.”  In other words, the liberal searchers had found a liberal 
Jesus.  The same can be said of Jesus-searchers of every era:  the deists 
found a deist, the Romantics a Romantic, the existentialists an 
existentialist, and the liberationists a Jesus of the class struggle.  
Supposedly equipped with the latest critical and historical tools, the 
“scientific” quest for the historical Jesus has nearly always devolved into 
theology, ideology, and even autobiography.9 
 
 Ultimately, however, the abandonment of the Jesus of history had more to do with 
the evolution of the purpose of Voegelin’s scholarship.  In Order and History, Voegelin’s 
purpose is to explore his theory of consciousness and lay out his philosophy of history.  
As such, it is an examination of the symbols of order in light of the experiences that 
produced them.  With this in mind, the symbols cannot be separated from the experiences 
themselves—that is the origin of the deformation of reality that occurs in history and 
culminates in the rise of ideological mass movements.  As Michael P. Morrissey points 
out, the “meaning” of the symbols 
 
is moored to their source of emergence:  the person who experienced, 
interpreted and understood the transcendent reality they objectified 
through their symbolic imagination.  That is why, instead of focusing on 
the historical Jesus, Voegelin concerns himself with the kerygmata of a 
Paul, a John, or a Matthew as providing the privileged, indeed the only, 
access to Christ.  The only “historical Jesus” we can know is the one 
known by the New Testament authors.  The event of the theotes coming 
into revelatory luminosity in Jesus and his disciples is the significant 
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reality behind the language that expresses the event.  There would be no 
Christ without those who pronounced the Christ and recognized the Christ 
in Jesus.  This event of the recognition and the symbolic representation of 
it cannot be separated.10 
 
 With that noted, however, the purpose of Voegelin in the History of Political 
Ideas is somewhat different.  Voegelin’s analysis of the Jesus of history in the History is 
undertaken not so much for the purpose of explaining his existence, but rather with an 
eye towards the community and the ideas that serve as the evocative underpinnings of 
that community as a result of Jesus’ existence.  Voegelin does make note of the historical 
Jesus research, citing Charles Guignebert’s Jesus as “the latest authoritative study.”11  
However, it is important to note that Voegelin does so within the context of lamenting the 
“Insufficiency of Critical Exegesis of the Gospels” (HPI I, 151).  
Guignebert concludes that Jesus lacked any sense of being the “messiah” and that 
his ministry on earth had failed to accomplish its end, which was to bring about the 
Kingdom of God on earth in a political sense.   Furthermore, Guignebert maintains that 
the visions of the resurrected Christ were a result of the enthusiasm of the apostles and 
were not reflective of a real event.  However, Voegelin finds Guignebert’s conclusions 
unsatisfactory.  Ultimately, Guignebert’s conclusions do little to explain “what in the 
personality of Jesus should have been the cause for the somewhat surprising effect on the 
disciples after his life had ended in a black failure” (HPI I, 152).  To do that would 
require a different way of approaching the Gospel accounts of Jesus’ life, death, and 
resurrection. 
                                                 
10 Morrissey, 233. 
11 Charles Guignebert, Jesus, trans. S.H. Hooke (London:  Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd, 1935). 
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Voegelin’s Approach to the Gospels 
Voegelin’s dissatisfaction with the critical exegesis of Gospel sources readily available 
stemmed from the seeming inability of the exegetes to explore “the religious personality 
and its effect on the disciples” (HPI I, 153).  The reason this is problematic in an analysis 
of the birth of the Christian community is because of Voegelin’s understanding that 
“(t)he constitution of the new community begins with the personality, the life, and the 
work of Jesus” (HPI I, 151).  Thus, any attempt to understand the community must be 
able to increase our understanding of these elements that contributed to its constitution.  
To this end, Voegelin proposes: 
 
To start with the assumption that the Gospel of the Markian type reflects 
the personality of Jesus, his life and work, though the details may be 
historically incorrect.  We may agree that every single miracle report is 
untrustworthy and still understand the report as a whole as substantially 
reflecting the healing work of the Savior; we may agree that the parables 
and dialogue scenes have little chance of reporting correctly the 
pronouncements of Jesus and still be sure that he expressed himself in 
parables in general and that the parables as reported reflect the essential 
features of his teaching; we may doubt the report of the baptism by John 
and still be sure that at some point in his life the experience must have 
occurred that started him on his life; and we may doubt the report on the 
temptation and still assume the existence of the problem of temptation in 
his life (HPI I, 153). 
 
This method of interpretation, of course, places Voegelin squarely at odds with the 
predominate school of thought at the time that he wrote the early chapters on Christianity 
in the History of Political Ideas.  In the approach adopted to the critical analysis of the 
Gospels, Voegelin was again swimming against the tide of what was perceived as the 
current trend in popular scholarship. 
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 The crucial element in understanding Jesus’ personality, a question raised 
repeatedly in historical Jesus research, was the question of Jesus’ perception of himself as 
the Messiah.  Voegelin describes “the question of the self-consciousness of Jesus as the 
Messiah” as the “most important question” in the exploration of Jesus’ personality.  But 
coupled with this assertion is the observation that “it borders on the comic to see a 
distinguished scholar pointing the revolver of logical consistency at the Gospel and 
demanding that the author make up his mind whether Jesus said that he was the Messiah 
or not” (HPI I, 153).  However, the situation that confronted Voegelin is further 
complicated by the fact that the general category of the Messianic consciousness and 
Jesus’ self-consciousness in particular is a preoccupation that is peculiarly related to 
historical Jesus research. 
The Messiah and the Self-Consciousness of Jesus 
William Scott Green notes “the messiah as a subject of academic study derives not from 
ancient Jewish preoccupation, but from early Christian work-choice, theology and 
apologetics.”  At issue are the twin efforts by the authors of the New Testament to both 
name and describe Jesus in messianic terms.  The first is represented by the use of the 
term “christos,” the Greek translation of the Hebrew word “masshiah” as a proper 
surname for Jesus of Nazareth.  The second, “the major achievement of the New 
Testament apologetics,” is the transformation of the Hebrew scripture “into a harbinger” 
of the “career, suffering, and death” of Jesus.12 Instead, Green argues, the relative scarcity 
of the use of the Hebrew noun masshiah in the extant texts would seem to argue against 
                                                 
12 William Scott Green, “Messiah in Judaism:  Rethinking the Question,” in Judaisms and Their Messiahs 
at the Turn of the Christian Era, Jacob Neusner, William Scott Greed, and Ernest S. Friechs, eds. 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1987), 4. 
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the notion of a messiah figure as an evocative category in the political and social situation 
confronting the people of Israel.   
The problem with Green’s argument, however, is that it contains its own 
contradiction.  If the terms christos and masshiah were without meaningful content, why 
were they chosen?  Furthermore, if the Israelitic notion of the “messiah” was not 
categorical in some way, how does one explain the messianic movements prevalent 
throughout Palestine in the century before and the century after Christ?13  As Richard A. 
Horsley and John S. Hanson point out,  
 
The scarcity of the term messiah in the Jewish literature of the time does 
not mean…that there was no expectation whatever of an anointed royal 
leader.  At certain levels of Jewish society, there was indeed some 
anticipation of a kingly agent inspired by God to bring deliverance to the 
people.  Besides the infrequently attested messiah, there were other images 
that expressed this particular tradition of expectation, the most prominent 
of which was a Davidic king.14 
 
 The notions of messianic expectation and the emergence of a Davidic king-like 
figure are relatively late developments in the Judaism in the centuries before the birth of 
Jesus.  In the original development of Jewish eschatological expectation the covenant 
between God and Israel would have resulted in the direct rule of God over his people—if 
the people abided by the law.   This oriented Israel toward expectation to the future since 
it clearly had not been realized in the present.  As Emil Schürer points out in his The 
History of the Jewish People in the Time of Christ: 
 
(I)t was…expected that Israel’s faithfulness would be suitably rewarded in 
the life of both the nation and the individual.  Yet it was obvious that in 
                                                 
13 See Richard A. Horsley and John S. Hanson, Bandits, Prophets, and Messiahs:  Popular Movements in 
the Time of Jesus (Minneapolis:  Winston Press, 1985).  
14 Horsley and Hanson, 93. 
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actual experience the reward came neither to the people as a whole, nor to 
individuals in the proportion anticipated.  Accordingly, the more deeply 
this awareness penetrated into the mind of the nation and of the individual, 
the more they were forced to turn their eyes to the future; and of course, 
the worse their present state, the more lively their hope.  It may therefore 
be said that in later eras religious consciousness was concentrated upon 
hope for the future.  A perfect age to come was the goal to which all other 
religious ideas were teleologically related.  As the conduct of the Israelite 
was essentially observance of the Torah, so his faith was centered on 
awaiting God’s kingdom.15 
 
However, in the historical development of the nation, the conception of the social 
organization of a chosen people under God was transformed by the external pressure of 
other peoples and nations upon Israel.  Voegelin notes that the constitution of the people 
of Israel as a religious order under God took place at a time in Israel’s history and in “an 
environment of nomads where the tribal and clan organizations were in flux” (HPI I, 111) 
and that the initial constitution formed by the first berith between God and Israel placed 
God as the head of his united people in what Martin Buber has called a “theo-political” 
act.16  Ultimately, the development of an eschatological outlook on history was, to some 
degree, contained in the notion of the initial covenant between God and Israel and the 
experience of the Exodus that culminated in the events at Mount Sinai recounted in 
Exodus 19.  As G.R. Beasley-Murray observes:   
 
Israel’s unique achievement of an eschatology in relation to history was 
conditioned by the uniqueness of the revelation it experienced, the 
covenant into which it entered, and the history in which it was set and to 
which the whole complex gave rise.  From the events at Sinai onward, the 
tribes were a group on the march under Yahweh; they were on the way to 
a new life in a new land, to a future that was in the hands of the Lord.17 
                                                 
15 Emil Schürer, The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ, Vol. II, rev. and ed. Geza 
Vermes and Gergus Millar (Edinburgh:  T & T Clark, 1979), 492.        
16 Martin Buber, The Kingship of God (New York:  Harper and Row, 1967), 24. 
17 G.R. Beasley Murray, Jesus and the Kingdom of God (Grand Rapids:  William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Co., 1986), 18—19. 
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Despite the uniqueness of the revelation it received and the covenant into which it 
entered, the exigencies of Israel’s political and social existence required a social 
organization more in keeping with the political organization of the rival power centers 
that threatened Israel.  As a result, Israel cried out for a king “like the other nations” 
despite Samuel’s warnings that such an institution would cause God to turn away from 
his people (1 Sam. 4—21).   
The institution of the Israelitic monarchy was a violation of the original covenant 
by which Israel was created and led to the rise of the prophets who challenged Israel to 
fulfill its share of the bargain so as to reap the rewards promised.  The import of 
prophetic utterances moves through successive stages to reach its culmination in Ezekiel 
(36:26—27) and Jeremiah (31:31—34) and the promise of a “new covenant” to be 
“written on the hearts” of the people of Israel.  However, the institution of the kingship 
made two new formulations possible:  Instead of God acting to redeem Israel, a king of 
Davidic origin might be the agent of supernatural transformation.  In contradistinction to 
that, however, there also arises, from the peasant countryside, the notion of “of a leader 
riding on an ass as did the charismatic war leaders of the pre-royal time (Deborah song, 
Judg. 5:10)” (HPI I, 109—16). 
 As a result of these conflicting images, there emerged what Voegelin describes as 
“the profound confusion of eschatological sentiments.”  This situation was further 
exacerbated by the seemingly endless series of debasement and defeat suffered by Israel.  
To be sure, Israel had violated its obligation under the original contract, and because of 
that Israel had been, and was being, punished through its subjections to the other nations 
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and would ultimately emerge victorious as God’s chosen.  However, as disaster piled on 
disaster “it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain this position.”  The reason is clear:  
“the sinfulness of Israel, however great it may be, is not greater than that of other nations, 
and, furthermore, what can be the meaning of being God’s chosen people if the result of 
the choice is endless abasement.”  It was against this backdrop of abasement, “out of the 
immense faith” of the people of Israel and their “equally profound despair” that “one of 
the greatest creations of mankind…the Suffering Servant of the Lord,” emerges  
(HPI I, 116—17). 
 It is no wonder that given the confusion of sentiments the symbol of the Suffering 
Servant is notoriously difficult to explicate.  From Voegelin’s perspective, there is 
something of a synthesis between the idea of the people as an instrument of redemption 
and the appearance of a savior who will lead them to it.  Voegelin maintains that the 
image of the Suffering Servant acted upon the Israelitic mind to explain the intense 
suffering endured by Israel.  In the Servant Songs, the suffering of Israel is made the 
catalyst by which not just Israel, but potentially all of humanity may experience the 
redemption of God.   Voegelin argues that the “the disproportionate suffering” of Israel 
“makes sense…only in a world plan in which the suffering becomes the means of 
redemption fro the whole world.  Under these conditions the faith can be maintained, the 
suffering can become bearable, and the identity of the people…can be preserved with the 
utmost tenacity” (HPI I, 118).  It is through the Suffering Servant that Israel is elevated to 
the status of world redeemer, and the complex of symbols emerges that will be used to 
demonstrate to the world that Jesus was the fulfillment of the promise. 
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 The image of the Suffering Servant “is still deeply embedded in the particular 
Israelitic experiences and sorrows,” however, “the image of the future Savior appears 
lucidly before the background of anguish.”  Voegelin notes the parallel quotations from 
Psalm 22 and Mark 15:34, “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” And 
describes it from the cross not as “an utterance of ultimate despair, but, as a quotation 
from Psalm 22,” and as such “a self interpretation and identification with the symbol of 
the Suffering Servant” (HPI I, 119).  But this does not really answer the question 
regarding the self-consciousness of Jesus as the Messiah under the methodology 
employed by Voegelin.   Voegelin’s own answer to the question Jesus’ self-
consciousness as the Messiah is cryptic: 
 
If we take…the Gospels as the reflection of religious processes, it seems 
clear that the Messiah consciousness did not appear at any definite time in 
the life of Jesus, but that it was an experience that could become stronger 
at times, and at times be weakened.  We may assume that the 
preoccupation with his quality as the Messiah was increasing toward the 
end of his public life when believers more strongly and in greater numbers 
responded to him as the Messiah; but to the end, to the prayer in 
Gethsemane…we feel the tension between the messianic and 
nonmessianic personality in Jesus:  he, as the man, submits to the 
possibility of being the Messiah (HPI I, 162—63). 
 
 Yet even if there was vacillation between the messianic and nonmessianic 
elements of Jesus’ personality, there can be no doubt that the messianic consciousness 
had grown beyond the images of the Messiah as a war leader who would crush those who 
had oppressed and inflicted suffering upon Israel.  Voegelin notes that Jesus’ teaching 
“had far outgrown the cruder form of the turning of the tables; his realm was not of this 
world.  If he was the Messiah, his fate differed widely from the images of victorious royal 
glory and resembled rather the Suffering Servant of Isaiah” (HPI I, 163).  Indeed, this 
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simple fact explains the effectiveness of Isaiah as a justification and explanation of Jesus 
as the Christ.  Furthermore, this parallel would have been appealing given the apparent 
prominence of Isaiah in rabbinic Judaism in the century preceding Jesus’ birth.18  
Mana, Metanoia, Spirit and Faith:  The Community Substance 
In examining the personality of Jesus and the community that grew up around him, 
Voegelin focuses upon events recounted in Mark 5:25—35.   As Jesus is moving through 
a large crowd, woman, suffering from hemorrhaging reaches out to simply touch his 
cloak because she believed she would be healed.  Upon touching Jesus’ cloak, 
“Immediately her bleeding stopped and she felt in her body that she was free from 
suffering” (Mk 5:29).  Jesus stops and turns because he feels that some power has gone 
out of him.  Voegelin notes:  “The historicity of the incident is irrelevant; what matters is 
the conception of the healing process.  Jesus is possessed of a mana that he can 
communicate to other person.” However, in order for that communication to occur, there 
has to be a reciprocal relationship between the mana of Jesus and the faith of the believer.  
“The metanoia, the turning, the healing, the state of faith had to spring from the soul 
forces of the individual; there is no sign that Jesus ever attempted to heal or convert 
persons who did not respond to his call” (HPI I, 154).  Thus in life, Jesus created the 
conditions for the emergence of a new community based on faith, but it was to a faith that 
emerged in response to the call. 
 The mana of Jesus is the potential for the realization of a new community to the 
degree that, as Voegelin writes, “The mana of Jesus and the faith of the believer are 
corresponding personality elements that can communicate with each other and thus 
                                                 
18 On the prominence of Isaiah see John F.A. Sawyer, “Isaiah and Christian Origins,” in The Fifth Gospel:  
Isaiah in the History of Christianity (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1995), 21—41; and Bruce 
Chilton, A Galilean Rabbi and His Bible:  Jesus’ Own Interpretation of Isaiah (London:  SPCK, 1984). 
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constitute a kind of community substance.  This interaction between Jesus and the faithful 
is the closest we can come through our sources to the constitution of the Christian 
community as a divine and at the same time historically active substance” (HPI I, 155).  
In the descriptive passage, however, it is important to note that the community as it exists 
under the dynamic interaction of the mana of Jesus is a community between Jesus and 
those who follow him.  The distinctly Christian community does not emerge until the 
death of Jesus and the visions of the resurrected Christ among individuals and groups of 
people who had followed Jesus the man. 
 In the emergence of the new Christian community, it was the death and 
resurrection that constituted the true birth of the new community.  As Voegelin notes, 
“The visions of the disciples in the days after the death of Jesus are the fundamental 
evocative acts of the Christian community” (HPI I, 163).  It is the death and resurrection 
of Jesus, and the witnesses of the risen Christ who testified to the occurrence, that 
transform the potential for a new community of faith into the reality through the 
evocation of the visions.  Voegelin argues,  
 
In order to understand properly the function of the visions, we have to 
imagine the main alternatives.  If Jesus had been the Messiah according to 
the older Israelitic tradition, his death would have been proof of his 
failure, and the community of his followers would probably have been 
dispersed.  If he had been no more than a prophet, he could still have 
become the founder of a religion comparable to Buddhism.  If his life and 
death had fallen under the sway of Hellenic or Roman religious forms to a 
larger extent than it did, he could have become a cult deity.  None of these 
possibilities was realized.  There developed, instead, the unique 
phenomenon of a community under the leadership of a historical 
personality who at the same time was a manifestation of God, so that the 
community of believers with the man Jesus could be continued after his 
death with the living divine personality of Christ.  The Spirit of the 
Resurrected (Gk. Pneuma) took as the community substance the place of 
the mana (the dynamis) of the living Jesus.  The precondition for this 
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community of believers with the living God was the visionary conviction 
of his personal presence (HPI I, 164). 
 
While “Jesus the man” may have died on the cross, “Christ lives, and under the guidance 
of his spirit the community continues to exist as it did when he was present in flesh”  
(HPI I, 165). 
 However, while the new community is constituted by the Descent of the Spirit at 
Pentecost (Acts 2), the individual becomes a member of the community by responding to 
the call through faith.  The faith in Jesus the man is transformed into faith in the risen 
Christ.  The essence of faith in the Hebrew tradition had been oriented to the “god of 
history leading his people to supreme victory” (HPI I, 113).  With the Descent of the 
Spirit, the element of faith is transformed into the means by which metanoia itself is 
achieved, and the individuals who experience it are taken into the community of Christ as 
described in the Epistle to the Hebrews.  As Voegelin writes: 
 
The image of the indwelling of Christ, the priest, in the house of his 
community receives conceptual precision through the doctrine of faith.  
“Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not 
seen” (Heb. 11:1);  Faith is not a subjective attitude of the individual, a 
belief, but the community substance itself, created by the appearance of 
Jesus….  The awakening of the faith and the consequent partaking of the 
Holy Ghost are, therefore, not an intellectual process but a transformation 
of the whole personality, the process by which man is integrated into the 
community substance….  The community is imagined as a field in which 
“power” circulates; faith is the process through which a man becomes a 
unit in this field, permeable for the circulating power substance  
(HPI I, 167). 
 
However, as was the case with the hemorrhagic woman of Mark, the awakening of the 
faith requires the conscious desire of each individual human being who would take part in 
the community. 
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A Community for Human Existence:  The Pauline Compromises 
The Christian community might have remained confined as an obscure sect of Judaism in 
the Near East but for the genius of Paul and his capacity to conceive of an overarching 
community of faith that would be cognizant of the inherent weaknesses of human nature, 
the natural gifts of man, and the realities of the world.  In the Epistle to the Hebrews, the 
author, who was either Paul himself or a member his circle—the authorship of the letter 
is a matter of some debate–notes that because Jesus “himself suffered when he was 
tempted, he is able to help those who are being tempted” (3:18).  Paul understood the 
nature of human being as a fallen one that only the grace of God could redeem from his 
own experience.   
 
I have the desire to do what is good, but I cannot carry it out.  For what I 
do is not the good I want to do; no, the evil I do not want to do—this I 
keep on doing….   
When I want to do good, evil is right there with me.  For in my 
inner being I delight in God’s law; but I see another law at work in the 
members of my body, waging war against the law of my mind and making 
me a prisoner of the law of sin at work in my members.  What a wretched 
man I am!  Who will rescue me from this body of death?  Thanks be to 
God—through Jesus Christ our Lord. 
So then, I myself in my mind am a slave to God’s law, but in the 
sinful nature a slave to the law of sin (Rom. 7:18—25). 
 
 This understanding of the spiritual anthropology of human beings in which the 
passions, “the law of sin at work in my members,” predominates, conditions Paul’s 
speculations regarding the essence of the new community that would both be a fit 
repository for the spirit of Christ as well as practical to the existence of human beings in 
their lives.  As Voegelin notes:   
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The greatness of Paul lies in his quality as a statesman that enables him to 
fill in the abstractions of Hebrews, and to transpose the community of the 
perfect with Christ into an idea that took into account the practical 
problems of a community that did not all consist of perfect saints.  The 
Epistles of Paul present the momentous step from radical perfectionism to 
the compromise with the realities of the Christian community in its 
environment.  From Hebrews the path could have led to a small 
community of saints; Paul opens the way to imperial expansion, the way 
to Rome (HPI I, 169). 
 
These “compromises” with the realities of the world would create the conditions by 
which the followers of an itinerant rabbi could claim the Western world.  Voegelin 
argues, “The main function of Christianity, as far as its rise belongs in the history of 
political evocations, was the creation of a new community substance that would be 
grafted, with varying degrees of success, first on the population basis of the Roman 
empire, and later on the tribes of the Great Migration” (HPI I, 150).   
This was only possible because of a series of compromises made by Paul in the 
nascent days of Christianity.  Voegelin identifies five compromises made by Paul which 
consisted of a compromise with history, a compromise with the weakness of human 
beings as realized in the differences of gifts that accrue to the members of the mystical 
body of Christ, the addition of the law of love to the codified law of the Old Testament, 
the eschatological indifference to social problems, and the compromise with authority by 
the acceptance of governmental authority as being ordained by God.  However, the 
present study will collapse these compromises into three major compromises which tend 
to subsume the others.  The eschatological indifference to social problems may be 
considered as part of Paul’s compromise with authority.  At the same time, the addition 
of the law of love is directly related to the compromise with history.  Thus, the three 
major headings of the compromises of Paul would be:  the historical horizon, the body of 
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Christ, and the powers that be.  It is to the historical horizon that we first turn in our 
analysis. 
Historical Horizon 
The first compromise made by Paul and identified by Voegelin is a “compromise with 
history.”  This particular compromise deals specifically with the world and among the 
peoples in which Christianity emerged.  The compromise with history consisted of 
identifying Christianity with the social world that gave it birth, identifying the three 
realms of the pagan, the Israelitic, and the Christian.   Subsumed in the limitation Paul 
imposes on human history by civilizational and geographical construction are the two 
ideas of history as having a direction, as in the case of the Israelitic experience, and the 
periodization of history into epochs. 
 The second idea, strictly speaking, is also based in the experience of the people of 
Israel, to the degree that it is in the book of Daniel that the myth of the metal ages first 
seen in Hesiod finds its place in the speculation upon the experience of Israel as a 
conquered people being tossed about by a succession of empires.  In interpreting the 
dream of Nebuchadnezzar, Daniel describes a succession of empires in which the fourth 
will be “the kingdom that will never be destroyed, nor will it be left to another people.  It 
will crush all those kingdoms and bring them to an end , but it will itself endure forever” 
(4:31—45).  This construction of history into epochs with an eschatological direction is 
an important element in understanding the historical understanding that underlies the 
emergence of the Christian community.19 
 With the eschatological understanding of Israel and the periodization of history, 
the new Christian community was understood by Paul and the first Christians was seen as 
                                                 
19 See HPI I, 121—22. 
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the beginning of a new age.  As Voegelin writes, “The new community between Christ 
and the faithful is not just any community that now enters the scene of history, but it is 
the realm of the new epoch.  The epochal consciousness is fully developed:  the 
appearance of Christ is the dividing line of world history” (HPI I, 168).   Thus history is 
now conceived of in terms of past, present and future with the decisive event in the center 
of history that imbues it with meaning.  History becomes the drama of salvation.  Karl 
Löwith observes that “the articulation of all historical time into past, present, and future 
reflects the temporal structure of the history of salvation.  The past points to the first 
things, the future to the last things, and the present to a central presence which connects 
the past with the future through teleological succession.”20  And for the Christian, that 
“central presence” is the Spirit of Christ   Voegelin writes: 
 
The idea of Hebrews evisages the aeon of Christ as the ultimate fulfillment 
of history and the preceding period as a preparation in accordance with the 
plan of God.  The existence of mankind in time has from now on the 
meaning that we properly call history because God is the divine partner in 
the process that unfolds according to his providence (HPI I, 168—69). 
 
 But, of course, with the realization of the eschatological reality of the kingdom of 
God in Christ, the eschatological notions that served as the backdrop for the appearance 
of the Messiah were also transformed.  In the Pauline vision of the resurrected Christ, the 
eschatological idea of the coming Messiah created the possibility for the development of 
an apocalyptic understanding of the kingdom of God.  “The eschatological expectation of 
the kingdom had implied that the Messiah would appear at a given point of time in the 
near future and replace the world order by the kingdom of God.”  Since, from the 
perspective of Paul and the Christian community, the Messiah has in fact appeared, a new 
                                                 
20 Karl Löwith, Meaning in History (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1949), 185. 
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understanding of the kingdom itself was necessary.  “The apocalyptic idea implies that 
the Messiah has appeared and that his realm is actually established as the community 
between him, the Resurrected and his believers.” Voegelin maintains that the 
“eschatological sentiment has not disappeared completely by any means, but the 
apocalyptic sentiment, the belief in the revealed community, is growing and finally 
overshadows the expectation of the end in the main line of Christian evolution”  
(HPI I, 166).   
However, contained within the apocalyptic idea is a danger in the fact that the 
revealed community between Christ and the faithful may not live up to the expectations 
of those who experience it.  This, combined with the fact that the eschatological 
understanding of history remains present in the background, would prove extremely 
problematic.  This is especially true in light of the fact that the Christian community had 
now embarked upon a period of waiting for the second appearance of the Savior to gather 
his flock to him.  The belief in the revealed community helps make possible the 
unification of humanity under God, but it also carries with it the potential for difficulties 
that can be a source of disturbance and disorder into the future.   The problem is that 
“Christian existence is set between an accomplished redemption and an awaited 
consummation, and it involves dependence on the grace of the Lord who has come, is 
present and is to come.”21  Or as Löwith remarks: 
 
Invisibly, history has fundamentally changed; visibly it is still the same, 
for the Kingdom of God is already at hand, and yet, as an eschaton, still to 
come.  This ambiguity is essential to all history after Christ:  the time is 
already fulfilled and not yet consummated.  The Christian times between 
Christ’s resurrection and his reappearance are definitely the last times (I 
John 2:18; Matt. 12:28); but, as long as they last, they are penultimate 
                                                 
21 Murray, 22. 
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times before the completion of the present, though hidden Kingdom of 
Christ in the manifest Kingdom of God beyond historical times.  On 
account of this profound ambiguity of the historical fulfillment where 
everything is “already” what it is “not yet,” the Christian believer lives in 
a radical tension between present and future.22 
 
Christ may have “laid open to us both past and present history, and has given us an 
anticipatory taste of the future as well,”23 according to Barnabas, but for human beings in 
their immanent lives while the end of history may be known, the process of history itself 
is still a mystery. 
Closely related to the “compromise with history” is the adoption of “the law of 
love” into the community of the faithful by Paul in Romans 13:8—10.  In accomplishing 
the compromise with history, Paul had created the historical horizon by the recognition of 
the civilizational orders with which he was familiar.  The laws of Israel and the new law 
of Christ “were insufficient as an empirical pattern of civilization.”  To overcome this 
difficulty, Paul “retains the epochal function of the appearance of the Messiah but he 
adds to the Israelitic law a natural law, a law of the gentiles.  God has revealed himself to 
the gentiles through his creation (Rom. 1:19—20), to Israel through the written law, and 
now to mankind through the pneumatic law of Christ that is engraved in the hearts of the 
believers through their faith” (HPI I, 170).    
As for the social rules to govern the new community, Paul was, in Voegelin’s 
words, “strongly traditional,” by which he means that Paul imports the written laws of 
Israel as the social code to be followed (HPI I, 171; Rom 13:9—10).  This was of 
                                                 
22 Löwith, 188.  See also R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (London:  Oxford University Press,  
1956), 46—49. 
23 “The Epistle of Barnabas,” in Early Christian Writings:  The Apostolic Fathers, translated by Maxwell 
Staniforth, revised translation, introductions and new editorial material by Andrew Louth (London:  
Penguin Books, 1968), 159. 
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immense significance in the organization of the first Christian communities.  Having the 
“character of divine law” the social codes of Israel “were received by the Christian 
community and Christianity was thereby saved from becoming just one of many similar 
Hellenistic mystery cults.  Possessing the complete Israelitic law was the most important 
asset of the Church when it had to face the task of ordering social life in the Roman 
empire” (HPI I, 113).  Important as well was the content of the law regarding the 
treatment of the poor and the dispossessed within the society.  This was especially true 
with regard to the creation of the corpus mysticum. 
The Body of Christ 
The second compromise made by Paul is specifically with the weaknesses of human 
nature brought on by humanity’s fallen condition.  Voegelin notes that “(t)he renovation 
of the personality in the Spirit of Christ would in most cases not be so radical that 
frequent lapses would not occur.”  For this reason, “a natural hierarchy” would exist 
within the Christian community “of higher and lower degrees of perfection that expresses 
itself in a social stratification into apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, and teachers 
whose function is ‘the perfecting of the saints…till we all come in the unity of faith, and 
of the knowledge of the Song of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature 
of the fullness of Christ’ (Eph. 4:11—13)” (HPI I, 170). 
 But despite the stratification of the society, there is a unity of the Spirit that 
transforms individuals into integral parts of the new spiritual body of Christ.  Voegelin 
notes that “Chapter 12 of 1 Corinthians elaborates the idea of the body of Christ in which 
every personality type has its function, the types complementing each other as the 
members of the body; the unity between them is constituted by the Spirit by which they 
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have been baptized.” Baptism is thus the symbolic representation of the Descent of the 
Spirit and delivers the baptized individual “into the corpus mysticum of which Christ is 
the head” (HPI I, 170).   
 This organic construction of the whole of the Christian community is important to 
the expansion of Christianity and its transformation into the political rationale for the 
imperial order and the Church as an institution.  In Race and State, Voegelin argues, “the 
idea of the kingdom and body of Christ as it was articulated by Paul and his circle 
expanded in the course of Christian history into the idea of the spiritual-worldly empire.”   
However, Voegelin goes on to note, “The idea of the corpus mysticum did not spring 
entirely new from the ideas of Paul; the ground had been prepared by the Hellenistic idea 
of the heavenly person and his embodiment in the cosmos, and especially by the doctrine 
of the second Adam” (RS, 132).  The Hellenistic idea proceeds from the Stoic perception 
of the apospasma, the piece of the divine logos that pervades the cosmos as the 
equivalent of the human soul naked before God. 
 In defining Christ as “the second Adam,” Paul was calling upon both the 
traditions of Israel and the spiritual anthropology that served as the basis for his 
understanding of the reborn community.  In the case of the traditions of Israel, of course, 
Adam as the first man is the father of humanity.  The symbolism of Paul in I Corinthians 
15:45—49 spiritualizes that condition to make Christ “the spiritual father of the reborn 
Christian personality” (HPI I, 170—71).  With regard to the second, since human beings 
participate in existence with their entire beings, body and soul, the relationship to Adam, 
the relationship by blood, has an appeal.  As Voegelin notes, “The idea of the corpus 
mysticum…does not entirely relinquish its grounding in the animal world—without the 
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resonating image of a second Adam, of a second man as the ancestor of a new humanity, 
it would hardly have attained as strong a response” (RS, 138). 
 In addition to the Hellenistic and Adamic elements, however, the traditions of 
Israel provided a background for the Christian use of the organic symbol.  Although 
Voegelin himself does not make the linkage between sections of the History, in his 
commentary on Israel he points to the berith  by which David is installed as the king of 
Israel and the people of Israel gather together to proclaim that “we are thy bone and thy 
flesh” (1 Sam. 5:1; 1 Chron. 11:1).   Voegelin comments, “The organic symbolism 
indicates the idea of a mystical body that is created through the choice of a head for the 
bone and the flesh.  The berith, instituting a king, is the act that creates the permanent 
historical personality of the people” (HPI I, 111).   
 The compromise with the weaknesses of human beings, in addition to providing 
the impetus for the creation of a spiritual-worldy empire, also provided something else.  
In adopting the organic symbolism of the body, Paul had helped to illuminate the 
perception of the spiritual equality of human beings before God.  The social stratification 
is not reflective of greater or lesser worth on the part of the individuals involved, but 
rather a reflection of the spiritual gifts that are measured out according to the dictates of 
divine providence.  Within the community, these gifts are to be used for the benefit and 
expansion of the Christian community of the faithful, but before God and Christ each 
member of the community has value and worth.  This is a profound sentiment that, as the 
community of faith expanded into the imperial sphere, would have profound implications 
in the development of ethics, politics, and social structures and conventions. 
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The Powers That Be 
The relationship between the Christian community and governmental authority was very 
simply defined by Paul in Romans 13:1–2:  “Let every person be subject to the governing 
authorities.   For there is no authority except from God and those that exist have been 
instituted by God.  Therefore he who resists the authorities resists what God has 
appointed and those who resist will incur judgment.  For rulers are not a terror to good 
conduct but to bad.”  The purpose of government is to maintain the peace and “to wield 
the power of the sword against evildoers; resistance against the government would be 
resistance to God.”  Voegelin argues that this relationship “is…determined not by a rule 
that envisages a permanent establishment, but as a provisional arrangement that is 
necessitated by the coexistence of the invisible realm with the world until, with the 
second coming of Christ, the tension between the two is resolved into the visible 
supernatural glory of the kingdom of God” (HPI I, 172).   
 As a provisional arrangement it was one that may have been necessary given the 
emergence of the Christian community in a Roman province, the antipathy of the Jewish 
communities, and its expansion into the pagan world beyond that included Rome.  In 
Acts 18: 23—40 the story is told of a riot that is narrowly averted when a silversmith who 
made icons of the goddess Artemis rallied his workmen and other artisans against the 
Christians in Ephesus because they might be bad for business.  In Rome itself, the 
destination of the Pauline epistle, the various Jewish communities there had already been 
restricted by the law on congregations from forming any sort of community beyond the 
individual synagogues.  As for Christians themselves, Ernst Bammel argues, “Oriental 
cults, while permitted with great liberality outside the urbs, still came under the critical 
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eye of the city prefect within Rome during the early principate and could only hope to be 
tolerated if their loyalty and good behavior was beyond question.”24   Thus the letter of 
Paul may have been a defensive one intended to establish the fact that Christianity did not 
represent a threat to the established order.  
 The idea that all government is ordained by God is not new with Paul or the 
experience of the Christian community.  In interpreting the “handwriting on the wall” for 
King Belshazzar, son of Nebuchanezzar, the prophet Daniel notes “that the most high 
God rules the kingdom of men, and sets over it whom he will” (5:21).  So Paul’s dictum 
in Romans 13 is a continuation of the prophetic tradition that defined human existence in 
the world as existence under God.  Since God rules all, all that rule must be ordained of 
God. 
 However, it would be a mistake to conflate the existence of the governmental 
authorities as being ordained of God into the conception that it was representative of the 
community of the faithful.  The Pauline theory of the charismata, of the mystical body of 
Christ, extended to the community of the faithful as distinct from the political community 
proper.  As Voegelin notes in a footnote:  “The exousia, the governmental authority is 
‘ordained’ by God, but it is not permeated by the heavenly dynamis; the magistrate is not 
a member of the mystical body” (HPI I, 172n15).  The expansion of the charismata to 
include the temporal ruler does not occur until the conceptual framework provided by the 
polis is done away with as a result of the Germanic migrations and the formulation of the 
Gelasian formula regarding the specific functions exercised by the temporal and spiritual 
                                                 
24 Ernst Bammel, “Romans 13,” in Ernst Bammel and C.F.D. Moule, eds., Jesus and the Politics of His 
Day (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1984), 367—68.   
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authorities and the relationship of those authorities to the person of Christ as “the priest-
king” (HPI II, 62—63).  
Obstacles to Metanoia and the Social Order 
Closely tied to the compromise with the power of political authorities is what Voegelin 
calls “Eschatological Indifference to Social Problems.”  And this, in turn is related to the 
primary social teaching associated with Jesus in the great sermons recounted in Luke 
6:17—49 and Matt. 5—7; the Sermon on the Plain and the Sermon on the Mount.  
Voegelin presents the arguments of the respective sermons in terms of the eschatological 
character of Jesus’ ministry overall.  Jesus preached that the kingdom of God was at 
hand, and the believer should repent and turn away from inequity and believe to enter the 
kingdom.  With this understanding in mind, the Sermons are not actually “social” 
strictures at all, but rather the recognition of the potential obstacles that face the 
individual in gaining access to the eschatological kingdom heralded by Jesus.   
 
The question of property and wealth is not considered a social problem at 
all, but a personal one.  The possession of wealth is a personal obstacle for 
the rich man to achieve complete metanoia.  The entanglement with the 
manifold interests of the world that goes with riches makes it more 
difficult to turn the heart to the point where the insight into what is right, 
and the desire to do it, determines the conduct of life and directs it toward 
the impending kingdom of Heaven.  The kingdom that is not of this world 
is more easily accessible to those whose stake in the world is small 
anyway (HPI I, 156—57).   
 
As Jesus warns those who are gathered to hear him, “where your treasure is, there will be 
your heart also” (Matt. 6:21).  Furthermore, Voegelin asserts, “The rules of the sermon 
are not a code that can be followed like the Ten Commandments.  The radicalism of the 
demands precludes their use as a system of social ethics” (HPI I, 162).  As Dietrich 
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Bonhoeffer argues, “Having reached the end of the Beatitudes, we naturally ask if there is 
any place on this earth for the community which they describe.  Clearly, there is one 
place, and only one, and that is where the Poorest, Meekest, and most sorely Tried of all 
men is to be found—on the cross at Golgotha.”25 
Neither sermon can be read as the pronouncement of a new social code or an 
advocacy statement on the desirability of redistributing resources.  As Voegelin notes 
with regard to the Sermon on the Mount:  “The doctrine of the sermon is an 
eschatological doctrine.  It demands a change of heart and imposes rules of conduct that 
have their meaning for men who live in the daily expectation of the kingdom of Heaven.  
It is not a doctrine that can be followed by men who live in a less intense environment, 
who expect to live out their lives and who wish to make the world livable for their 
families.”  And, in a passage reminiscent of Machiavelli’s warning to The Prince 
regarding speculation on ideal states, “Following the doctrine of the sermon to the letter 
would in each individual case inevitably entail social and economic disaster and would 
probably lead to an early death” (HPI I, 161).  This is because, while love, in the form 
advanced by Jesus in Matt. 22:37—40, may be the vine on which “all the Law and the 
prophets hang,” it must be filtered through the imperfect vessel of human nature.26  A 
person may repent, but human nature remains what it is. 
                                                 
25 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, cited in Warren S. Kissinger, The Sermon on the Mount:  
A History of Interpretation and Bibliography, ATLA Bibliography Series No. 3 (Metuchen, NJ:  The 
Scarecrow Press, 1975), 85. 
26 Voegelin (HPI I, 171) notes that Paul argues, “Love is the comprehensive supplement to the old law,” 
however, Voegelin seems to neglect the text of Matthew 23:37—40:  “Hearing that Jesus had silenced the 
Sadducees, the Pharisees got together.  One of them, an expert in the law, tested him with this question:  
‘Teacher, which is the greatest commandment in the Law?’  Jesus replied, ‘Love the Lord, your God, with 
all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.  This is the first and greatest commandment.  
And the second is like it:  Love your neighbor as yourself.  All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two 
commandments.’”  So, far from merely being a “supplement” to the Law, love is presented in the Gospel 
account as the spring from which all the Law flows.  
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On the other hand, the sermons do serve a social function to the degree that they 
provide what may be described as an ideal standard of social behavior that can be used as 
a rule by which to judge the real social order in which people find themselves.  This 
“regulative function,” as Voegelin calls it, is its great strength and potential danger.  The 
fact that “(a)ny set of rules that is accepted by a Christian society as a standard of conduct 
will inevitably fall short of the teaching of the sermon,” their very existence as a standard 
creates an inevitable “tension between the accepted standard and the eschatological 
sermon.”  As a consequence, “Whenever the standard sinks, it can be pulled up again 
through a reorientation toward the radical demands.”   This lies at the heart of the “wave 
after wave of reformations” that occur throughout the history of Christian civilization in 
the West.  However, “when the swing toward the eschatological demands goes too far, 
the civilizational structure, which is based on a compromise with the natural gifts of man, 
is imperiled” (HPI I, 162). 
Indeed, the Sermon on the Mount, in particular, represents a direct challenge to 
the institutional structures of Israelitic life itself—and by extension, the Christian 
structures as well.  Voegelin’s discussion of the Sermon is concerned primarily with an 
exegesis of Matt. 5:1—11, the recounting of those who are blessed.  However, Clarence 
Baumann’s analysis of the entire content of the Sermon leads him to observe, “Though 
the Sermon on the Mount contains no political program…and prescribes no sociological 
lineaments for a new corpus christianum, we would miss its social intentions if we 
assumed…that it is inconsequential for the actual structures of life.”  Baumann argues 




(1)the protection of life in accord with the equity of lex talionis (“an eye 
for an eye”) and the social binding of the collective ego (“love your 
neighbor and hate your enemy”), (2) the preservation of the family (by 
prohibiting adultery) and its social control (“give her a certificate of 
divorce”), (3) the confirmation of the religious oath (“you shall not swear 
falsely…”), (4) the public scrutiny and social approval of exemplary 
behavior patterns involving charity, piety and asceticism (alms, prayer, 
fasting), (5) the social control implicated by reciprocal surveillance, 
mutual censure, and democratic correction to conform with established 
custom and convention (you will be judged as you judge and get what you 
give), (6) the social ownership of public property (“treasures on earth”), 
and (7) the economic provision of life’s necessities (concerning food and 
clothing….27 
 
The presentation of the “Antitheses” of Jesus, as Baumann describes them, is thus 
considered as a call for the “reorientation” of the believer “to the Father in heaven rather 
than to the social approval of the religious establishment.”  Baumann maintains, “Point 
by point Jesus confronts the fixed institutional structures with a new understanding of 
one’s place before God and man in a new kind of relationship characterized as the 
‘Kingdom of God.’”  The Sermon is a call to recognize the specific condition of the 
individual human soul in its relationship to God.  Baumann writes:   
 
The institution insures its perpetuation into the future in continuity with its 
past while he who seeks the Kingdom of God and his righteousness lives 
in the eternal Now.  His is not a disconnected, solitary, uncommitted, 
irresponsible, momentary existence but one filled with spontaneously vital 
meetings with God and other human beings.  Jesus assumed the essential 
nature of man to be structural openness because any programmed 
depersonalized fixation with his relationships thwarts his spiritual 
potential and interferes with the “way that leads to life” by stifling the life 
of the spirit.28 
 
                                                 
27 Clarence Baumann, The Sermon on the Mount:  The Modern Quest for its Meaning (Macon, GA:  Mercer 
University Press, 1985), 410—12. 
28 Ibid., 412. 
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  Voegelin recounts the episode from I Tim. 6 in which Paul admonishes slaves in 
Ephesus to respect their masters as their brethren in Christ and equates it to the 16th 
century revolt of German peasants “who like the slaves of Ephesus, fell into the 
misunderstanding that the spiritual freedom of the renovated personality was a charter of 
social liberties.”  Voegelin goes on to note that “(t)he transition from the idea of spiritual 
brotherhood to social revolt is the inevitable result of the tension between the invisible 
kingdom of Heaven and the all-too-visible order of this world in which it is embedded” 
(HPI I, 172).   
However, this would seem to ignore the institutional response to very real 
problems that emerge in the social life of human beings and the unwillingness, or 
inability of, institutions to confront such problems in a realistic way.  The tension 
between the experience of the individual in a position of immediacy to God and the 
institutional apparatus that is representative of that relationship is complicated, and the 
line between reform and revolution is a narrow one.  “The goal of the Sermon on the 
Mount,” Baumann argues,  
 
is not a utopian escape from social existence.  Law and the prophets are to 
be fulfilled not through abolishing all institutions and exploring purely 
personal ways of conduct that lead directly to life eternal but rather by 
reifying and reauthenticating the corporate forms of existence so as to 
fulfill God’s covenantal intentions for all his people….  The presence of 
personal openness challenges the institutional fixation from within by 
creating an intolerable tension which eventually forces it open, relativizes 
its absolute authority, and qualifies its unconditional validity.  In the 
process of its revitalization, the institution, however, develops an 
inevitable hostility against the free spirit who surmounts it, resulting in a 
confrontation which in its crudest form eventuates in crucifixion.29 
 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 412—13. 
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Social revolution is thus more than simply the inevitable result of a new spiritual 
freedom, but also the inability of institutions to adapt to the new conditions with which 
they are presented.  The line between reform and revolution is a thin one that requires 
mediation both individually and institutionally.  The problem of Christian political order 
has been an inability to find the mean between the two. 
Saint Augustine and the Construction of Christian History 
With that said, however, Christianity made remarkable progress in the world into which it 
emerged.  While a complete history of the expansion of Christianity is beyond the scope 
of the current study, it had become prominent enough by early fourth century for the 
emperor Constantine to legitimately convert to the new faith.  This was despite the 
problems of doctrinal purity and schism, persecutions by and conflicts with the pagans, 
and the generally unstable atmosphere of both the region and the period.30 
It was in part because of that instability that Saint Augustine applied himself to 
the task of explaining the meaning, or lack thereof, of history.  Voegelin describes Saint 
Augustine as “one of the great epochal figures of mankind.  His life and work summarize 
the four centuries of the Roman-Christian age and mark its end; and his work, being the 
summa of the age that has laid the foundation of Western Christian civilization, has 
remained the foundation of Christian thought to this day…” (HPI I, 206).   
 Voegelin notes that by “the time of Augustine [354—430], Christian history had 
evolved along lines rather different from those envisaged in the imperial idea of Paul.  
The revealed kingdom of Heaven had progressed stupendously, but by no means to the 
                                                 
30 On the expansion of Christianity see Rodney Stark, The Rise of Christianity (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1996); Kenneth Scott LaTourette, The First Five Centuries, vol. 1 of A History of the 
Expansion of Christianity, 7 vols. (Grand Rapids:  Zondervan Publishing, 1970), and Henry Chadwick, The 
Early Church (London:  Penguin Books, 1967). 
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extent that it could have absorbed paganism” (HPI I, 207).  This, however, should come 
as no great surprise since the Pauline vision was built around the impending parousia, the 
return of Christ and the gathering of the faithful into the kingdom fully revealed.  When 
this did not occur, the historical existence of the Christian community in the world 
became somewhat problematic.31   
 The City of God had its origins in the sack of Rome by Alaric in 410.  “The 
conquest of the symbol of Roman eternity by the barbarians had wide repercussions in 
popular sentiments, the pagans naturally branding the Christianization of the empire as 
the cause of the disaster, the Christians being deeply perturbed by the fact that even 
Christianization could not avert it.”  In response to the attack upon the faith by the pagans 
and the disquiet among the Christians, Augustine composed his great work.  The City of 
God, as Voegelin points out, “began as an oeuvre de circonstance:  books I—III appeared 
first as a political pamphlet to deal with the misunderstanding that Christianity was some 
kind of insurance against disaster” (HPI I, 209).  In the context of the refutation of the 
pagans and in his attempt “to repair Christian confidence and to teach Christians what 
they should expect (and should not expect) of God’s sovereignty over history,”32 
Augustine would create a new conception of history and drive the final nail into the 
coffin of the notion of cyclical recurrence that had been the focal point of Hellenic and 
Roman historiography. 
 The epochal construction of history is retained by Augustine in that he divides the 
history of the world into six ages as “the analogue of creation,” correlated to “the life of 
                                                 
31 A contrary view is expressed by C.K. Barrett in his examination of the Gospel of Luke and the Acts of 
the Apostles.  See C.K. Barrett, “Luke-Acts,” in John Barclay and John Sweet, eds., Early Christian 
Thought in its Jewish Context (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1996), 84—95. 
32 Peter Iver Kaufman, Redeeming Politics (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1990), 136. 
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Christ,” divided “by the generations of the ancestors of Jesus,” and “as an analogue of the 
phases of human life.”  With the coming of Christ, the last age had begun.  The world is 
now the “saeculum senescens…aging and tending toward an inevitable end.”  The 
inevitable end is, of course, the glorious realization of the Kingdom of God, however, for 
human beings in the here and now a problem still remains.  Voegelin notes: 
 
The construction has one weak point, but one of decisive importance:  the 
history of the Christian world has no structure of its own.  After the 
appearance of Christ, history simply goes on having no internal aim until 
at some unknown point of time the aimless course is cut short by the 
second appearance of Christ, an appearance that, as far as the internal 
structure of the Christian community life is concerned, might come today 
as well as tomorrow or in a thousand years (HPI I, 211—12). 
  
 This understanding is, in turn, premised on Augustine’s conception of parallel 
histories—of the division of history between between the civitas terrena and the civitas 
Dei.  In the Augustinian formulation, “History runs on a double plan:  it is the sacred 
history of mankind expressed in the six symbolic ages, and it is the history of the good 
and the souls, beginning with the reign of God in the angel-state, going through the fall of 
the angels, the split between good and bad human souls, and ending in the reign of the 
righteous souls with Christ at the end of the world.”  However, the division between the 
two cities cannot be understood with reference to human institutions such as “church and 
state.”   The church may “the militant representative” of the City of God on earth, but it is 
still simply “the kingdom of Christ quailis nunc est [as it is now], though not all members 
of the historical Church…will be members of the final Church qualis tunc erit [as it will 
be then], when the tares are weeded out” (HPI I, 214).  
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 Voegelin notes that what is missing from the analysis in the City of God is an 
extended discussion of profane history.  For Augustine, the question of profane history 
was of little consequence because it was merely a time of waiting for the end.  As Löwith 
points out, however, from the “strictly religious viewpoint” of Augustine, “we cannot 
expect…a detailed interest in secular history as such.”33  The rise and fall of empires was 
a matter of little consequence for a man with his focus on eternity.  Christopher Dawson 
points out that the Christian view of the mystery of history as expressed by Saint 
Augustine was “essentially the mystery of eternal life.  It was not concerned with the life 
of nature or with culture as a part of the order of nature, but with the redemption and 
regeneration of humanity by the Incarnation of the Divine Word.”34 
For this reason, profane history was a problem that Augustine passed on to his 
student Orosius to complete.  Both Augustine and Orosius, however, worked within the 
framework imposed by Paul’s compromise with history in the formulation of the 
constitution of the Christian community in that their primary focus was upon the world as 
it was defined by the experience of the pagan, Israelitic, and Christian experience.  The 
eastern dynasties of the Parthian and Sassanid empires in the east were largely irrelevant.  
As Voegelin points out, “The Orient simply dropped out of the Western horizon, though 
Eastern power did not show any sign of decline” (HPI I, 221). 
 While Orosius’ Historiiae Adversum Paganos may be “a systemic part of the 
Augustinian philosophy of politics and history,” it also serves to illustrate the essential 
difference of Augustine’s attitude toward profane history and the direction in which the 
understanding of profane history was heading.  As Ernest L. Fortin observes, “in 
                                                 
33 Löwith, 171. 
34 Christopher Dawson, Religion and the Rise of Western Culture (New York:  Sheed and Ward, 1950), 41. 
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discharging his mandate, Orosius went well beyond the call of duty.  His simpleminded 
thesis is that, far from boding ill for the Empire, Christianity was responsible for untold 
favors that had accrued to it in recent times.”35   
Voegelin notices the “symbolic parallel between the closing of the temple of 
Janus under Augustus and the birth of Jesus with the announcement of peace to all men 
of good will” (HPI I, 221).  However, Voegelin does not point out that Orosius’ parallel 
construction takes place in the context of extolling the virtues of the empire and the 
triumph of Christianity by linking them together.  Whereas Augustine argues that the 
unity of the empire has been forged with “much slaughter and bloodshed” and extols the 
reader “who thinks with pain on all these great evils, so horrible, so ruthless,” to 
“acknowledge that this is misery,”36 Orosius sees in the civil wars the creation of the 
Christian empire.  “Behold how under Christians and in these Christian times civil wars, 
even when they prove unavoidable are brought to a happy issue.  The victory has been 
won, the city stands intact, the tyrant has been laid low.”37   
While Orosius takes joy in the “common fellowship” provided by the order of 
Rome, Augustine is more sanguine, arguing that “as far as this life of mortals is 
concerned, which is spent and ended in a few days, what does it matter under whose 
government a dying man lives, if they who govern do not force him to impiety and 
iniquity?”38  Augustine may have broken the linkage between sacred and profane history, 
but his student saw in the profane the hand of God at work moving humanity forward into 
                                                 
35 Ernest L. Fortin, “Introduction,” to Augustine:  Political Writings, translated by Michael W. Tkacz and 
Douglas Kries, edited by Ernest L. Fortin and Douglas Kries  (Indianapolis:  Hackett Publishing, 1994), 
xvii.  Fortin’s judgment might be a little too harsh.  See Löwith, 174—81. 
36 Saint Augustine, The City of God, XIX. 7, 683. 
37 Orosius, Historia, VII. 33. 
38 Orosius, V.1; Saint Augustine, V.17, 166 
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a new age.  Like Melito of Sardes, whom Voegelin quotes at the beginning of the section 
on the emergence of Christianity (HPI I, 149), Orosius sees the future of Christianity in 
Empire.39  
The Tyconian Problem 
Yet behind the construction of history in both Augustine and Orosius a problem was 
lurking as demonstrated by the Donatists in Northern Africa and the musings of 
Tyconius.40  The issue that led to the schism between the Donatist church and the 
universal church concerned the readmission to the community of the faithful of those 
priests and bishops who had offered sacrifices to pagan gods under threat of persecution.  
More specifically, the issue that really caused the schism was the relationship of the 
sacrament to the priest who administered it.  The sacraments of baptism and communion 
by which a person joined and acknowledged his or her membership in the community of 
the faithful were considered legitimate by the Donatists only if they were administered by 
one who had not been tainted by apostasy. 
 Voegelin lays out the essentials doctrinal position of the Donatist Church as 
developed by “its theorist” Tyconius: 
 
The Donatist Church was the true church, according to Tyconian theory, 
while the main church, which admitted the fallen brethren, stood outside 
the true church just as did the pagans.  Tyconius went even further and 
admitted that within the true church there were imperfect members who 
                                                 
39 The linkage of Roman success to Christianity was, of course, a position taken by many of the Church 
fathers.  See Christopher Dawson, The Making of Europe (New York:  Sheed and Ward, 1952), 34—35. 
40 See W.H.C. Frend, The Donatist Church:  A Movement of Protest in North Africa (Oxford:  Clarendon 
Press, 1952); On the relationship of Saint Augustine to the Donatist movement in particular see Geoffrey 
Grimshaw Willis, Saint Augustine and the Donatist Controversy (London:  SPCK, 1950), John von 
Heyking, Augustine and Politics as Longing in the World, Eric Voegelin Institute Series in Political 
Philosophy  (Columbia:  University of Missouri Press, 2001), 224—48; and Kaufmann, 139—43.  On 
Donatism and other heretical movements generally, see Chas S. Clifton, Encyclopedia of Heresies and 
Heretics  (Santa Barbare:  ABC-CLIO, 1992) and Joan O’Grady, Heresies:  Heretical Truth or Orthodox 
Error (Longmead, U.K.:  Element Books, 1985). 
 74 
 75 
did not actually participate in the spiritual corpus mysticum of the saints.  
Within the visible true church, there was, therefore, an invisible spiritual 
church of the perfect Christians….  This invisible church was the true 
civitas Dei, while the false brethren, the separati, of the main church and 
the pagans, belonged to another unit, the civitas diaboli, the city of the 
devil (HPI I, 213). 
 
But even beyond the doctrinal construction of the two cities, the city of God and that of 
the devil, the Donatist construction advocated the use of violence in order to maintain 
doctrinal discipline against the members of the city of the devil who refused to realize the 
error of their ways.  This factor, combined with a rigid interpretation of the forms of 
Christian observance, marked the Donatists as among the first of many puritanical groups 
that would emerge throughout Christian history.  And ultimately, the success or failure of 
the distinct Christian civilization would be dependent upon the ability of the church to 
either absorb such movements through reformist efforts or crush them so completely they 
would not emerge to terrorize the great body of the faithful.  To the degree that the 
universal church adopted the rigorous doctrinal standards of the Donatists, however, the 
less representative it would be of the corpus mixtum represented by the variety of human 
types that both Saint Paul and Saint Augustine see in the civitas Dei.   
Conclusion 
Saint Paul’s dream of universal Christendom was not realized in the history of Rome, 
despite Orosius’ and Melito’s confident expressions of the new epoch linking the fate of 
Rome to the fate of Christianity.  Which, as we know from the perspective of history, was 
probably just as well for the fate of Christianity generally.  However, the idea of imperial 
Christianity would reemerge during the Middle Ages as the evocative underpinning of 
sacrum imperium, which is the subject of the next chapter. 
Chapter Three:  Imperium 
 
The Political Idea in Voegelin’s History of Political Ideas 
In the “Introduction” to the History of Political Ideas, Voegelin writes, “the function 
proper of order is the creation of a shelter in which man may give his life a semblance of 
meaning.”  As such, the political idea is representative of “a little world of order, a 
cosmic analogy, a cosmion, leading a precarious life under the pressure of destructive 
forces from within and without” (HPI I, 225).  This, in turn, informs Voegelin’s 
discussion of the functional component of the political idea.  “The political idea is only to 
a limited extent descriptive of any reality; its primary function is not cognitive but a 
formative one.  The political idea is not an instrument of description of a political unit but 
an instrument of its creation” (HPI I, 227—28).    
As a practical matter, this is important to an understanding of the sense in which 
Voegelin examines political ideas as they occur in history.  The reason for this is that in 
its character and an evocation of meaning, the idea itself may never reach its fruition in 
an institutional form.  Since the idea itself is pure, the realization of the idea may not be 
fully realizable in the historical existence of human beings in reality.  At this point in 
Voegelin’s development there may, in fact, be something of the Platonist within him. 
However, the use of the term “idea” may, in itself, be misleading when it comes 
to a reading of Voegelin’s History of Political Ideas.  Generally speaking, when Voegelin 
uses the terms “political idea” he is not referring to an “idea” per se, or an idea in the 
singular.  Rather Voegelin is usually describing matrices of ideas that serve as the basis 
upon which the Idea is constructed.  This is indicated by Voegelin’s structural analysis of 
the basis of political ideas.  The structure of the Idea is determined by “three sets of ideas:  
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the ideas concerning the constitution of the cosmos as whole; the ideas concerning the 
internal order; the ideas concerning the status of the cosmion in the simultaneous world 
and in history” (HPI I, 226). 
Paul’s evocation of the Christian community had fulfilled the requirements for the 
evocation of a little world of meaning.  In chapter two we noted Voegelin’s argument 
regarding the “greatness of Paul” in the apostle’s ability to create a constitution for the 
community of the faithful that was fully cognizant of the realities of human beings and 
human nature in addition to a complete recognition of the realities of the world in which 
Christianity emerged.  In his evocation of the Christian community through a series of 
compromises with the world, Paul had created a complex of ideas that would lead to the 
expansion of Christianity throughout the known world.  With that said, the dream of Paul, 
in the sense of an overarching community that would extend beyond the boundaries of 
nations and peoples failed to materialize in history, it was transformed into something 
else, the notion of the sacrum imperium.  The idea of “imperial Christianity,” the sacrum 
imperium, although never fully realized in history, would become the defining 
characteristic of the Middle Ages and set the stage for the disorder of the modern period. 
The problem with any political idea is that it is dependent upon the historical 
circumstance in which it happens to be formulated   As such; political ideas are largely 
contingent upon the moment in time, or history, in which they emerge.    Furthermore, 
political ideas are also entirely dependent upon the institutionalization of the idea if they 
are to be translatable into concrete human action and the creation of order or disorder.  It 
is important to remember Voegelin’s warning regarding the existence of destructive 
forces, both “within and without” of the political cosmion.  An idea can only be effective 
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in history to the degree that it is realized through the institutional representation of the 
idea. 
In the Christian experience, the representation of the Pauline idea came to be 
embodied in the institutional church.  This was implied in both the idea of the differing 
spiritual gifts granted to individual human beings in their equality before God, and the 
necessary requirement that the expansion of the community of the faithful and the 
realization of imperial Christianity required a corresponding organization by which to 
undertake the program.  Voegelin argues: 
 
The church has become the great civilizing influence in the Western world 
because it was able to compromise the strict teachings of the Sermon on 
the Mount with the weakness of human nature, with the existence of 
governmental power, and with the historical content of pre-Christian 
civilization.  The compromise with the weakness of man expressed itself 
in the inclusion of everybody into the mystical body of Christ through the 
sacraments of baptism and the Lord’s Supper; the foundation for 
membership is laid through the sacramental reception, not through any 
guarantee that the person is, indeed, a member of the invisible church.   
The actual status of the soul is known to God alone; it cannot be judged by 
the brethren in the community.  The acceptance of governmental power as 
part of the “world” and willed by God is the second great compromise.  It 
enabled the church to outlast the difficulties of the early centuries and 
reached its climax in the integration of the royal function into the order of 
the charismata in the ninth century.  The third compromise, equally 
inaugurated by Saint Paul, was the compromise with history through the 
recognition that God had revealed himself through the law of nature and to 
the Hebrews through the Old Law before he revealed himself to the world 
at large through the Logos that had become flesh.  As a consequence of 
this third compromise it was possible for the early patres to absorb the 
Stoic natural law into Christian doctrine, and by virtue of this absorption 
to create for Christianity a system of ethics that was applicable to relations 
between men who live in the world  (HPI IV, 140—41). 
 
However, Voegelin notes that the importance of these compromises is mitigated by the 
realization that “they could not have unfolded their full effectiveness unless they had 
 78 
been accompanied by the creation of a sacramental organization” (HPI IV, 141).  In other 
words, in order for the compromises to lead to the creation of some form of political 
order, some corresponding representative institution was required.   
 Problems arise, however, when the organizational realization of the idea moves 
through history and faces the pressure of existence in the field of social and institutional 
forces upon it.  In the instance of Christian civilization, the Church as an institution is 
created as an institutional embodiment of a spiritual event.  Voegelin observes that in the 
context of the Christian West, the “public institutions of imperial Christianity (church and 
empire) have, from their very beginning, absorbed the problems of the spiritual soul and 
its destiny into their pattern” (HPI IV, 133).  The difference between “reform” and 
“revolution” is thus a reflection of the effectiveness with which the institutional structures 
are able to absorb those problems or eliminate them.   
 The experience of Christianity into the Middle Ages had demonstrated that under 
the surface of the institutional order were political, social and spiritual movements that 
came into play in the creation of Christian order.  For this reason, Voegelin argues, we 
can distinguish “between two planes of Western civilization, an upper plane and a lower 
plane.”   The upper plane consists of “the public institutions; the lower plane as that of 
the movements that are in permanent revolt against the established institutions” (HPI IV, 
131—32).    Christian political order was problematic largely because of the inherent 
tension between the institutional order and the distinctly “Christian idea of the person in 
immediacy to God” (HPI IV, 132—33).   
This tension was both lessened and, paradoxically enough, increased, by the 
apparent existence of an objective standard by which to measure the success or failure of 
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public institutions in representing the very real demands of the spiritual existence of 
human beings in society.  The social standard created by the Sermon on the Mount 
proved to be both the source of order and disorder.  Voegelin argues, “The spiritualism of 
Christianity, and in particular the spiritualism of the Sermon on the Mount, is a standard 
that can be invoked against the institution that is supposed to represent it; if the spiritual 
order of Christianity is grossly violated through the conduct of the ruling groups, the 
appeal can go to standards that are, on principle, accepted by the ruling groups 
themselves.”  On the other, hand, it created an impossible standard for institutions to 
achieve in reality.  As a result, there were always elements on the fringe that stood in 
opposition to the institutional order.   
However, the contingent nature of the idea remained a major problem that, in the 
course of centuries, would result in crisis of the Reformation.   The “general problem that 
caused the great religious disruption” of the Reformation is characterized by Voegelin as: 
 
the crisis of accumulated, but intellectually undigested, historical content 
of Christianity.  The Spirit is absolute; but the symbolization of the 
experience and its institutionalization in the life of human community is 
historical.  In the course of history, symbolizations that express the 
essence of Christianity adequately at one time may become inadequate in 
a new age; the essence of Christianity is a matter of permanent 
readjustment of its historical expression….  The flash of eternity that is the 
church is a flash into history; the doctrinal expressions of the flash—
which at the beginnings of the church may have seemed as eternal as the 
flash itself—reveal their relativity in the light of history that flows on 
through the ages (HPI IV, 223). 
 
The revolution that was the Great Reformation is thus a reflection of the inability of the 
church itself to adjust to the changing political, social and religious environment in which 
it found itself.   
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 In this chapter we shall analyze Voegelin’s discussion of the problem of Christian 
order as it expresses itself in the evocation of the sacrum imperium of the Middle Ages.  
“The political ideas of the Middle Ages are oriented toward the focal point of the sacrum 
imperium, of the holy empire, just as Hellenic theory was oriented toward the polis and 
Christian-Roman theory toward the kingdom of Heaven and the Roman empire.”  
However, the sacrum imperium as an “ideal type” is faulty in that it was never fully 
realized in history.  As Voegelin observes, “the entelechy of the process failed to reach its 
stage of perfection; the universal empire as a power organization and the universal 
spiritual community tended toward each other and finally met, but they did not 
amalgamate” (HPI II, 66).   
However, the very fact that it is not an “ideal type” points to the problem with the 
realization of the idea in history.  Furthermore, it also illustrates the interplay between the 
calls for reform from the bottom of the social structure and the increasing inability of the 
institutional order to reflect the reality experienced by the people within the society.  
Finally, it is in the rise and fall of the idea of the sacrum imperium that the compromises 
with the world that St. Paul made in his initial contact with the world and the conception 
of the constitution of the Christian community come undone in the interplay of 
institutional order and social forces. 
 In chapter two we discussed the Tyconian problem.  The reason this is important 
is that it prefigures what was going to occur within the realm of the sacrum imperium and 
beyond.  The Donatist controversy was contained because it took place on the fringes of 
the empire.  But the role of the institutional church as the representative of transcendent 
order and the conduit by which one entered into the community of the faithful would 
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remain a constant target for those who did not believe that the church was, in fact, truly 
representative of the spiritual order of the kingdom of God.  For the future, the Tyconian 
problem would reemerge in the middle of Europe and the conflagration could not be 
simply brushed aside to the margins of community existence.   
 The Great Reformation may properly be understood, from the Voegelinian 
perspective, as the end of a process that has two primary components.  On the one hand 
there is the social pressure from the bottom in the form of the Reformist impulse.  This, 
however, only becomes problematic to the degree that the institutions are unable to 
absorb the demands.  As to the demands themselves, they are the result of a narrowing of 
the ontological perspectives that defined the existence of human beings in history.  In 
other words, the reality in which the reformers worked became increasingly restricted 
which, in turn, limited the range of options available by the institutional order.  On the 
other hand, the institutional order, the order of the church specifically, must bear some of 
the burden of responsibility in history.  The problem with the institutionalization of the 
spirit is ultimately that it must be representative of the spirit.  From the beginning of the 
experience of the institutional church, however, the field of reality in which it operated 
began to contract as well into the intramundane reality of the world of statecraft.  In fact, 
it could be argued that the modern state was born out of the experience of the church well 
before the modern territorial state as we understand it emerged.  
The Construction of the Imperium 
Voegelin argues that the Carolingian empire was the result of a gradual historic evolution 
that took some 300 years to occur.1  At the Council of Chalcedon of 451, the Roman 
                                                 
1 See Judith Herrin, The Formation of Christendom (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1987), 
especially Chapter 11, “The Two Emperors of Christendom,” 445—76; Kenneth Scott LaTourette, The 
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church condemned the Monophysite Christology and appealed to Emperor Zeno (d. 491) 
to enforce the Orthodox doctrine as expressed by Leo I (d. 461).  The emperor’s response 
was to propose a compromise that drove the final wedge between Constantinople and 
Rome.  The result of this split was the development of the Gelasian doctrine of the two 
swords by which temporal and spiritual powers were to be separated between two 
authorities with the emperor having primacy in temporal matters and the Church having 
primacy in matters of springing from the spiritual.  This, as Voegelin points out, was 
“incompatible with the practice of Byzantine emperors if not with their theory” (HPI II, 
53).  And the solution could not be found in a rapprochement.  Instead, relations between 
Constantinople and Rome stagnated in an uneasy alliance, as the church in Rome 
remained enamored of the idea of the Roman Empire to which the Byzantine emperor 
was ostensibly heir. 
The situation had been exacerbated when the power of the Eastern Empire was 
threatened by pressure brought on by the barbarian invasions and the near complete 
breakdown of the administrative apparatus of the Empire.  As a result, the Church was 
thrown back on its own resources, and, more importantly, Rome became dependent upon 
the papal organization and the Church for its sustenance.  This allowed Gregory I (d. 604) 
to claim not only papal supremacy over the other churches of the empire, and the 
patriarch in Constantinople, but, more importantly, he began to fulfill the functions of a 
temporal ruler in the West.   The final straw consisted of the loss of political and military 
control that was, in turn, the result of the Lombard invasions.  The pope “had to look for 
temporal support elsewhere unless he wanted to become a court bishop in the Lombard 
                                                                                                                                                 
Thousand Years of Uncertainty:  500 A.D. to 1500 A.D., vol. 2 of A History of the Expansion of 
Christianity, 7 vols. (Grand Rapids:  Zondervan Publishing, 1970); and Christopher Dawson, The Making 
of Europe, 214—33. 
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kingdom, a position that would have been even less appealing than imperial interference 
in spiritual matters” (HPI II, 55). 
In the long, slow decline of the alliance between Rome and Constantinople, we 
can see the power of an idea.  Voegelin argues that it “is surprising for how long the 
papacy held the emperor in profound awe, in spite of the humiliations to which a number 
of popes were exposed.”  But while the “interference in spiritual matters led to temporary 
severances of the communion” it did not lead to a “a formal breach.”  Instead, the formal 
breach only occurs when Constantinople is no longer able to fulfill its temporal functions 
sufficiently to support the episcopate in Rome (HPI II, 54—55).  The reason for this is 
that hovering in the background is the idea of the Roman Empire.   
As Voegelin argues, “The idea of Rome lay heavily over the historical process, 
and it required the accumulated force of centuries of events to crystallize the new 
evocation” (HPI II, 66).  The epochal consciousness expressed by Melito of Sardis and 
quoted by Voegelin, indicates the perception that the fate of Christianity and the fate of 
the empire are linked. Melito writes to the emperor Marcus Aurelius: 
 
Our philosophy first grew up among the barbarians, but its full flower 
came among your nation in the great reign of your ancestor Augustus, and 
became an omen of good to your empire, for from that time the power of 
the Romans became great and splendid.  You are now his happy successor, 
and shall be so along with your son, if you protect the philosophy which 
grew up with the empire and began with Augustus.2 
 
Only when the empire proves itself to be inadequate to the maintenance of civil and 
political order is that linkage broken.  The existence of a new evocation for the empire 
                                                 
2 Eusebius, Ecclesiastica Historia, IV.xxvi.7, trans. Kirsopp Lake, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, 
MA, 1926), cited by Voegelin at HPI I, 149.  
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required the destruction of the old one.  Christopher Dawson describes the change in 
terms that Voegelin would undoubtedly understand: 
 
For centuries a civilization will follow the same path, worshipping the 
same gods, cherishing the same ideals, acknowledging the same moral and 
intellectual standards.  And then all at once a change will come, the 
springs of the old life run dry, and men suddenly awaken to a new world, 
in which the ruling principles of the former age seem to lose their validity 
and to become inapplicable or meaningless. 
 This is what occurred in the time of the Roman Empire, when the 
ancient world, which had lived for centuries on the inherited capital of the 
Hellenistic culture, seemed suddenly to come to the end of its resources 
and to realize its need of something entirely new.  For four hundred years 
the civilized world had been reading the same books, admiring the same 
works of art, and cultivating the same types of social and personal 
expression.  Then came the change of the third and fourth centuries, A.D., 
when the forms of the Hellenistic culture lost their vitality and men turned 
to a new art, a new thought and a new way of life—from philosophy to 
theology, from the Greek statue to the Byzantine mosaic, from the 
gymnasium to the monastery.3 
 
With that said, of course, the new evocation took centuries to fully materialize 
until it was realized and institutionalized with the coronation of Charlemagne (d. 814) in 
800—and even then it would never reach the status of completeness.  With the 
understanding that God was the partner in the destiny of the Church, the “slow ripening” 
of the “situation that was consummated in the coronation of Charlemagne” was 
understood “in the symbolism of the time” as “decisions of God.  For the contemporaries 
of the coronation, the transfer of the empire was neither an act of the pope, nor an act of 
the Frankish king, nor an act of the people of Rome, but an act of God.  Divine 
providence had shown its intentions through the course that it let history take, and the 
acts of man could do nothing but accept the divine decision” (HPI II, 52).  And it was 
                                                 
3 Christopher Dawson, Christianity and the New Age (Manchester, NH:  Sophia Institute Press,  
1985),  1—2. 
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within the scope of the new evocation that the entity properly understood as “Europe” 
came to be.  Dawson observes, “it was only in so far as the different peoples of the West 
were incorporated in the spiritual community of Christendom that they acquired a 
common culture.  It is this, above all, that distinguishes the Western development from 
that of the other great world civilizations.”4 
Voegelin notes the irony of the situation in that “the papacy and the Frankish 
monarchy had developed in directions that, on the surface at least, seemed to contradict 
the Gelasian declaration of separation of powers” (HPI II, 59—60).  In the case of the 
Frankish monarchy, even prior to the coronation of Charlemagne it had “evolved…in a 
theocratic direction insofar as the church organization was integrated into the 
administrative hierarchy of the monarchy and the king presided over church assemblies 
with far-reaching interference in matters of discipline….” However, Voegelin is careful 
to note that  
 
it would be rash to assume that the theocratic tendencies in the Western 
empire duplicated the caesaropapism of the Byzantine empire.  While the 
static relationship is similar, the dynamics are completely different.  In the 
East, the imperial administration represented the old civilizational forces 
and the Christian Church had to integrate herself into and established 
system of superior civilizational quality; in the West the church 
represented the superior civilizational forces, and the temporal power had 
to grow into political and historical stature by means of ecclesiastical aid.  
The institutional ascendancy of the temporal power in the Frankish 
kingdom was balanced, therefore, in practice by the dependence of the 
Carolingian administration on the church organization and church 
personnel for the governmental and civilizational penetration of the realm, 
particularly those sections where the Germanic population was strong in 
numbers.  The compulsory Sunday service with the influence exerted from 
the pulpit was the main instrument of transmitting temporal power for 
welding the people into a unit by transmitting the intentions of the central 
administration to the last village (HPI II, 60—62). 
 
                                                 
4 Christopher Dawson, Religion and the Rise of Western Culture, 23. 
 86 
Dawson echoes Voegelin’s observation: “The government of the whole Empire was 
largely ecclesiastical, for the bishop shared equally with the count in the local 
administration of the 300 counties into which the Empire was divided, while the central 
government was mainly in the hands of the chancery and of the royal chapel….” The 
Church was thus an essential representative of political, as well as spiritual, order.5  
Furthermore, in the cooperation of the imperial administration and the clerical 
administration, the development of permanent political and legal institutions was made 
possible.6 
 On the side of the church, by the time of the Carolingian empire it had evolved 
into not only a spiritual power, but had taken on the trappings of a territorial state.  
Voegelin notes that the “papacy had grown, already before Gregory I the Great, into a 
huge domainal administration; since Gregory it had acquired the characteristics of a 
temporal principality…the spiritual head of Christianity had become in addition a 
temporal monarch” (HPI II, 60).  This evolution of the institutional representative of 
Christianity into a temporal kingdom would become an increasing source of tension and 
future problems. 
 Contributing to the difficulties would be the incorporation of the temporal ruler 
into the corpus mysticum.  We have noted that Paul made certain compromises with the 
world in his creation of the constitution of the Christian community.  Among those was 
the derivation of the gifts of the spirit and the use of the analogy of the body as the 
representative of the community on earth.  By the time of the Carolingian foundation, the 
temporal ruler has been incorporated into the body of Christ.  Voegelin writes: 
                                                 
5 Dawson, The Making of Europe, 218. 
6 See Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution:  The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge:  
Harvard University Press, 1983), 62—84. 
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The Pauline doctrine of the charismata, of the gifts of grace differentiating 
the functions of the members of the corpus mysticum, has been enlarged 
beyond the early Christian community idea.  The body of Christ has 
absorbed the ruling office into the field of the dynamis of Christ.  This 
office had been distinguished as the exousia by Saint Paul and been 
excluded from the corpus mysticum; the ruler has become charismatic 
(HPI II, 63). 
 
This, of course, is problematic to some degree as well.  With the differentiation of power 
defined in terms of spiritual and temporal as expressed in the Gelasian doctrine and with 
the inclusion of the temporal ruler as a member of the corpus mysticum the lines of 
authority were sometimes confused and confusing to both the church as the recognized 
spiritual authority and the emperor as the constituted temporal ruler of the community.   
The lines of authority, temporal and spiritual, which had never really been clear to 
begin with, become even more complex and interrelated.  There was, in the sacrum 
imperium, from its foundation with Charlemagne to its destruction following Frederick II 
a great degree of what Louis Halphen as termed “systematic confusion” regarding the 
balance between the spiritual and temporal powers within the empire on the part of the 
temporal authorities.7  Which, in turn, poses a problem for the relationship of the church 
to the temporal authority to the degree that the church itself has become a territorial 
power with interests of its own that may or may not be congruent with the interests of the 
temporal authority.   
But it would be a mistake to transpose the modern understanding of the division 
between church and state to the medieval sphere.  Dawson maintains that in the Middle 
Ages, the “conception of Christian society was essentially a unitary one.  State and 
                                                 
7 Louis Halphen, Charlemagne and the Carolingian Empire, trans. Giselle de Nie (Amsterdam:  North 
Holland Publishing, Co., 1977), 148. 
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church were not independent organisms but different orders or functions in a single 
society of which the Pope was the head.  Yet at the same time this did not mean that the 
two orders were confused or identified with one another.  The prince had his proper 
function in Christian society and his own rights within the sphere of its exercise.”8  And 
this is a point that Voegelin repeatedly stresses with regard to the evocation of the sacrum 
imperium.  However, the potential existed for conflict between the two orders of power 
within the Holy Empire, and this potential would become increasingly apparent with the 
subsequent development of the church into the first “Renaissance monarchy.” 
Monasteries as Repositories of Reform:  The Question of Community 
Of significant importance in the creation of the new Christian community, the new 
Christian “people,” was the monastery.  Voegelin maintains, “The institutions gained 
their function as the uniformly civilizing factor of the countryside with the introduction 
of the Rule of Saint Benedict in the ninth century.”  In the adoption of the Rule of Saint 
Benedict (c. 530), the monasteries transferred “the Hellenic ideal of the self-sufficient 
community from the polis to a select Christian community.”  However, unlike in the 
Hellenic case, the select Christian community had a function outside of itself.  Whereas 
“the Platonic polis was a self-sufficient politico-religious unit…the Benedictine polis had 
its meaning in the larger Christian community as a form of life supplemented by, and 
supplementing the functions of, the secular clergy and the temporal power.”  As such, the 
monastery becomes “the symbol of the changes that occurred in the transition from 
ancient Mediterranean civilization to Western Civilization:  from the polis to the 
                                                 
8 Christopher Dawson, “Church and State in the Middle Ages,” Medieval Essays (New York:  Sheed and 
Ward, 1954), 86. 
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territorial empire (and later to the territorial state), from urban civilization to agricultural 
feudal civilization, from pagan myth to the spirit of Christ” (HPI II, 64). 
 In addition to its role in the foundation of the new evocation, the monasteries also 
functioned as a regulative force upon the spiritual/temporal community of the church.  
We have noted that the line between reform and revolution is a thin one, and the 
monasteries were an important source of the impetus toward the first and the avoidance 
of the second.   Voegelin notes that in the context of the sacrum imperium,  
 
reform was concerned in principle with a reassertion of the evangelical 
demands against the evils that had encroached on the life of the Christian 
community in the centuries after Charlemagne.  The demands of poverty, 
celibacy, and Christian discipline were directed against the main evils of 
lay investiture, simony, and clerical marriage in particular, and they were 
directed in general against the engrossment of the representatives of the 
Christian life, of the secular clergy, and of the monasteries, in the interests 
of the world.  The reform began where the contrast between the spiritual 
idea of Christianity and reality was felt most keenly, and where at the 
same time the resistance of vested interests could be overcome more 
easily:  in the monasteries (HPI II, 68). 
 
It is an irony of history that the reform movements themselves, while intended to 
supplement and revivify the connection between the spiritual existence of human beings 
in the church, would also serve to undermine the existing foundations of the 
representative institutions of the church itself.9 
 The Cluniac reform (910) consisted of the creation of an “order” as distinct from a 
“house.”  With the Benedictine model, each monastery was an independent organization.  
The establishment of the Cluniac orders created a hierarchical system in which authority 
flowed downward from the abbot of the original house to all houses that composed the 
                                                 
9 See Dawson, Religion and the Rise of Western Culture, 243—64. 
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order.  This provided a model for the church as a whole, and, paradoxically enough, for 
the temporal authorities.  As Voegelin notes, 
 
The strict observance of the rule and the centralizing constitution 
recommended the order to the papacy as the model of a hierarchical 
spiritual organization with ultimate concentration of authority in the head 
of the church; it was precisely the type of organization that could serve as 
a pattern for the organizational independence of the church herself from 
secular power.  In a most unworldly corner of the Christian community, in 
the midst of a diffuse field of regional powers, the type of a well-
integrated sovereign organization emerged that could be put to use in the 
organization of the church as well as later of secular political authority 
(HPI II, 69), 
 
 Contrary to the Cluniac concern with its organization in the world and the 
relationship between the monastery and the world, the Anchorite reforms concerned the 
spiritual development of the individual person.  However, the Anchorite movement (c. 
1000), with its emphasis upon the withdrawal from the world and contemplative life were 
of little direct influence in itself.  “Individual hermits…could exert an influence as 
models of extreme Christian unworldliness and thus become a regenerative force, but as 
soon as the anchoritic principles were transferred to a larger group a shading off into 
Benedictine cenobitism ensued” (HPI II, 70).   The asceticism of the hermit is largely 
incompatible with life in society. 
 The importance of the Anchorite movement only emerges with the creation of the 
Cistercian orders (1098) that sought to combine “the organizational element of Cluny 
with the anchoritic element of asceticism on a new spiritual level” (HPI II, 71).  It is in 
the combination of the two, that Voegelin sees the maximal differentiation of the spiritual 
consciousness.  The Cistercian establishment took place, largely as a reform of the 
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Cluniac system established some 200 years previously, and as a result of the effective 
failure of the anchorite movement.    
 
The achievements of Cluny were discipline, obedience, and organization; 
the achievements of the anchorite foundations were poverty, asceticism, 
and the contemplative life in solitude.  Two hundred years of success had 
brought to Cluny a wealth and external splendor that cast a shadow on the 
Christian spirituality that it was supposed to represent.  The hermit, 
movement, on the other hand, was inevitably asocial; the attempt at 
recapturing Christian primitive simplicity implied the withdrawal from 
effectiveness in Christian community life” (HPI II, 70—71). 
 
It is in the amalgamation of the two approaches that a compromise is reached between the 
demands of Christian spirituality and the concern for community existence.  Voegelin 
writes: 
 
Organizationally, the Charter of Charity provided for relative 
independence of the monasteries….  The influence of the abbot of Cîteaux 
was purely spiritual and could not extend to temporal exactions.  The new 
foundations were, furthermore, not directly under Cîteaux, but formed in a 
hierarchy so that only the immediate foundations of Cîteaux were under 
the spiritual supervision of the founding house, while the houses founded 
by the filial establishments were spiritually dependent on their own 
founding houses, etc.  This organizational feature reflected the basic 
principle of spiritual father- and sonship.  The element of spiritual 
fatherhood, of spiritual formation from man to man, defines the new level 
of Christianity….  The relationship resembles in some respects the 
Platonic eros, though in substance it is worlds apart from it:  for the soul of 
the spiritual father does not create a new cosmion, but father and son are 
members of the pneumatic community in Christ (HPI II, 71). 
 
The construction of the pneumatic community of Christ is thus based on the spiritual 
equality of persons.  As Voegelin reflects on the correspondence between Saint Bernard 
(d. 1153) and Eugenius III (d. 1151), the spiritual equality of the individual person is the 
focus.  The pope’s power derives from his office, not from any spiritual quality of 
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superiority.  Bernard’s thesis, in Voegelin’s view, represents the spiritual maturation of 
the Christian West.   
 However, concomitant with the internal reforms of the monastic movement that 
led to the development of the spiritual self-consciousness of Saint Bernard, the “second 
strain in the Western process was the defense against Islam” (HPI II, 72).  Voegelin sees 
three stages  
 
in the concentration of the physical and spiritual substance that gives its 
peculiar dynamic expansiveness to our Western civilization.  As a first 
stage we may count the migration events up to the eighth century, by 
which time the area of the West was set off, as a new ethnic and 
civilizational unit, against the ancient Mediterranean.  A second stage was 
marked by the migratory disturbances of the ninth and tenth centuries, 
ending in the check of the Slavic and Magyar advances in the east and the 
stemming of the Islamic tide in the south.  The third stage was reached 
with the Crusades proper, in which the external relations of the West 
evolved from the semiconsciousness of natural growth and defensive 
reaction into a fully conscious attitude of self assertion and offensive 
action, paralleling the internal process in which the logic of ideas asserting 
itself against the infidels is followed by peaceful missionary activities 
(HPI II, 72). 
 
The rise of the military and mendicant orders is a part of, and reflective of, this growing 
imperial self-consciousness on the part of the West.  Perhaps even more importantly, 
however, was the planting of the spiritual seeds of destruction to the unity of the 
distinctly Western civilization that was inadvertently brought on by the establishment of 
the Mendicant orders. 
 Voegelin notes that the “activist order of the military type was supplemented a 
century later by a movement for the spiritualization and intellectualization of self-
conscious expansiveness” (HPI II, 77).  However, once the “point was reached where the 
absolutism of the Christian drives was bent, in principle, into a consciousness of its 
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relativity through contact with a world of superior force that followed its own laws (HPI 
II, 79),” the danger began to grow that such movements might turn inward.   Voegelin 
argues that the mendicant orders became “the great instrument of mass Christianization, 
positively as well as in the negative form of the papal Inquisition,” and in carrying out 
this function they provided a tremendous service—in their time and ours—in maintaining 
the learning of the past and in adding to it as “their schools became…the great centers of 
intellectual, theological, and philosophical activity” (HPI II, 78).   
However, Voegelin observes the problems that accrue to the mendicant spirit, 
especially as it became manifest in the Franciscans (1209).  First, there is the 
understanding that developed concerning Saint Francis (d. 1226) “as the symbol of a new 
Christian dispensation.”  Secondly, the “movement of Saint Francis and his poverelli is 
distinguished, in its original form, by the personality of the saint, but it does not differ in 
essence from similar movements of the time….  It is typical…of the popular religious 
movements spreading over the towns of Europe in the great heretical undercurrent that 
broke finally through into the institutional sphere of the sacrum imperium in the Great 
Reformation.”   The “second form” of the Franciscan Order, “the Conventual with 
permanent houses, and the Dominican Order may best be characterized…as successful 
attempts at integrating the activist spirit of popular sectarianism into acceptable, non-
heretical institutions” (HPI II, 78—79).  The problem, however, is that the spirit of 
popular sectarianism could not be contained in the absence of an ongoing process of 
institutional reform in the church hierarchy. 
In order for the symbol of Saint Francis as the symbol of a new Christian 
dispensation to come to the fore, however, the meaning of history had to be revealed—or 
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rather changed—in a way that Saint Augustine, the original expositor of Christian history 
could not have expected.  J.G.A. Pocock defines the problem to be confronted in terms of 
Saint Augustine’s construction of history.  The  
separation of salvation and society, redemption and history, soul and body, 
sundered but did not abolish the problem of the eschatological present….  
Within the saeculum, there remained the problem of assigning meaning to 
the social and historical events experienced by individuals throughout the 
remembered past and henceforth to the end of time.10 
 
The Investiture Controversy and the Contraction of Reality 
The dispute that began in the conflict between Gregory VII (d. 1085) and Henry IV (d. 
1108) known as the Investiture Controversy (1000—1122) is notable for Voegelin 
because it illustrates some of the inherent tensions that existed in the West and pointed in 
the direction that events would take.  Voegelin’s interpretation of the Investiture 
Controversy is based on the perception that all too often in history, “the spectacular tends 
to obscure the essential.”  The underlying question that needed to be resolved was who 
was responsible for the consecration of bishops?  However, as Voegelin argues, 
 
The question of lay investiture was no “question” at all.  Under the 
accepted canon law the papacy had control over the bishops, and this 
could not be exerted if he ecclesiastical appointments were due to lay 
influence, a reform, asserting the church investiture, was clearly indicated.  
The reform became a practical problem because the bishops had become 
heads of temporal administrative bodies and an assertion of papal control 
would destroy the system of government by which medieval feudal society 
existed.  The canonical answer to the question was clear as soon as it was 
put; and the political solution, the compromise that was reached in the 
Concordat of Worms in 1122 was a foregone conclusion (HPI II, 67—68). 
 
                                                 
10 J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican 
Tradition (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1975), 35. 
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But despite the fact that there was no real question to be resolved in the Investiture 
Controversy it would serve to raise several questions that would require answers.   
 Here was a pivotal moment.  For it was within the context of the debate 
concerning investiture that “(p)olitical theory came at last to grips with the compromises 
implied in the Pauline decision to establish the realm of God as a realm in this world for 
the duration.”  To fully examine the implications of this “coming to grips,” Voegelin 
focuses on “the great intellectual radicals who, as far as the central evocation of the 
empire is concerned, were marginal to the controversy” (HPI II, 91—92).  The reason 
Voegelin focuses on the extremes of the debate is two-fold.  On the one hand, the 
fundamental area of agreement between the extreme partisans in the debate indicates an 
evolution of sentiments with regard to the meaning of intramundane history.  On the 
other hand, the extreme examples give a better indication of the shape of things to come.  
 The real issue that underlay the question of simony was the objectivity of the 
sacrament by which a member joined the body of Christ.   In 1052 Peter Damian (d. 
1072) advanced the argument that the worthiness of the priest was irrelevant to the 
relevance of the spiritual gift granted by the sacrament.  “The spiritual life of the church 
emanates directly from Christ, the head of the mystical body.  Hence the sacramental 
charisma is always pure, however unworthy may be the hand that administers it.  The 
sacrament is only administered by the priest; its substance remains unaffected by his 
personal qualities”  (HPI II, 83).  What really mattered was the spiritual condition of the 
person receiving the sacrament.  Voegelin sees in this construction a fundamental 
“precondition for the function of the church as the unifying spiritual organization of the 
sacrum imperium.  When the accents lie too heavily on the personal worthiness of the 
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members, the danger of revolutionary disruption of the church unit arises if sufficient 
social forces are available for a violent reform” (HPI II, 84).  In other words, simony may 
be abusive, but it does not strike at the heart of the spiritual community of Christ. 
 By the time of the Investiture Controversy proper, the issue was still not resolved.  
For the papacy, Cardinal Humbert (d. 1054) argued that simony was more than simply 
abuse, it constituted heresy.  Humbert’s argument centered on the notion that the 
mediation of the sacraments required both the giver and the receiver to be participants in 
the  
 
free actuality of the spirit of Christ.  Here we meet with a precise formula 
for the opposition between sacramental objectivity as the principle of a 
mystical body of good and bad (which for that very reason can become the 
human corpus of a Christian civilization), and the radical postulate of 
spiritual freedom that of necessity has to distinguish between a pure body 
of Christ and a mystical counterbody of the devil (HPI II, 92). 
 
That this is the tack that Humbert means to take is clarified by his construction of history 
in which “the Tyconian problem breaks through with full force.  The spiritually free 
church is the body of Christ; the simoniacally infected body is the corpus diaboli.”  
Furthermore, the corpus diaboli can be reformed through action in history.  More 
importantly, regarding the investiture of bishops, Voegelin argues that 
 
Humbert decides that sacerdotal dignity is inseparable from the 
administration of church property, that the property is just as sacred as the 
spiritual structure of the church, and that it is, therefore, impermissible to 
have the worldy power precede the spiritual in the investiture.  The 
reversal of the procedure, what was actually practiced, would pervert the 
true order and function of the members of the mystical body.  The sphere 
of material goods, thus, becomes integrated into the realm of the spirit; the 
realm of God is not a realm of persons only but comprises the physical 
dimension of this world….  The world in its full historico-political reality, 
with its material equipment, has become so firm a part of the Christian 
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order of thought that the early eschatological tension between a realm of 
God that is not of this world and the world itself has practically 
disappeared (HPI II, 93—94). 
 
 But also of importance, and largely ignored by Voegelin, is the sense of 
antagonism that Cardinal Humbert has toward the laity generally, and the temporal power 
in particular.  The responsibility for simoniac practices rests, in Humbert’s view, not with 
the church, but rather with the temporal authorities.  Uta-Renate Blumenthal describes the 
problem:   
 
Unlike Abbot Abbo of Fleury…who had branded simony as an evil within 
the church and particularly blamed the bishops, Humbert relates simony 
primarily to lay influence in the church.  From top to bottom, from the 
highest to the lowest order, he sees trade in ecclesiastical goods 
flourishing.  Primarily, however, it was emperors, kings, princes, judges, 
and just about anyone with some kind of secular power, who engaged in 
this shameful trade.  Never mind that they had been entrusted with the 
defense of the church.  All of them therefore carried the sword in vain.  
They neglected their proper tasks, only to devote themselves body and 
soul to the acquisition of ecclesiastical property.11 
 
There is in this interpretation a sense of the particularity of the sacerdotal offices that is 
missing in Voegelin’s analysis, although it will appear later in his discussion of the 
hardening of the institutional church.  The clear antagonism between the contracted 
ecclesia of Saint Francis is prefigured in the attack on the temporal powers based on the 
perception of interference by Humbert. 
 The evidence for the assertion that the world has become part of the Christian 
order of thought is found in the construction of the Norman Anonymous.12  Whereas 
                                                 
11 Uta-Renate Blumenthal, The Investiture Controversy:  Church and Monarchy from the Ninth to the 
Twelfth Century (Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), 89. 
12 The identity of the Norman Anonymous is a matter of some academic controversy, so I have avoided the 
appellation “The Anonymous of York.”  Apparently the Norman Anonymous may actually be the 
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Humbert supported the papacy, the Norman Anonymous supports the authority of the 
emperor.  With that said though there is a fundamental issue upon which both Humbert 
and the Norman Anonymous do agree.   Both parties in the dispute tend to agree upon the 
fundamental importance of the world itself in the divine plan of human salvation.  
Voegelin notes,  
 
On the level of the controversy Humbert and the author of the York Tracts 
are opponents, the one enhancing the dignity of the sacerdotium, the other 
that of the regnum; but in their fundamental attitudes they are brothers 
under the skin, the Anonymous being the more radical since the world for 
him is sufficiently imbued with the spirit to make the priest as its special 
custodian a secondary if not a superfluous figure; the world of the 
Anonymous can spiritually take care of itself (HPI II, 96). 
 
In order to support his argument, the Anonymous constructs a theory of the present 
saeculum that is contrary to the original Pauline and Augustinian constructions.  The 
result of this radical reconstruction is a conception of history as one of three ages, each of 
which is “distinguished by the degree to which the realm of God is realized.”   By means 
of this construction, the “spiritual history of mankind receives a new teleological 
orderliness; the redemption is not an inordinate act of divine grace but a step leading to 
the ultimate general kingship of men” (HPI II, 97—98).   
 The great danger posed by the Anonymous is not his argument, per se, but rather 
the fact that he is representative of a growing threat to the order of the imperium.  
Voegelin argues, “The York Tracts revealed what had happened and what was going to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Anonymous of Rouen, see Ruth Nineham, “The So-Called Anonymous of York,” The Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History XIV, no. 1 (April 1963), 31—45.  On the other hand, Norman F. Cantor rigorously 
maintains that the Anonymous was Gerard of York, see Church, Kingship, and Lay Investiture in England 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1958), 174—97.  On the Norman Anonymous’ theory of kingship 
see, Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The Kings Two Bodies:  A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1957), 42—61 in addition to the previously cited section of Cantor. 
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happen.”  More than simply an argument in favor of the temporal order as such, “they 
implied a fact:  the fact of the free personality of the author who could live in the age of 
Christ under the guidance of the sacred writings without assistance from the Church of 
Rome” (HPI II, 105).  This is problematic since in the sacrum imperium is premised upon 
the structure of authority being divided between the spiritual authority of the Church, and 
the temporal authority of the government.  From the point of view of the Anonymous 
however, the Church, as such is largely irrelevant. 
 
The general priesthood of every Christian is not a mere theoretical 
proposition but is living reality in the opinion of the Anonymous.  With 
frank brutality he denies that the Roman Church has any teaching function 
with regard to the Christian people; we possess the prophetic, evangelical, 
and apostolic Scriptures, and we know them better than the pope…if the 
papacy wants to assume the function of a teacher of mankind it has the 
pagan world for a field of operation; in Western Christianity it is 
superfluous.  The forces can be felt that will disrupt the ecclesiastical unit 
of the sacrum imperium, as the national will disrupt the precarious 
temporal in the upheaval of the Great Reformation (HPI II, 101). 
 
 At the core of the arguments advanced, in the Investiture Controversy, Voegelin 
sees the specter of the age of religious wars—the attack upon the order of the world and 
the complete breakdown of the Pauline compromises with the world.  In Voegelin’s 
analysis the historical period between the Concordat of Worms (1122) and the Summa 
Theologicae of St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) is a time of profound confusion in terms of 
the evocative idea that lay at the heart of the sacrum imperium.  Voegelin notes,  
 
The “compromise with the world” and its institutionalization in the 
sacrum imperium have had the effect of gradually weakening the 
sentiment of distinction between this world and the realm that is not of this 
world; the eschatological component in the Christian sentiment was 
receding rapidly and, correspondingly, the sentiment that the structure of 
the world was part of the Christian realm was growing; the world had 
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entered the realm of God….  The transcendental order of God was 
supplemented by an intramundane order of forces filling the realm  
(HPI II, 109). 
 
And it was only a matter of time, as it were before the “intramundane order of forces 
filling the realm” would begin to take precedence in the life of the community of the 
faithful. 
Joachim and the New Age 
The movement reached its peak in the speculation of Joachim of Flora (d. 1202) and his 
new construction of immanent Christian history.   In the construction of his history, the 
Norman Anonymous had prefigured the influential history of the three realms 
promulgated by Joachim of Flora that would result in the appearance of the symbolic 
“Third Realm” that “has remained ever since a basic category of Western speculation, 
reappearing when a rising force wished to express its claim to dominance of the age” 
(HPI II, 111).  Joachim, according to Voegelin, represents “the end of an evolution” away 
from the understanding of the Augustinian construction of history” (HPI II, 127).  The 
impetus for the evolutionary change was the existence of the religious orders that began 
to infuse European life with a new religious sentiment and a “feeling that the rise of the 
orders was symptomatic of progressive spirituality inaugurating a new phase of Christian 
life.”  This, in turn, created the conditions by which the “revelational experience of 
Joachim” was able “to touch off the potentialities of this field of sentiments and to create 
the new pattern of Christian history.  The decisive step is the conception of the Third 
Realm, not as the eternal Sabbath, but as an age that is to follow the dispensation of the 
Son as the last age of human history” (HPI II, 128—29). As Nicholas Campion wryly 
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observes, “There is almost nothing original in Joachim’s ideas, and his importance lies in 
the simple fact that he was the right person in the right place at the right time.”13  
 Joachim of Flora was a Cistercian monk who had experienced the call to enter the 
order during a pilgrimage to the Holy Land.  And, like the Norman Anonymous, Joachim 
found the essential pessimism regarding human existence in history he saw in the Civitas 
Dei of Saint Augustine to be less desirable than the search for a meaning of and direction 
to history as it was experienced by human beings in their worldly existence.    
 According to the speculation of Joachim, “The history of mankind is a progress of 
spiritual evolution from the natural, pre-Mosaic law, through the Mosaic and evangelical 
laws, to the fullness of spiritual freedom” (HPI II, 129).  This evolutionary passage is 
marked by human existence in the ages of history, each of which corresponds to one of 
the persons of the Holy Trinity.  And the beginning of each realm is preceded by a period 
of preparation.  Joachim was to be the prophet of the third age, the age of the Holy Spirit 
in which the spiritual freedom of the individual human person will be realized under the 
guidance of a new leader, the dux.   
 The Trinitarian structure of history was nothing new.  In the Gospel of Matthew, 
the generations to Christ were reckoned in three groups, each encompassing fourteen 
generations (1:1—17).    And the logic of the identities of the Holy Trinity lent itself to 
divisions of three.  Thus Irenaeus was the first patristic leader to divide history into three 
ages and natural phenomena into three types.14  In the Manichean heresy, the struggle 
between the opposing forces of light and darkness passed through three stages.15  Even 
                                                 
13 Nicolas Campion, The Great Year:  Astrology, Millenarianism and History in the Western Tradition 
(London:  Arkana, 1994), 372. 
14 Ibid., 321—22. 
15 Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, 2nd ed. (Boston:  Beacon Press, 1958) 206—237. 
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St. Augustine had appropriated the use of the number three for the divisions of human 
affairs and the human qualities necessary for their study.  However, while “the trinitarian 
scheme of history was taken for granted by Christian of the first millennium,” the 
mystical revelation of Joachim would give the symbol a resonance that would move 
through history.16 
Voegelin maintains that as a result of Joachim’s construction of history and its 
entering into “the main stock of Western political speculation,” it has had a profound 
effect upon the understanding of history generally.  Joachim’s periodization of a 
progressive history resulting in the appearance of the Third Realm has created the 
impression that “history has to have an intelligible structure.  The present age must not be 
a time of meaningless transition; it has to be a meaningful step toward a definite goal.  
The Augustinian pessimistic waiting for the end of a structureless saeculum has 
disappeared” (HPI II, 130).   Accordingly, the “third age would be to its predecessors as 
broad daylight compared with starlight and dawn, as high summer compared with winter 
and spring….  The Empire would be no more and the Church of Rome would give place 
to a free community of perfected beings who would have no need of clergy or sacraments 
or Bible.”17 
Joachim’s construction of history is premised upon “the sentiments engendered by 
the Cistercian environment.  The three realms are characterized by the predominance of 
the law, of grace, and of the spirit” (HPI II, 133).  As such, the third age, the age of the 
Spirit was supposed to be realized in the community in “the perfect contemplative life of 
the monk,” and “the perfection of life…in the three elements of contemplation, liberty, 
                                                 
16 Campion, 322. 
17 Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium (Fairlawn, NJ:  Essential Books, 1957), 100. 
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and spirit” (HPI II, 133).  There is something almost tragic about the uses to which his 
symbolic construction would be put.  Löwith writes: 
 
Joachim…could not foresee that his religious intention—that of 
desecularizing the church and restoring its spiritual fervor—would, in the 
hands of others, turn into its opposite:  the secularization of the world 
which became increasingly worldly by the very fact that eschatological 
thinking about last things was introduced into penultimate matters, a fact 
which intensified the power of the secular drive toward a final solution of 
problems which cannot be solved by their own means and on their own 
level….  The revolution which had been proclaimed within the framework 
of an eschatological faith and with reference to the perfect monastic life 
was taken over, five centuries later, by a philosophical priesthood, which 
interpreted the process of secularization in terms of a “spiritual” 
realization of the Kingdom of God on earth.  As an attempt at realization 
the spiritual pattern of Lessing, Ficht, Schelling, and Hegel could be 
transposed into the positivistic and materialistic schemes of Comte and 
Marx.  The third dispensation of the Joachites reappeared as a third 
International and a third Reich inaugurated by a dux or a Führer who was 
acclaimed as a savior and greeted by millions with Heil!18 
 
  
 In summary, it may be that the Pauline compromise with history was based on the 
idea that the kingdom of God is both present and future.  St. Augustine had conceived of 
the division between sacred and profane history with the realization of the destiny of 
human beings beyond history.   However, the consciousness of epoch seen in Melito and 
Orosius had planted the seed of an idea regarding a progressive history of human beings 
in the world under the hand of Providence that was tempered through the Norman 
Anonymous to reach its fruition in the visionary revelation of Joachim of Flora.   The 
imperial ruler of Joachitic speculation would be transposed from a spiritual to a political 
figure in Dante (HPI III, 79—80), and although Dante would seek to offset his temporal 
Dux with a new spiritual head of the empire, it would be the transfigured temporal ruler 
                                                 
18 Löwith, 158—59. 
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that would rule the march of history from Dante forward.  Thomas Aquinas attempted to 
stem the tide released by the Joachitic speculation, but the genie was out of the bottle. 
Symbols of the Epoch 
The influence of Joachim is most clearly seen in the program of Saint Francis of Assisi.  
As Voegelin notes, “As symbolic figures of their age, the persons of Saint Francis of 
Assisi and Joachim of Fiore are intimately connected.  Saint Francis could not have been 
seen by the Spirituals as the decisive figure inaugurating a new epoch of Christian history 
unless the prophecies of Joachim had furnished the symbolic pattern for their 
interpretation” (HPI II, 135).   
Voegelin argues that with Saint Francis and the Franciscan movement,  
 
The penetration of the spirit into the realm of nature has now reached its 
full development.  Saint Francis uses the formulas of eschatological 
hardness, and he can act hard, but the sentiment that moves him does not 
deny the world; on the contrary, it adds to the world a dimension of which 
it had been hitherto deprived in the Christian dispensation.  The joy of 
creaturely existence and the joyful expansion of his world reaching out in 
brotherly love to that section of the world that glorifies God by nothing 
but the humbleness of being created, this simple joy in the newly 
discovered fellowship of God’s creation, makes Francis the great saint. 
 Through his discovery and acceptance of the lowest stratum of 
creation as a meaningful part of the world, he became on of the 
momentous figures of Western history.  He took the humble by the hand 
and led them to their dignity, not in an otherworldly realm of God, but in a 
realm of God that is not of this world.  And he gave nature its Christian 
soul, and with it the dignity that made it the object of observation  
(HPI II, 141). 
 
However, the new realm that Francis opened up was “distinctly intramundane” and stood 
“in opposition to the imperium with its Gelasian principles” (HPI II, 140).  Saint Francis 
attempted to construct the third age of Joachim’s historical construction.  Instead of an 
opening of the realm of the spirit, Saint Francis created the complex of ideas concerning 
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the construction of community that stood in opposition to the evocation of the sacrum 
imperium.   
 Furthermore, there is a certain militancy to Saint Francis and the Franciscans 
generally that would become increasingly problematic.  In point of fact, it is reminiscent 
of the Tyconian problem to which we have repeatedly referred.  In the case of the 
Franciscan Spirituals, the puritanical struggle against vice echoes the puritanical struggle 
of the Donatists against the established institution of the church.   Voegelin points to the 
Franciscan tract Praise of Virtues and argues that it indicates the “tragic necessity that the 
creation of an order, even of love, requires demonic ruthlessness of action, offensive to 
the environment.”  To struggle against vice, however, is a collective struggle against the 
world itself.  Voegelin notes 
 
It is impossible to understand the Franciscan attitude if the ethical 
categories of virtues and vices are supposed to refer to the character of the 
individual person alone.  In the context of the Praise, virtues and vices are 
forces emanating from the supreme powers of good and evil, from God 
and Satan, and taking possession of men.  The struggle of virtues against 
vices becomes a collective undertaking; the virtues of the one group have 
the function of “confounding” the vices of the other….  The possession of 
the virtues thus serves the attack on the world with its institutions of 
family, property, inheritance, governmental authority, and intellectual 
civilization (HPI II, 135—37). 
 
In the case of Saint Francis personally, this struggle against the vices and the world takes 
the form of simple preaching and a general call to repentance for the faithful.  However, 
to paraphrase Publius, wise men will not always rule.  Voegelin observes that what 
“distinguished Saint Francis from other sectarian leaders and made him a saint instead of 
a heresiarch, was his convincing sincerity, his exemplary personal realization of the 
ideals he taught, his charm, his humility, and his unworldly naïveté” (HPI II, 138—39). It 
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was perhaps this odd combination that made him so effective and also so myopic 
regarding the forces he was inadvertently unleashing on the world. 
The Franciscan formulation was not simply a matter of recognizing the human 
dignity of the poor, but rather an elevation of “the poor” to the status of agents of change.  
Voegelin argues, “The spirit of revolt against the established powers was spreading all 
over the Western world, ranging from the intellectuals to the townspeople and the 
peasants.  The movement was increasingly directed against the feudal organization of 
society (HPI II, 138).  Saint Francis transformed the image of Christ and in so doing had 
provided a symbol of opposition to the established order of the society generally.  
Voegelin argues that in his conformance to the life of Christ, “Saint Francis had 
conformed the image of Christ to the human possibilities,” but the grandeur of “Christ the 
king in his glory” was lost.   
 
In the sequence of intramundane forces using Christian symbols for their 
self-interpretation, Saint Francis had created the symbol of the 
intramundane Christ, but this symbol can absorb only that aspect of the 
person of the Savior that conforms with the humble and the suffering of 
this world.  The function of Christ as the priestly-royal hierarch had to be 
neglected; the Christ of Saint Francis is an innerworldy Christ of the poor; 
he is no longer the head of the whole corpus mysticum of mankind.  The 
great evocative achievement of the compromise with the world, 
particularly in the Western imperial period was the understanding of the 
natural differentiation of men and of the spiritual and temporal hierarchies 
as functions in the mystical body.  In this preference for the Christ of the 
poor and he neglect for the hierarchical Christ, this great civilizational 
work was, in principle, undone by Saint Francis.  The world had to break 
asunder when Christ was no longer the head of the differentiated body of 
Christianity but only the symbol of particular forces who claimed for 
themselves a privileged status in conformance with him (HPI II, 142). 
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 Which is not to say, however, that the image of the imperial Christ had simply 
vanished.  Indeed, nearly contemporaneously with the new reality proposed by the 
Franciscans emerged Frederick II (d. 1250).  Voegelin asserts:   
 
We have seen how Saint Francis transformed the image of Christ into that 
of the suffering Jesus with the consequence that Christ became an 
intramundane symbol to which the poor could conform while the 
hierarchies were left without the messianic head.  The ideas of Frederick II 
represent the opposite attempt at creating an image of rulership in 
conformance with Christ as the cosmocrator, with the Messiah in all his 
glory (HPI II, 157).  
 
 Voegelin notes with some irony that the “last medieval emperor was the founder 
of the first modern state.  In him the crisis of the age met with the man who became its 
perfect symbol through the circumstances of his descent and through his personal genius” 
(HPI II, 144).  Frederick II came to power as the sacrum imperium was being battered by 
political and spiritual powers on the “’fringe’ that, by their sheer weight, shifted the 
center of politics to the west and the south.  The rise of these powers had the consequence 
of dissolving the imperial idea and of supplanting it with new evocative ideas adapted to 
a world of rival powers; the Gelasian principle, as the dominating evocative idea of the 
West, was on the wane and the problems of power politics in the modern sense emerged” 
(HPI II, 148).  It was in his capacity to recognize and adapt to the changing situation that 
Frederick II’s greatness and weakness may be observed. 
 In the Proeoemium to the Constitutions of Melfi, Frederick II advanced an idea of 
rulership that Voegelin describes as a “naturalistic theory of government, deriving the 
function of rulership from the structure of intramundane human reality” (HPI II, 153).  
But it does so by the use of “Christian language.”  The theory advanced in the 
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Prooemium  is that government was instituted among human beings after the Fall, which 
had resulted in the loss of immortality as a punishment.  “With the death of man, 
however, creation would have lost its meaning, and in order not to destroy creation with 
the first man, God made him fertile.  The inclination to transgression being inherited, 
men fell out among themselves, and God provided rulers of the people to preserve the 
order of human society.” Through this construction, the grace of God as represented by 
the Incarnation of Christ is removed from the calculation.  Furthermore, “(t)he 
substitution of the community of mortal man for immortal man re-forms the hierarchical 
structure of the world; the creation reaches its climax in the ruler who has to preserve the 
order of the people” (HPI II, 153).    
The third, and perhaps most important, element of the construction is what 
Voegelin describes as its “Averroist” element.  “The place in the hierarchy of the 
paradisiacal immortal couple has been taken, after the Fall, by the succession of 
generations of mortal man.  The collective immortality of mankind has succeeded the 
individual immortality of Paradise.”  The importance of this sentiment lies in the fact that 
by adopting a position that substitutes the immortality of the species rather than the 
immortality of the individual, Frederick II struck at the heart of the Pauline conception of 
the body of Christ.    
 
The collectivist interpretation of mankind is, by principle, opposed to the 
Christian idea of the corpus mysticum.  The idea of the mystical body 
achieves an understanding to the spiritual unity of mankind while leaving 
the natural gifts as well as the human personality and the immortality of 
the soul intact.  The collectivist idea, in its logically elaborated form, 
absorbs the human personality into the spirit of the group.  Man is the 
individuation of a generic intellect, and death means depersonalization 
through dissolution into the world-mind (or the group-mind)….  In the 
field of ethics and politics this anthropological assumption may have the 
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consequence of supporting the ideal of conformance to a type, a group 
discipline, and of governmental measures for the enforcement of such 
conformance and discipline.  The Averroist anthropology may become, in 
brief, the philosophical basis for a collectivist totalitarian organization of 
society (HPI II, 154). 
 
In place of the corpus mysticum in which the spiritual equality of individual human 
beings is taken as the origin of community, Frederick II would substitute a system in 
which the ruler is elevated in order to maintain order in God’s creation.  Thus  
 
the evocation of the Constitutions tends to reserve the dignity of full 
humanity to one person in the community only, the ruler.  This severe 
irruption of the intramundane force of rulership into the realm of Christian 
ideas, the transformation of the mystical body of the immortal faithful 
under the leadership of Christ into a mystical body of mortals under the 
leadership of the ruler, had to precipitate a crisis when it went beyond the 
stage of implications, as it actually did in the deeds and pronouncements 
of the emperor and his associates (HPI II, 156). 
 
In the case of Frederick II, his conflicts with the papacy destroyed the existential 
representation of the idea of the sacrum imperium and plunged the papacy into a slow 
death spiral that would not reach final fruition until Boniface VIII issued the Unam 
Sanctum. 
  This is not to say, however, that the idea of the sacrum imperium dies with 
Frederick.  The idea itself remains, but the personality and institutions that have any hope 
of achieving the realization of the idea are swept from the stage of history.  Voegelin 
notes that the “relative importance of the sacrum imperium became weaker because new 
powers arose in the ‘fringe’ that, by their sheer weight, shifted the center of politics to the 
west and the south.  The rise of these powers had the consequence of dissolving the 
imperial idea and of supplanting it with new evocative ideas adapted to a world of rival 
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powers; the Gelasian principle as the dominating evocative idea of the West was on the 
wane, and the problems of power politics in the modern sense emerged” (HPI II, 148). 
 In the dichotomy between Saint Francis and Frederick II is the symbolic 
representation of what had occurred within the sacrum imperium.  The elements of the 
Christian personality, indeed of the personality of Christ himself, had been split into two 
images.  Neither complete in themselves, yet both clung to by their adherents with a 
ferocity that only extreme faith could give.  The broken body of the corpus mysticum 
would move into the future and be given another opportunity at life through the 
philosophical/theological explorations of Saint Thomas Aquinas.  Unfortunately, like 
Plato trying to salvage the polis from the depths of his own soul, Saint Thomas’ vision 
would likewise be frustrated.  
Conclusion 
For all practical purposes, the break in the idea of the imperium had occurred when 
Frederick II died.  However, the potential for renewal remained in the willingness of the 
church to adapt to the changes brought on by the changing political situation.  Saint 
Thomas Aquinas would offer a way out of the mess that the wreck of the imperium had 
created.  Unfortunately, the inability of the church to recognize what had happened and 
respond to it effectively is the subject of chapter four. 
 
Chapter Four:  The Age of Confusion 
 
Saint Thomas Aquinas at the Edge of the Abyss 
 
In The New Science of Politics, the later Voegelin would remark that the substance of 
history consisted of the differentiation of reality through experience and that “the 
maximum of differentiation was achieved through Greek philosophy and Christianity.”  
Furthermore, Voegelin argued that to “recede from the maximum of differentiation is 
theoretical retrogression” (NSP, 79).  The meaning of the phrase “maximum 
differentiation” that occurs with Christianity, however, cannot be understood without 
reference to the work of Saint Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274).  It is through Saint Thomas 
that the maximum differentiation of which Voegelin speaks actually occurs.  This fact is 
illustrated by Voegelin’s analysis of Saint Thomas in the History of Political Ideas.  
Indeed, the problem of Christian political order may be defined in terms of “Before 
Aquinas” and “After Aquinas” in much the same way that history is conventionally 
designated in terms of the Incarnation. 
 As part of the analysis in the History, Voegelin writes:  “Since the time of Dante 
the spiritual realist has been faced with the problem that the surrounding political reality 
of the Western world no longer can adequately absorb the spirit into its public 
institutions” (HPI III, 68).  The sacrum imperium, the organizing principle of the Middle 
Ages had been broken.  The nearly contemporaneous lives of Frederick II and Saint 
Francis of Assisi are a fitting symbol of what had occurred.  The sacrum imperium had 
been constructed with the central idea of the Pauline corpus mysticum, the body of Christ 
that consisted of the believers in a unified whole with Christ as the head.  With Saint 
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Francis and Frederick II, the perception of a unified whole was irreparably broken.  The 
ties that bound the imperial order together were broken. 
 Saint Thomas had witnessed what had happened and perhaps he perceived what 
was going to happen.  In Voegelin’s analysis, Aquinas offers the compromise required to 
salvage order from impending chaos.  Unfortunately, as Voegelin observes, Aquinas is a 
representative of “the spiritually and intellectually mature Western man” (HPI II, 232).  
And while this may be true, Aquinas is not representative of human beings as such.  
Rather the intellectual, personal, and spiritual qualities of Aquinas must be accepted as 
the exception rather than the rule.  Or, more precisely, Aquinas is representative of the 
maximum human potential realized. 
 The problem with the contraction of the reality given to human beings that began 
with Orosius’ conception of the linkage between Christianity and Rome, through 
Cardinal Humbert and the Norman Anonymous and the speculations of Joachim of Flora 
was that in each instance the contraction of the overall reality of existence was also a 
contraction of the meaning of human being.  The reason that Frederick II and Saint 
Francis are symbolic of the age is that each of them represent different aspects of the 
complete human existence under God.  However, after Joachim, the full reality of human 
existence was no longer a primary concern.  Hence, with Siger de Brabant (d.ca. 1284) 
and Boetheius of Dacia (fl. 1270), you get a contraction of human existence under God in 
their interpretations of the Aristotle of Averroës.  As Voegelin writes, “The idea of 
mankind as the mystical body of Christ is replaced by the idea of the human species as a 
collective unit existing through the process of generation from eternity.  No individual 
soul, furthermore, gives form to the body, but the Intellect uno in numero, one in number, 
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operates on the human beings” (HPI II, 192).   This, in turn, results in a hierarchical 
structure of the human collective based on the degree of participation in the collective 
mind and “the ideal of intellectual life is coupled with the idea that the man of substance 
is superior to the poor man” (HPI II, 193).  Voegelin argues that this “strict immanentist 
construction of the world permits the idea neither of a creative divine act as the beginning 
nor of divine intervention at a later point.  The world exists from eternity and its 
existence in time is governed by nothing but by the laws of its fixed internal 
construction” (HPI II, 194). 
 In Saint Thomas, we see the shape of rebellion against this construction, and, as it 
happens, things to come.  Thomas’ great insight, cited by Voegelin, “The order of things 
in Truth, is the order of things in Being” is nothing less than “the experience of identity 
between the truth of God and the reality of the world” (HPI II, 207).  And in Thomas, the 
intellectual life is indeed elevated.  This is informed by Thomas’ reading of Aristotle, but 
while the intellectual “is still superior in understanding to the common man…the 
common man is not a vilis homo,” as in the construction of Siger.  “What the philosopher 
knows through the activity of his intellect, the layman knows through the revelation of 
God in Christ.  The supernatural manifestation of the Truth in Christ and its natural 
manifestation in the intellectual as the mature man stand side by side” (HPI II, 208—
209).  In other words, the hierarchy of human order is not conditioned upon an 
understanding of an intrinsic moral superiority on the part of the intellectual, all share 
equally in the capacity to experience reason and revelation.  Part of the genius of Saint 
Thomas’ construction is the understanding of the essential equality of human beings 
before God. 
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 Indeed, it is the parallel construction of reason and revelation that Voegelin sees 
the greatest element of Saint Thomas’ thought.  “Faith and reason,” Voegelin writes  
 
cannot be in conflict because the human intellect carries the impression of 
the divine intellect; it is impossible that God should be guilty of deceiving 
man by leading him through his intellect to results conflicting with the 
revealed faith.  It follows that the human intellect, though capable of 
errors, will arrive at the truth wherever it goes.  The revealed faith, 
however, contains besides the truths that are accessible to the natural 
intellect, such as the existence of God, other truths, such as the Trinitarian 
character of the divinity, that are inaccessible to reason. 
 
Through this construction, Saint Thomas “faces the intramundane forces that threaten to 
wreck the Christian world and he successfully attempts a synthesis….  The authority of 
the intellect is preserved, but through its transcendental orientation it is transformed from 
an intramundane rival of faith into a legitimate expression of natural man”  
(HPI II, 209—10). 
 In terms of its implications for politics, the best regime is that which is constituted 
to allow the mutual cooperation of spiritually free individuals.  As Voegelin notes, 
“Thomas makes freedom or servitude the criterion of good or bad government.  If the 
members of the community cooperate freely in the enterprise of common existence, the 
government is good, be it a monarchy, aristocracy, or polity.  If one or many are free and 
conduct the government in their [own] interest by exploiting the others, the government is 
bad” (HPI II, 218—19).  As for the relationship between the powers of the imperium, 
temporal and spiritual, Voegelin argues,  
 
The order of the multitude of Christian men has to be under the ruler who 
is the spiritual king of mankind—that is, under Christ.  The ministry of 
this spiritual reign is entrusted to the priesthood, in order to keep it distinct 
from the natural earthly affairs, and in particular to the Roman pontiff, “to 
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whom all kings of the Christian people are subordinate as to the Lord 
Jesus himself….” Under the hands of Thomas the term political begins to 
assume its modern meaning; the Gelasian dichotomy of spiritual and 
temporal powers began to be replaced by the modern dichotomy of 
religion and politics.  With Thomas, the political sphere, in the modern 
sense, was still completely oriented toward the spiritual, but the beginning 
of the momentous evolution that led, through the Lockean privatization of 
religion and the assignment of a public monopoly to politics, to the 
totalitarian integration of an intramundane spirituality into the public 
sphere of politics can be discerned (HPI II, 218—19). 
 
And perhaps the reason for this shift is illuminated by the fact that the  
 
sacrum imperium with the Gelasian powers is no longer topical; we are 
now in the time of the Interregnum.  The temporal power, which at the 
time of the Investiture Struggle was still implicitly understood as the 
imperial power, is now replaced by the plurality of political units with 
their immanent natural structure, and the spiritual power recedes from its 
place as an order within the unit of the Christian empire into the position 
of a spiritual superstructure over the multitude of civitates (HPI II, 212).   
 
And it was this reality that made it so easy for Saint Thomas to import the political 
categories established by Aristotle as the criteria by which types of regimes may be 
defined with the caveat that Saint Thomas argues that even Aristotle’s “good regimes” 
could be bad because of the theory of “natural slavery” contained therein.  “For Thomas 
there are no natural slaves.  His anthropology operates with the idea of the mature, free 
Christian, and in his magnanimous idea of freedom we can even feel a touch of the 
aristocratic egalitarianism of Saint Francis” (HPI II, 219).  
 And Saint Thomas is at his most profound in his description of the “free 
Christian.”  As part of the development of the theory of law, Saint Thomas confronts the 
question of the New Law of Christ.  In a discussion that Voegelin describes as 
“revolutionary,” Saint Thomas skirts the edges of the theological position of the 
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institutional church.  Voegelin writes:  “The lex nova is written by the grace of the spirit 
into the hearts of the faithful, only secondarily is it a written law.  With a radical sweep, 
not eliminating but at least not mentioning the church, the essence of Christianity is put 
directly in faith, in the pistis in the Pauline sense….  The principle of justification by faith 
is made the essence of the lex nova” (HPI II, 230).  In a footnote, Voegelin warns against 
understanding that one can find hints of “Lutheranism in the theology of Thomas 
Aquinas,” however, he also notes that “within the disquisition of the lex nova, taken for 
itself, the spiritualism of Aquinas becomes, indeed, somewhat forgetful of institutions” 
(HPI II, 230n). 
 In seeking to categorize Saint Thomas for the purpose of the History of Political 
Ideas, Voegelin argues that his place  
 
has to be fixed with regard to the irruption of the intramundane forces 
since the Investiture Struggle.  The new age, announcing itself in the 
stirring of these forces, could be characterized by the entrance of the 
‘world’ into the orbit of the otherworldly spiritualism of Christianity.  
Thomas stands on the dividing line of the ages in the sense that his 
harmonizing powers were able to create a Christian spiritual system that 
absorbed the contents of the stirring world in all its aspects:  of the 
revolutionary people, of the natural prince, and of the independent 
intellectual.  His system is medieval as a manifestation of Christian 
spiritualism with its claim to universal validity.  It is modern because it 
expresses the forces that were to determine the political history of the 
West to this time:  the constitutionally organized people, the bourgeois 
commercial society, the spiritualism of the Reformation, the 
intellectualism of science. 
 
However, the greatness of Saint Thomas cannot obscure the fact that ultimately his 
sentiments did not prevail.   Voegelin argues, “The work of Saint Thomas was a triumph 
of the spirit and the intellect over the forces of the age but it did not change their course” 
(HPI III, 37). 
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 The course of history was not represented in the creation of Saint Thomas, but 
was rather more closely related to the symbols of Saint Francis and Frederick II, the 
broken body of the sacrum imperium and the surgical incision placed between the realm 
of the spirit and the realm of politics.  Instead of following the path of compromise 
opened by Saint Thomas, the church and the nations would follow different paths through 
the later Middle Ages to the Reformation.  It was the epoch in which the spiritual 
orientation of the comprehensive community of the West was transformed and 
transferred to other carriers of spiritual authority outside of the universal church.  It was 
the age of increasing national consciousness and conflict between states.  It was the age 
in which “the people” became the determinants of political systems.  More importantly, 
perhaps, is the fact that it was also the period in which the church abandoned its proper 
position as the institutional representative of spiritual truth.  And finally, to paraphrase 
Leo Strauss, it was the epoch in which the orientation toward what was highest in human 
beings no longer became the fundamental principle of order. 
 After the work of Saint Thomas, Voegelin argues, “the complexes of sentiments 
and ideas” that emerged can be placed into two broad categories.  “On the one side, the 
spiritualism of the church has developed into the ecclesiasticism of Boniface VIII and 
Giles of Rome, and on the other side we can observe the national sentiments reaching the 
stage where they inject problems of national institutions into general political theory” 
(HPI III, 104).  However, the first category may be further subdivided in that in the 
ecclesiasticism of the church we can most clearly see the influx of the intramundane 
forces most adequately.   
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The problem of Christian political order in the period between Aquinas and the 
Reformation should not be misunderstood as a problem of church and state, or even as 
church and states, or even as church under state, although each of these factors do enter 
into the equation.  The real problem of Christian political order consisted of the doctrinal 
hardening that occurred as a result of the church as state.  This particular problem is the 
great underlying factor that allowed the increasing tensions that ultimately broke in the 
final schism of the church known as the Great Reformation.  It also represents the final 
destruction of the Pauline compromises with the world that had made Christian political 
order possible in the first place.   
The Church as State: Unam Sanctum 
In a previous chapter, we have already had occasion to note that even prior to the 
institution of the sacrum imperium, when Gregory I the Great was pope, “the papacy had 
grown…into a huge domainal administration” and “since Gregory it had acquired the 
characteristics of a temporal principality…the spiritual head of Christianity had become 
in addition a temporal monarch” (HPI II, 60; 79).  This process had continued throughout 
the Middle Ages.  Indeed, Voegelin argues that an understanding of the devolution of 
temporal authority as a distinct order within the universal empire of the imperium into 
what we today would define in terms of the purely political, as distinct from the spiritual, 
must be understood in light of the changing nature of the spiritual authority as 
represented in the offices of the universal church with the papacy at its head.1  
 
The great transformation of the charismatic temporal power within the 
imperium into political power in the modern sense was paralleled in the 
                                                 
1 For background on the development of the papal theory see J.A. Watt, “Spiritual and Temporal Powers,” 
in J.H. Burns, ed., The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought:  c. 350—c. 1450 (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 367—424. 
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church by the transformation of the papal spiritual power within the 
imperial order into the ecclesiastical organization as a distinct power unit 
side by side with the secular political units….  By the end of the thirteenth 
century the church herself had become a power unit organized as an 
absolute monarchy (HPI III, 41). 
 
 Indeed, by 1310 at the latest, “the church became the first absolute Renaissance 
monarchy with a competent central bureaucracy and a ruthlessly efficient financial 
system.  Similar standards of efficiency were reached in the national realms only toward 
the end of the fifteenth century, in Tudor England and in the France of Louis XI…” (HPI 
III, 167).  Thus Voegelin maintains that the “history of the church in the period after 
Saint Thomas is the history of the clash with the political powers and of the attempts at 
finding working relations between the church and the national political forces”  
(HPI III, 41). 
 The most important papal pronouncement, for our purposes, by which we can 
discern the changing nature of the church, was prompted by the dispute between Philip 
the Fair of France (d. 1314) and Boniface VIII (d. 1303).  The origin of the conflict was a 
financial dispute in which Philip attempted to levy the clergy in France.  This, of course, 
upset the financial system that the papacy had established to keep itself “on a lavish 
scale” (HPI III, 41).  The conflict was resolved with the death of Boniface VIII shortly 
after the affair of Anagni in 1303 in which mercenaries, hired by the French king, were 
unable to arrest the pontiff.2 In part, however, it was the issuance of the papal bull, the 
Unam Sanctum that prompted Philip to act.3 
                                                 
2 For an interesting account of the affair at Anagni see "William of Hundlehy's Account of the Anagni 
Outrage," trans. by H. G. J. Beck, Catholic Historical Review, 32 (1947), 200-201. 
3 On the history of the conflict between Philip and the papacy see Joseph R. Strayer, The Reign of Philip 
the Fair (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1980), 237—300; and Mary Mildred Curry, The Conflict 
Between Pope Boniface VIII and King Philip IV, the Fair (Washington, D.C.:  Catholic University of 
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 A charitable interpretation of the Unam Sanctum is that it represents the changing 
circumstances in which the church and the papacy found themselves in at the beginning 
of the fourteenth century.  The old order of the sacrum imperium was gone, and in its 
place nothing had yet emerged.  In fact, the papal decree may be understood as an explicit 
recognition that the days of the old order have indeed passed.  Implicit in the 
pronouncement is the understanding that the old order has passed, or is passing, away.  
Voegelin argues, “The clash between the pope and France was the very occasion upon 
which the problem of secular national politics, without relations to the interests of the 
papacy were discovered.  Up to this time the political interests of the spiritual and 
temporal powers had been, on the whole parallel” (HPI III, 44).  However, these parallel 
interests had only occurred within the context of the mythical structure of the Sacred 
Empire.  Once that was broken, the interests of the temporal and spiritual authorities 
began to move in different directions.   
 Again, however, a charitable interpretation would note that from the perspective 
of Boniface VIII, the relevance of the church as the spiritual authority for a universal 
community was under attack and demanded a vigorous response.  In other words, it could 
be argued that Boniface VIII was attempting to salvage the dream of universal 
Christendom from the wreck of the sacrum imperium.  Voegelin hints at as much in his 
analysis:   
 
The theory of the charismata and the Gelasian balance of powers was 
applicable only as long as the temporal power was represented by the 
more or less uncontested single imperial head.  When the unity of 
Christian mankind split up into national bodies politics, the absolutist 
                                                                                                                                                 
America, 1927).  The complete text of Unam Sanctum is available online at 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/b8-unam.html 
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construction of the power hierarchy was one possible means of saving the 
spiritual unit of Western mankind.   
 
The alternative, what actually happened, was “the disintegration of the spiritual power 
paralleling and following the disintegration of imperial power.  The several temporal 
political units would tend to acquire the status of separate spiritual units, as they actually 
did with the rise of nationalism as the spiritual determinant of Western political 
communities” (HPI III, 46). 
 With that said, though, it was clear from the issuance of the bull itself that the 
spiritual authority, rather than moving in a direction that would clarify its position as the 
institutional realization of a universal spiritual movement, demonstrated that its perceived 
interests were really quite different.   
 Voegelin argues that the “critical statement” made in the Unam Sanctum is the 
declaration:  “That every human creature is under the Roman pontiff we declare, say, and 
define and pronounce it necessary for salvation” (HPI III, 43).  Furthermore, in the 
Gelasian language of the two swords, the logical extension of the idea is taken to mean 
that the two swords, spiritual and temporal, are to be administered, in the first instance, 
“in the hands of the priest,” and in the second, “at the sufferance of the priest.”  This is 
because, as Voegelin quotes from the papal bull itself:  “For according to the order of the 
universe things cannot be equal or immediate but the lowest will be brought into order by 
the intermediate, and the lower by the higher” (HPI III, 45).  In other words, there is a 
hierarchy of powers that exist and the spiritual power, as represented by the 
administrative bodies of the church, is a higher power.  All powers are organized, 
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according to the logic of the bull, in a hierarchical structure, and the papacy sits at the 
apex of all powers, temporal and spiritual. 
 Lurking under the papal pronouncement, Voegelin sees the influence of Giles of 
Rome (Aegidius Romanus, d. 1316), papal counselor and author of De ecclesiastica 
potestate.  Voegelin sees in Giles “the will to power of the intellectual” personified (HPI 
III, 48).  Coupled with this is the observation  
 
that Giles was less interested in spiritual or temporal power than in power 
as such.  He was willing to advocate any power as absolute as long as he 
was associated with it.  If Giles were placed in a modern environment we 
would have to say that he was a Fascist by temperament.  His fundamental 
position is perhaps best revealed in this remark:  “it is natural that those 
who are superior in intellect and excel in industry should rule.”  This is the 
confession of an intellectual activist (HPI III, 49). 
 
As a result of Giles indulgence in the libido dominandi, he developed a theory of power 
that is distinctly modern in that it is “the first Western treatise on power as such”  
(HPI III, 50). 
 Giles elaborates a theory of power through an explication of the power of the 
papacy.  “The plenitude of the spiritual and material powers belong to the pope.  Both 
swords are in the hands of the church, but they are not held in the same manner.”  In an 
argument that was advanced in the bull itself, Voegelin notes that according to Giles’ 
theory, “the church has the spiritual sword to use herself, and she has the material sword 
to be used at her command by the secular princes.  The princely powers are completely 
subordinate to the papal.  Secular power has the function of ‘ordering matter at the 
disposition of the ecclesiastical power.’”  In order to realize this goal, 
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All organs and instruments of government, the arms, the earthly goods, 
and the laws have to be administered in obedience to, and at the will of, 
the church….  All laws specifically, imperial as well as those of other 
princes, are invalid if they are in conflict with ecclesiastical laws; and 
confirmation by the spiritual power is required for their validity….  These 
technical rules make Christian mankind a closed governmental system 
with respect to legislation, administration, and the use of the instruments 
of coercion (HPI III, 51). 
 
Furthermore, this “closed system” extends to the practice of philosophy and theology.  
Voegelin argues, “A generation after Saint Thomas, who could establish the freedom and 
independence of the intellect because he was a great spiritualist, there appeared in Giles 
the first modern political intellectual to use the intellect as a subservient instrument for 
the support of a dogmatic position in much the same manner as do our contemporary 
leftist and rightist intellectuals.”  Indeed, according to Voegelin, in Giles “tendency 
toward a rigidly controlled and closed system” we can observe the first stirrings of a 
system “that today we should call ideological” (HPI III, 52). 
 Indeed, within the closed system of power advocated by both Unam Sanctum and 
the theoretical justification of Giles, the role of the individual human person outside of 
the ecclesiastical hierarchy is that of a “subject” as opposed to the “free citizen” of the 
realm.  And this is, in fact, the reason for Voegelin’s opprobrium toward both the papal 
bull and Giles’ formulation.  In the theoretical construction, a powerful ruler is required 
to exert power over human beings in order to produce certain effects.  Giles establishes 
that the spiritual power, with its representation in the hierarchical order of the papacy as 
the supreme power on earth.  However, 
 
Corresponding to the powerful ruler appears, at the other end of the scale, 
the powerless subject, obedient and completely subservient, having no 
natural rights, but only such rights as are derived from his status in the 
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power organization and granted by the absolute holder of all power.  The 
subjects are servi ascripticii, servi empticii, censuarii, tributarii; they are 
in a state of servitude (servitus); and they have no total dominion over 
earthly goods, but only a dominium particulare with obligation of tribute 
to the power…  This harsh doctrine is aggravated by the theory that God, 
who might have exerted the dominion in the world without earthly rulers, 
has given power to the princes because he wanted the creatures to 
participate in his dignity; the creatures should not be idle but have a sphere 
of power and action of their own.  This human dignity in the image of 
omnipotent divinity is given to the rulers only.  It does not become clear 
whether the subjects share in this dignity; the creation of man in the image 
of God becomes dangerously close to being the privilege of those who 
hold power (HPI III, 50—51). 
 
In one fell swoop, Giles has redefined human nature, the community of the faithful, and 
destroyed the Pauline compromise with the natural gifts of humanity. 
 Voegelin clarifies this point with a discussion of the relationship between the 
argument advanced in Unam Sanctum regarding the “judging” of the pontiff, or spiritual 
authority, and the Biblical justification offered within the bull itself which cites 1 Cor. 
2:15.   In the papal pronouncement, Boniface VIII offers the argument that “when a 
temporal power deviates, it will be judged by the spiritual power; and when a minor 
spiritual power deviates it can be judged only by God, not by man.  For this the Apostle is 
witness when he says ‘The spiritual man judges all things; but he himself is not judged by 
anybody’ (1 Cor. 2:15).”  However, the use of the scriptural passage indicates a severe 
case of selective interpretation, as Voegelin is quick to point out.  In the context from 
which the pope pulled out his quotation, Saint Paul is, in fact clarifying the distinction 
between the pneumatikos and the psychikos.  The pneumatikos is the mature Christian 
who has been touched by the spirit of God.  In this way he or she is capable of discussing 
the wisdom of God.  The psychikos, the person who is concerned only with the wisdom 
of human beings cannot know the wisdom of God until such time as he or she responds to 
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the call and is transformed into the pneumatikos.  Thus, the use by Boniface VIII is a 
diabolical interpretation of the passage.  Voegelin clarifies the issue: 
 
The meaning of the sentence from 1 Corinthians thus can be summarized:  
the pneumatikos cannot be judged by the mere psychikos.  Obviously, this 
is not the meaning the sentence has in the argument of the Unam Sanctum.  
The bull uses the term spiritual equivocally so that it refers to the spiritual 
power as distinguished from the temporal power in the Christian mystical 
body.  For Saint Paul every Christian is on principle a pneumatikos, 
whether cleric or layman, while the bull arrogates the spirituality of man 
to the clerical order, and within this order in a highest degree to the 
Supreme Pontiff (HPI IV, 206). 
 
 The issuance of the Unam Sanctum cannot be dismissed as “a mere matter of 
equivocation, perhaps for the purpose of gaining a momentary political advantage” (HPI 
IV, 207).  As J.A. Watt argues, “The argument that Unam sanctum was atypical and to be 
set aside as a serious misinterpretation of conventional papal theory before and after the 
pontificate of Boniface VIII cannot be taken seriously.”4  T.S.R. Boase, in his 
sympathetic biography of Boniface VIII and charitable reading of the Unam Sanctum 
maintains, “The whole form of it is as a general statement detached form any particular 
circumstance”5—and that is indeed the problem.  Instead of not taking it seriously, the 
bull has to be understood as a general statement, as the expression of a new doctrine in 
which “sectarian spirituality and an imperial will to power” are made manifest.   
 
The sectarian element is revealed in the distinction between pneumatici 
and psychici.  In 1 Corinthians the distinction simply means Christians and 
non-Christians; the bull, however, does not imply that the psychici are not 
Christians; they are Christians, but of a lower spiritual rank.  Neither does 
the bull identify the two types with the distinction between elect and 
condemned souls; the pneumatici are not the invisible church, nor do the 
psychici belong to the civitas diaboli.  On the contrary, the homines 
                                                 
4 Watt, 367. 
5 T.S.R. Boase, Boniface VIII (London:  Constable and Co., Ltd., 1933), 318. 
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spirituales are very visible as they constitute the hierarchy of the church.  
The bull, indeed, transfers the spiritual ranks, as we should find them in a 
Gnostic sect, to the whole body of Christianity (HPI IV, 207). 
 
Whereas the Pauline theory of the charismata had conceived of the gifts of the spirit 
meted out equally to human beings according to their nature and enhancing their natural 
gifts, Boniface VIII would transfer those gifts into a signification of the elect as 
represented in the hierarchy of the church.  Voegelin notes, 
 
In the theory of the sacrum imperium the charismata are given by God 
directly; the functions of the corpus mysticum are exercised freely; the 
members are held together by mutual love in the Pauline sense (1 Cor. 13).  
The hierarchical theory of power is a new element, incompatible with the 
Pauline doctrine as well as the Gelasian.  It rationalizes the older Christian 
evocation in the direction of a hierarchical system with an absolute power 
at the top of the pyramid (HPI III, 46). 
 
 However, Unam Sanctum was in many ways a logical outcome of the contraction 
of reality that had been occurring since the Investiture Controversy within the hierarchy 
of the church itself.  The evidence for this is seen in the contraction of the meaning of the 
term “ecclesia,” itself.  The increasing ecclesiasticism of the church is more than simply a 
“political” problem proper, but rather is indicative of a general trend toward the closure 
of the universal religion to the experience of transcendent being.  In the early church, the 
ecclesia was a reference to the individual church communities that “formed the island 
organization of the populous Christianus in a sea of paganism.”  With the linkage of 
temporal and spiritual authority in the corpus mysticum through the Gelasian formula, the 
ecclesiae were joined in the body of Christ under the twin hierarchies of the spiritual and 
temporal authorities.  However, “in the twelfth century, a process of dissociation began.  
In the language of Saint Francis the ecclesia is on the point of contracting into a 
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sacerdotal organization, while the laymen, the idiotae, form a community of their own 
that tries, however, to live in peace with the traditional hierarchy” (HPI II, 140).  
By the time Boniface VIII issued the Unam Sanctum in 1302, this process of 
contraction was complete.  It is fine to maintain, as R.W. Carlyle and A.J. Carlyle have 
done that the extremism of the church died with Boniface VIII,6 however, the fact 
remains that for all practical purposes the institutional order of Christianity was 
understood by the church hierarchy to consist of the administrative apparatus of the 
church.  The new princes and the laity constituted a different community that was joined 
to it and upon whom it depended for material support.  As Voegelin notes, with  
 
the contraction of the term ecclesia to the meaning of the hierarchy with 
Saint Francis, and the withdrawal of the spiritual power into an 
organization ranking over the multitude of political units with Saint 
Thomas…the formulation of the claims of the church had shifted slowly 
but irresistibly from claims of a spiritual order to legal jurisdictional 
claims (HPI III, 41). 
 
Thus the Unam Sanctum is representative of the new situation of the church with regard 
to the temporal powers, but it is also representative of the church’s understanding of itself 
as a temporal power.  But even beyond that, through the issuance of the bull, the papacy 
had redefined human nature so that it would have been unrecognizable to the experience 
of Saint Paul. 
 In the analysis of the Defensor Pacis of Marsilius of Padua (d.ca. 1342), Voegelin 
maintains that in the chapter that contains the discussion of Christianity7 Marsilius writes 
“as if the treatise were written for readers who had never heard of Christianity before” 
                                                 
6 R.W. Carlyle and A.J. Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, vol. 5, The Political 
Theory of the Thirteenth Century (Edinburgh:  William Blackwood and Sons, Ltd., 1950), 438. 
7 Defensor Pacis, I.6. 
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and “could have been written only by a man to whom Christianity had become a cultural 
curiosity and did not appeal to any more profound sentiments” (HPI III, 98).  And this is 
largely true because of the actions of the church itself and the development of a doctrinal 
position that was contrary to the experience of faith.  The church itself had been coopted 
by the slow creeping in of intramundane forces that would begin to define the meaning of 
life for the people who lived it and the church would find itself increasingly incapable of 
dealing with the problems that confronted it.  It is a great irony indeed that in seeking to 
establish both the relevance and necessity of the papacy that Boniface VIII set in motion 
the end of universal Christendom—at least as it was constituted in the Catholic church.  
As Mandell Creighton observes,  
 
With Boniface VIII fell the medieval Papacy.  He had striven to develop 
the idea of the Papal monarchy into a definite system.  He had claimed for 
it the noble position of arbiter amongst the nations of Europe.  Had he 
succeeded, the power which, according to the mediaeval theory of 
Christendom, was vested in the Empire, would have passed over to the 
Papacy no longer as a theoretical right, but as an actual possession; and the 
Papacy would have asserted its surpremacy over the rising state system in 
Europe.  His failure showed that with the destruction of the Empire the 
Papacy had fallen likewise.  Both continued to exist in name, and set forth 
their old pretensions; but the Empire, in its old aspect of head of 
Christendom, had become a name of the past or a dream of the future 
since the failure of Frederick II.  The failure of Boniface VIII showed that 
a like fate had overtaken the Papacy….8 
 
Authoritarian Faith 
Voegelin saw the end as well, but not necessarily in the pronouncement of Boniface VIII.  
According to Voegelin, “a great cycle of Western Christianity come to its end” in the 
nominalism of William of Ockham (d. 1374).  It is through the nominalism of Ockham 
                                                 
8 Mandell Creighton, A History of the Papacy from the Great Schism to the Sack of Rome (London:  
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897), 32. 
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that the division between faith and reason, first posited in the reception of the Averroeist 
Aristotle and then demolished by Saint Thomas reemerges.  Voegelin argues, “There is 
nothing in William of the sublime certainty of Saint Thomas that the order of the world is 
a manifestation of the divine intellect and that it is to be recreated by man in the order of 
truth.” Thus the “order of nature does not have a structure of real universals; we cannot 
know, therefore, any substance in itself but can know it only by its accidentals.”  The 
effect of this construction is to restrict reality to prevent any interference with the 
adherence to faith.   
 
The establishment of a critical theory of knowledge is undertaken, 
not…primarily to secure the progress of science but in order to restrict 
science critically to its field of possibilities.  The substance of the world, 
including man…and God, cannot be reached by science.  The critical 
confinement of science to the accidentals has the purpose of saving faith 
from its encroachments.  In the realm of revealed faith and of theology 
reigns the potesta absoluta of God; it is the field of the completely 
irrational, defying attempts at a rational theology.  The revealed religion is 
a miracle of God, not to be caught in the categories of science; its content 
cannot be penetrated by natural reason and, hence, its acceptance is 
possible only through the miracle of faith operated by God in man.  The 
irrational content of the dogma is believable because God has, through his 
postesta absoluta, infused faith in man, compelling the sacrifice of the 
intellect.  William gives the first construction of a strictly fideistic 
religious position, accepting the rationally impenetrable dogma by an act 
of faith that is worked in man by a miracle of God” (HPI III, 106—107). 
 
The experience of faith as the loving response to the call of God is done away with, and 
in its place is “the idea of an absolute authoritarian God who posits the content of faith at 
his will” (HPI III, 111). 
In Voegelin’s account, William of Ockham is representative of the forces that 
were first unleashed in the twelfth century that have finally found a home.  Voegelin 
argues, “the cycle that began with the realism of the York Tracts…now peters out in the 
 130 
nominalism of the late scholastics.  The world has been integrated into the realm of God 
spiritually, but its structure could not be integrated into the rational system of faith 
intellectually.  The harmonization of the spirit and the intellect had failed” (HPI III, 109). 
But William of Ockham is important for another reason as well in that he stands 
at the center of the formal division between the notions of religious and secular that have 
been the prominent feature of Western polities to the present.  Voegelin writes:   
 
The attitude adopted by William is symptomatic of the momentous 
situation that the Christian penetration of the “world,” progressing since 
the foundation of the Western empire, has now to be stopped.  Factors 
have grown in the world that have to remain in the world; the period of 
imperial Christianity with its, at least attempted, complete integration of 
the life of man in the life of the corpus mysticum had come to an end.  An 
intramundane civilization process would now run parallel with the 
Christian civilizational process as organized in the church…. 
 The tension between the independent intellect and the authority of 
faith changes fundamentally the relations between the church and the 
temporal sphere because from this point on the temporal sphere becomes 
increasingly identified with secularism and laicism, in the precise meaning 
of a realm that is organized under the authority of the critical intellect.  
The coordination of the two powers as orders within the one body of 
Christian mankind gives way to a new order in which the church is on the 
defensive as an enclave within the process of secular civilization.  The 
result for the church is a hardening and drying up of its intellectual life, for 
any movement that might touch the dogmatic sphere involves the risk of 
shaking the system on principle and opening it to the destructive invasion 
of the secular intellect and, therefore, has to be shunned  
(HPI III, 110—11). 
 
And this hardening and drying up is the source of much of the difficulties that led to the 
Great Reformation in an inability to cope with the changing situation in light of the 
burgeoning national movements. 
 Indeed, the great attempt at compromise, the Conciliar Movement that began as a 
result of the Great Schism (1378—1417) must be counted as a failure insofar as it did not 
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revitalize the church sufficiently to stem the growing tide of sectarianism.   Instead, the 
notable thing about the Conciliar Movement is that it demonstrated how far into the 
world the church itself had penetrated.  As Voegelin points out,  
 
the reforming zeal of the council was less absorbed by a reform of the 
spirit than by a jockeying for institutional positions.  The nominalism of 
the Ockhamist type had now, indeed, become institutional practice.  The 
spiritual reality of the corpus mysticum was dissolving into the positions 
and rights of the factions—that is, of the popes, the cardinals, the general 
councils, the “nations” within the council, and the national councils—and 
it was dissolving into ordinary jurisdictions and emergency measures  
(HPI III, 250). 
  
However, the Conciliar movement did result in the realization of what was, at the 
time, an accomplished fact.  As a result of the Gallican movement toward institutional 
autonomy of the French church, the Council of Constance promulgated the notion of 
“national concordats,” agreements between the papacy and national churches controlled 
by their respective sovereigns.  “The concordats were…a revolutionary innovation.  The 
idea of the sacrum imperium, which contains the spiritual and temporal powers as ordines 
within its mystical body, was now definitely destroyed.  The church appears as an 
autonomous society that can enter into contractual relations with the secular realms.”  
And while Voegelin is correct in saying that the “recognition of this new relationship 
between the church and secular powers…was the most important permanent result of the 
conciliar period,” it must be understood as well that it was also essentially simply the 
overdue acknowledgement of a situation that had already been in existence for some time 
prior to the convention of the first council. 
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The Church and the Nations in History 
In chapter three we had occasion to note the twin planes upon which the course of 
Western civilization moves from the emergence of the Christian order to the present.  The 
upper plane being the established institutions and the lower plane being that of those 
social groups and forces that exist in opposition to those institutions.  In the later Middle 
Ages, the conflict between these two planes would become increasingly problematic for 
the maintenance of public order.  In many ways, the situation of the church from the early 
fourteenth century through the Great Reformation was similar to that which confronted 
Paul in the propagation of the faith. 
 Through the vessel of the compromises with the world Paul had created the 
conditions for the expansion of the Christian community throughout the Roman world.  
However, Paul’s “imperial idea of Christianity,” the creation of it in the Roman world, 
was never “realized in history.”  The major impediment to its realization was “the 
national and civilizational diversification of mankind.”  Voegelin notes that while the 
“nations of the Mediterranean and the Near Eastern world had succumbed to the 
conquests of Alexander and Rome politically…their individualities were strong enough 
to reassert themselves in the contact with Christianity and to split the kingdom of God 
into several Christian churches” (HPI I, 174).   
This points to two areas of consideration.   First there is the changing nature of 
political order in light of the experience of conquest and empire.  Secondly, there is the 
confrontation of the early Church with the natural diversity of humanity. 
 With regard to the first, it is interesting that Voegelin begins his study of 
“political” ideas with and exploration of the “Problem of Apolitism” (HPI I, 70—74). In 
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the context of the overall study, Voegelin’s concern in the introductory chapter is to 
explain the rise of the Hellenic “schools” as the receptors of the drive for a meaningful 
community life for those who have experienced the implosion of the polis.  However, the 
issue of apolitism is critical to understanding the changing perception of politics that 
created the world within which Christianity emerged. 
 Examining the conquests of Alexander the Great (d. 323 B.C.), Voegelin observes 
that  
 
the technical performance of the conquest was not backed by an idea, 
and…the unit of conquest, which could hardly be called an empire, 
dissolved into smaller units after the exhilaration of the conquering drive 
was exhausted.  The conquered peoples, widely divergent in their 
civilizations, had not been welded into a new political unit, and nothing 
indicated that this aim could be achieved at the time (HPI I, 90—91). 
 
With the drive to empire and the expansion of the imperial order, the orientation of social 
and political life was transformed.  No longer was political order dependent upon a 
conception of “the people,” rather political life was determined by relations of power.  Or 
as Voegelin puts it, “the dissociation of the power structure from the people.”  In the new 
dispensation of the imperial orders, Voegelin writes, 
 
Politics was no longer seen as the internal affair of an unquestioned 
community, but as a movement of power structures on a world scale 
expressed by the new categories of the vicissitudes of history and fortune.  
The imperial organizations and the men dominating them had lost what 
roots they had in the life of a people; power became a game in the abstract 
to be played by professionals, while millions of people could do nothing 
but bow and dodge in order to escape the worst blows of the storm raging 
over them (HPI I, 120—21). 
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 Despite the bowing and dodging, however, conquered peoples were quite capable 
of maintaining a sense of themselves as a “people” separate and distinct from those who 
had conquered them and from others similarly situated in a condition of subservience to 
the imperial order.  As a particular political organization, the “empire was primarily a 
power apparatus, not the manifestation of a political will of a people” (HPI I, 178).  This 
did not mean, however, that particular peoples simply ceased to be. 
 This problem was one with which Alexander himself was acutely aware.  
Voegelin recounts Alexander’s prayer at Opus for homonoia between the Macedonians 
and the Persians as an attempt to create “a spiritual substance” for the empire he was 
seeking to create.  Voegelin maintains, “The idea of Alexander may not have gone 
beyond a desire to fuse the Macedonian and Persian aristocracies into one.  Nevertheless 
it marks a beginning of a great development.  Homonoia became the basic community 
concept of the Hellenistic and later of the Roman world…and through the Epistles of 
Saint Paul the idea became one of the founding elements of democracy.”  However, while 
“Alexander was strong enough to shatter the old world materially…it took more than 
Alexander to create a new one spiritually (HPI I, 91—94). 
 More importantly, perhaps, the prayer of Alexander at Opis is an illustration of 
what had changed in the field of sentiments by the time of the consolidation of Rome.  
The Stoics had conceived of the idea of the “cosmopolis,” the world community that 
exists between wise individuals who see the divine spark of the koinos nomos, the logos 
of the universe in one another (HPI I, 97—98).  As such, the cosmopolis is incapable of 
being realized as a political order since it exists solely for the wise person capable of 
recognizing the attributes of the divine in other wise people.   
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In Cicero (d. 43 B.C.) we see the transformation of the idea of the cosmopolis into 
the idea of Roman order itself.  Cicero observes a “generic equality of men as a 
consequence of their equal participation in the divine logos; the universe is a community 
of God and men.”  But the cosmopolis of the Stoics is not solely the province of the wise, 
it exists, and its name is Rome.   
 
Cicero was able to merge the idea of Rome into the idea of the 
cosmopolis, and thus to bridge with sublime complacency the problems 
that had been the torment of Greek political theory.  The ideal state is no 
problem for Cicero; he does not have to create it out of his soul; he just 
has to look around him:  Rome is the ideal state; all he has to do is to 
describe the constitution and the civil and religious law of Rome….  Rome 
is the ideal materialized; the stoic problem of making the cosmopolis 
compatible with the coexistence of finite states is solved by the actuality 
of the ideal Rome….  The imperium Romanum has grown into the 
cosmopolis; the Stoic idea that man has two fatherlands, that of his birth 
and the city of the world, has evolved into the formula that man has two 
fatherlands, the countryside of his birth and Rome (HPI I, 134—35).    
 
 The Ciceronian equation of the cosmopolis with Rome itself makes the question 
of the spiritual substance of the community irrelevant.   
 
Through the myth of Cicero, Rome has become more than Rome; it has 
become the political order in the absolute, accepted as it is, as a part of the 
universe, not to be questioned in its right to existence as a whole, nor in its 
mode of existence.  The people exist, and the government exists; no 
inquiry into the material or spiritual conditions of the existence of a 
political community is either desirable or necessary (HPI I, 136). 
 
For this reason, Cicero is the exemplar of the change in attitude that confronted Paul.  
Voegelin notes that the “profound difference between the Greek and Roman spirit can 
find no symbol more eloquent than the difference between the attitude of Alexander, who 
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prayed at Opis to the Gods for homonoia between the Greeks and barbarians, and the 
attitude of Cicero, who believed the legions would do the job” (HPI I, 197). 
 However, the problem of the maintenance of order in the absence of some degree 
of spiritual cohesion is a problem that cannot be whisked away by rhetorical fiat.  Rome 
may exist, but it exists as a system of power only: it lacked an internal justification for its 
existence.  Thus “the public appearance of Jesus” occurred when, in Voegelin’s words 
 
the time was certainly “ripe” for something to happen—within Judaea in 
the atmosphere of eschatological tension, and within the Hellenic world 
with its epochal consciousness that neither the decaying local cults nor the 
Roman administration could satisfy as to its spiritual substance.  A world 
empire had come into existence as a power organization, but there was no 
spiritually coherent people corresponding to the vast organizational range; 
to be exact:  the Roman empire had only a population, it did not have a 
people” (HPI I, 150).   
 
The Pauline vision of the Christian community infusing Rome with the vitality of its new 
life as the kingdom of God would seem to satisfy the requirement—provided, of course, 
that Paul and the early Church could find a way to overcome the national and 
civilizational diversity of humanity that had frustrated Alexander.  Paul himself was 
frustrated in the attempt, but the idea had been reborn with the infusion of Stoic theory 
into Christianity and its transformation into the core element in the evocation of the 
sacrum imperium. 
Paul, of course, had first hand experience with the problem posed by the diversity 
of humanity.  Voegelin cites Paul’s complaint in I Cor. 1:22—24:  “The Jews want signs 
and the Greeks seek wisdom but we preach the crucified Christ; that is a scandal to the 
Jews and a folly to the nations; to those, however, who are called, be they Jews or 
Greeks, Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God” (HPI I, 174).   The particular 
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issue, that prompted the outburst, the practice of Hellenistic pneumatics of “speaking in 
tongues,” is emblematic of the problems faced by Paul in that in spreading the news of 
the new kingdom he was dealing with a conglomeration of ethnic and national groups, 
each with some degree of cultural distinctiveness that they brought to the table.  
Furthermore, as the Christian message was taken out of Judea and into the larger world, 
the problem became more apparent.  As Voegelin points out, “Wherever Christianity 
penetrated, the regional and national traditions produced variations of the Christian 
experience that became the seeds of schisms” (HPI I, 176). 
Sectarian Movements 
By the later Middle Ages, this problem would reemerge through the increasing 
sectarianism of population groups throughout Europe.  Sectarian movements were 
problematic because they are a legitimate expression of the need for spiritual order.  As 
Voegelin notes,  
 
The objectification of the spirit in the sacerdotal and sacramental 
institution, the adaptation to the exigencies of the world, the gradualism of 
spiritual realization—all of this is certainly an authentic unfolding of the 
potentialities of Christianity.  Nevertheless, developments in an entirely 
different direction are possible.  It is equally possible to develop 
Christianity in the direction of an uncompromising realization of the 
evangelical counsels, of renouncing the universalism of the institution, and 
of concentrating on the realization of the spirit in small communities with 
high standards of personal religiousness and moral conduct.  Within the 
history of Christianity there is always possible the return from the 
apocalyptic to the eschatological mood, from the objective sacramental 
institution to the intense personal religiousness of the small group, from 
the compromises with the world to an uncompromising evangelical 
Christianity, from the universal church to the small sect.  We must 
recognize church and sect as equally authentic manifestations of 
Christianity, if we wish to understand the dynamic force for the sectarian 
movements in their struggle with the church; only because they are 
authentic Christian movements can they demand a reform of the church 
 138 
and can they threaten the very institution of the church by the demand for 
a more perfect realization of Christianity (HPI IV, 142). 
 
This potential was more realizable because of the reemergence of the national core as an 
identifiable point of focus.  It is not merely a matter of the cupidity of Henry VIII that the 
Church of England became, for all intents and purposes, the first church to break away 
from the universal church.  It had more to do with the peculiar geography of England that 
gave it a greater sense of national consciousness.  Even in this, however, the Catholic 
Church contributed through its own intransigence in the face of royal opposition  
(see HPI III, 166—68). 
 However, the “organizational resistance of the realms against the centralized 
church administration, which is known as Anglicanism and Gallicanism, would not have 
been possible unless a profound restructuring of religious sentiment had taken place in 
the direction of…parochial Christianity” (HPI III, 168).  In other words, the organized 
resistance of the emerging realms takes place against the backdrop of a preexisting 
sectarianism within the general population. 
 We have noted the capacity of the church in the early days of the imperium to 
absorb reformist and sectarian impulses into itself through the monastic reforms.  And it 
was the break in the ability to absorb reformist impulses that helped bring about an end to 
the dream of universal Christendom.  As Dawson observes, “the breach between the 
papacy and the spiritual reformers is the vital cause of the decline of the medieval Church 
and is one of the main factors in the dissolution of the medieval unity and the 
transformation that passed over Europe in the later Middle Ages.”9 
                                                 
9 Dawson, “Medieval Theology,” in Medieval Essays, 113. 
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Yet in many ways, the monastic reforms become a contributing factor in the 
disorder apparent in universal Christendom as we move into the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries.  The mendicant orders had successfully spiritualized the population, however, 
those same orders were becoming increasingly incapable of controlling the spiritual 
movements they unleashed.   
 
The Franciscans could absorb in their ranks…a proportion of the 
religiously moved people of the towns.  And both orders, the Franciscans 
and the Dominicans, could, through their missionary work spreading over 
Europe, control an appreciable part of the people and attach their 
sentiments through their orders to the church.  But a not inconsiderable 
part of the movement escaped such control and developed into the 
heretical sects.  As far as these sects remained small and localized they do 
not concern us in this context.  But parallel with the foundation of the 
mendicant order a social form of the movement began to appear in 
outlines that prognosticate the later events of the pre-Reformation and the 
Reformation (HPI III, 171—72). 
 
 Yet the Franciscans themselves demonstrated the danger that was accruing toward 
the established order of the church.  Dawson notes that the decline in the unity of the 
church can be identified in its earliest manifestation…in the extreme wing of the 
Franciscan order, the followers of John Peter Olivi [d. 1298] and Angelo Clareno [d. 
1337], and the disruption of the Franciscan movement is the first sign of the approaching 
disruption of medieval Christendom.”10 And in regard to the Franciscans specifically, 
Voegelin argues, “The very success” of the order in “channeling the movement”  
led to  
 
a revival of the movement character of the order.  With the 
institutionalizaton, the inevitable degenerative symptoms of routinization 
and abuse begin to appear, and a radical spiritual wing within the order 
attempted to restore the pristine character of the movement.  This wing of 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 114. 
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the Franciscan Spirituals was finally forced out of the order by the 
Conventuals; the Spirituals outside the order split into smaller groups, 
were persecuted as heretics, and disappeared in the fourteenth century, 
while the order itself degenerated to the point that, for a while, it became 
an outstanding scandal in the life of the church (HPI IV, 149—50).11   
 
Thus the very success of the reformist impulse could serve as an impetus to crush it, both 
within the order and under the rubric of the larger community of the church.  Or, to put it 
another way, the institutionalization of the idea brings with it a complex of problems, not 
least of which is the degree to which the idea can be realized in light of changing 
circumstances. 
 Voegelin observes that with regard to the struggle among the Franciscans is a 
microcosmic glimpse of what was occurring generally within the confines of the 
European world generally.  The conflict of the papacy with the Franciscan community 
concerned the ideal of poverty.  Put in its simplest terms, it revolved around whether or 
not extreme poverty was a requirement to live a life in conformance with Christ.  By the 
middle of the fourteenth century, the argument had devolved into a “legal dispute.”  
Voegelin sees in this an indication that the “Christian substance was getting thinner and 
thinner; in the great process of despiritualization of Christianity we have seen the hand of 
God in the translation of empire change into a legal transaction, we have seen the 
spiritual reform of the church hardening into ecclesiastical legalism, and we see now the 
life of Christ and the apostles discussed in terms of private and communal property.”  
Ultimately, of course those involved in the conflicts were unable to see what Voegelin 
sees as the essential problem.  “Both partners to the struggle were wrong; neither is the 
                                                 
11 On the history of the Franciscan Spirituals see David Burr, The Spiritual Franciscans:  From Protest to 
Persecution in the Century After Saint Francis (University Park, PA:  Pennsylvania State University  
Press, 2001). 
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kingdom of Christ a temporal principality bristling with regalia as the papal legalist 
wanted it, nor is the eschatological indifference toward property of the early Christians a 
form of communism as the general of the Franciscans would have it in the interest of the 
intramundane poverty ideal of his order” (HPI III, 114).  The kingdom of God remains 
“not of this world” although the faithful must endure this world in communion with the 
unseen yet present kingdom. 
With the hardening of the church, the capacity to absorb the movements was in 
decline.  Furthermore, the accretion of dogmatic positions by the church presented a 
problem insofar as its capacity to reform itself in response to exigent circumstances 
became increasingly problematic.  Voegelin notes “that the degree of absorption was very 
high until 1300 and declined decisively after this date.  Up to 1300 the church was still 
capable of grappling with its problems, on the whole.  The most notable feat was the 
absorption of popular religious movements into the church by means of the new 
mendicant orders” (HPI IV, 136).   
However, even before 1300, the direction of the church had been telescoped 
through the suppression of the Albigensians in the thirteenth century and the subsequent 
creation of the Inquisition.12  Voegelin argues, “we should…note that the Albigensian 
Crusade shows a grave weakness with regard to absorptiveness because it was conducted 
with complete military success to the destruction of the Albigensian movement” (HPI IV, 
136).  The Albigensian movement, however, had features that were absent from most 
heretical movements prior to 1300.   
 
                                                 
12 See Clifton, 6—12; O’Grady, 64—72; Joseph Reese Strayer, The Albigensian Crusades (New York:  
Dial Press, 1971).  
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In the case of the Albigensians, a heretical movement spread through the 
towns of a large region, the Provence, and found favor with the regional 
nobility.  This is the first instance in which a new religious movement, 
outside of the church, penetrated a cultural area and rose above the level of 
its origin in the towns into the ruling nobility.  The Provence had a culture, 
but it was not a realm; if it had remained undisturbed it might have 
developed into a realm and a Provençal nation might have grown. 
 
Thus while the “Albigensian movement does not have the characteristics of a national 
struggle that are typical of the later regional movements in England, Bohemia, and 
Germany…we have to classify it, nevertheless as the first in a series of upheavals that 
resulted in the parochialization of Christianity” (HPI III, 172).  And the parochialization 
of Christianity would gain increased impetus by the emerging nation states and the 
growing sense of national consciousness held by members of the various communities.  
Indeed, the Hussite rebellion was a nationalist movement hidden behind the veil of a 
religious heresy, and some have argued that the Albigensian Crusades were in fact a 
political maneuver on the part of the Capets to gain control of southern France.13  Be that 
as it may, Voegelin maintains:   
 
We may say…that the organization of the realm and nationalism were the 
factors, still missing in the Abigensian case, that provided the ethical, 
civilizational, and political foundation for the continuous evolution toward 
parochial Christianity, although the religious movement was not yet strong 
enough to accomplish the ecclesiastical schism.  More precisely, the 
weakness of the movement can be defined as the inability of the pre-
Reformation leaders to unify the forces of sectarianism and to direct them 
into the foundation of parochial counterchurches to the church of Rome 
(HPI III, 174). 
 
 With that said, the movement to the towns and the changing social structure of the 
feudal world brought on by the town movement helped to provide the organizational 
                                                 
13 Jacques Madaule, The Albigensian Crusade:  An Historical Essay, trans. Barbara Wall (New York:  
Fordham University Press, 1967). 
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infrastructure that was lacking in the sectarian movements against the established church.  
The reliance of the population upon the population centers of the rural economy provided 
a fertile ground for religious and social movements to congeal.  Voegelin notes that most 
sectarian movements are rooted in towns and are intimately connected to them.  This is 
because the town became the enclaves of feudal society in which the great leveling of 
corporate existence occurred.  For this reason, the spread of social and sectarian 
movements tended to follow the regional emergence of towns themselves (HPI IV, 150).  
Furthermore, in the process of the movement—a process that would move beyond the 
purely religious and into the secular world of modernity--it is the intellectually 
sophisticated member of the bourgeois class that would be essential to the movement.  As 
Voegelin argues, “The middle class in the towns is the nourishing center of the 
movements.  In critical periods, however, this center can radiate unrest into other sectors 
of society and the movements can find support from almost any group with momentary 
grievances against the established institutions” (HPI IV, 150). 
 The fact that the town should become the center of revolutionary fervor should 
come as no surprise, given the revolutionary nature of the institution itself.  “The town,” 
Voegelin argues,  
 
obviously was more than just another form of government; it was rather a 
new mode of life determining a type of political man who differed 
radically from the ruling as well as from the subject types of the feudal 
order—that is, from the noble, the ecclesiastic, and the peasant.  The town 
was, furthermore, not a mere addition to the feudal world, but rather the 
representative of a new phase of Western civilization.  Historical 
dynamics were on the side of the economic services, the rationality of 
business and politics, the amenities of luxury, the superior intellectual 
aliveness, the advancement of literacy, the arts and the sciences, and the 
active religiousness of the towns.  It is this civilizational style of the towns 
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that entered into rivalry with the style of the primary estates and was 
ultimately to dominate our civilization (HPI III, 219). 
 
As a revolutionary system of social order, it would be remarkable if the town did not 
realize itself as the source of revolutionary disorder.  With that said, it would be from the 
archetypal town of Voegelin’s presentation, the Italian city-state, that speculation 
concerning a new order of power would emerge through the work of a man whose name 
“still lies in the shadow of moralistic condemnation,” Niccolò Machiavelli (HPI IV, 31). 
Machiavelli as the New Man 
What Voegelin sees in Machiavelli (d. 1527) as “historically unique” is the convergence 
“the peculiar constellation of circumstances” and “the genius of Machiavelli” that was 
“bent toward crystallizing the ideas of the age in the symbol of the prince who, through 
fortuna and virtù, will be the savior and restorer of Italy” (HPI IV, 32).  As for the 
characterization of Machiavelli that stems solely from the posthumous publication of The 
Prince, it is an obstacle that must be overcome in order to understand Machiavelli in light 
of the circumstances in which he found himself.  Voegelin does recognize that with 
qualifications, “All we can retain from the caricature is the consciousness that something 
extraordinary had occurred, a severe break with the traditions for treating political 
questions—that with the author of the Prince we have passed the threshold into a new, 
‘modern’ era” (HPI IV, 31).  As Frederick Vaughan observes with regard to Machiavelli, 
“The key word which permeates Machiavelli’s writings is ‘new’; whether it be a ‘wholly 
new Prince,’ or a ‘wholly new regime,’ or ‘new modes and orders,’ there can be no doubt 
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that Machiavelli understood himself to be involved in the great task of a new founding, a 
new beginning.”14 
 What makes Machiavelli seem so new, so modern, are the circumstances in which 
he grappled with the problems of order.   As Voegelin points out,  
 
The medieval Christianitas was falling apart into the church and the 
national states….  The disintegration of the Christianitas affected both the 
spiritual and the temporal order insofar as in both spheres the common 
spirit that induces effective cooperation between persons in spite of 
divergence of interests, as well as the sense of an obligation to 
compromise in the spirit of the whole, was seeping out.  The “falling 
apart” means literally the breaking up of a spiritually animated whole into 
legal jurisdictions; it means the inflexible insistence on rights, and the 
pursuit of personal and institutional interests without regard to the 
destruction of the total order (HPI IV, 34—35). 
 
The representative of spiritual cohesion had assumed the form of a monarchy and was 
increasingly impervious to internal reform in light of changing circumstances.  The 
temporal orders were reforming in the nation states as “the old field of personal, feudal 
associations was disentangled and the old political units were consolidated in the national 
territorial realms” (HPI IV, 35) of England, France and Spain.  However, the warring 
states of the Italian peninsula were unable to reach a similar situation with its European 
neighbors and were thus an easy target for the ambitions of the new European monarchs.   
Some 400 years later, Abraham Lincoln would consider the disorder of his historical 
circumstance and assert, “As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew.”15  It 
was in that spirit that Machiavelli undertook to address the problem of order. 
                                                 
14Frederick Vaughan, The Tradition of Political Hedonism (New York:  Fordham University Press,  
1982), 21. 
15 Abraham Lincoln, 2nd Annual Address to Congress, Dec. 1, 1862. 
 146 
 In shaping his new approach to the problems of politics, Machiavelli was aided by 
a revolution in historiography brought on by contact with Asia.  The main import of the 
new historiography was to call into question the validity of the universal historical model 
of Christianized Europe.  As Voegelin points out, “Roman Christian universalism with its 
linear construction of history is now seriously disturbed by the emergence of Asiatic 
powers and of an Asiatic ‘parallel’ history” (HPI IV, 51).   This, in turn, reinforced the 
move toward the increasing secularization of the political world by making Christian 
history itself relative to the history of other powers.  Voegelin notes that the  
 
rise of Ottoman power, and the episode of Timur, had traumatic 
consequences for the Western idea of politics.  Even before the shock of 
149416 the Italians had formed the idea of nihilistic, rational power as an 
absolute force cutting its swath blindly across meaningful existence.  
Moreover, through the Near Eastern events, Asiatic history had become a 
fact that no longer could be overlooked; the imperial finality of the West 
lost its magic of absoluteness when the Turks were ante portas….  The 
structure of this new historical situation was understood in classical 
images…the reactivation of the Homeric and Herodotean mythical conflict 
in Europe, as well as the use of classic formulas in describing the new 
Xerxes.  The search for the typical, furthermore, determined the twisting 
and selecting of historical materials in such a manner that it would fit the 
established system of classification.  And behind the use of history for 
understanding the typical in the events, we could…discern the attempt at 
penetrating into the mystery of power and destruction through the creation 
of the mythical image of the terror gentium beyond good and evil  
(HPI IV, 55). 
 
                                                 
16 The reduction of the Italian city states to complete political impotence as a result of French, Spanish and 
German invaders that Voegelin describes as making no sense “in terms of a reduction of a poor, backward 
colonial region by economically progressive countries; neither did it make sense in terms of a social 
revolution, perhaps the rise of a third estate, or a populist uprising; neither were any issues of moral or 
political principles involved; neither was there any question of a religious movement as later in the wars of 
the Reformation.  In brief:  economics, morals, principles of social justice, ideas concerning political 
organization, spiritual movements, or religious factions had nothing to do with the event; it was a clear case 
of a stronger power and better military organization in ruthless victory over a weaker and militarily less-
well-equipped power” (HPI IV, 36—37). 
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This is the source of the “myth of order through intramundane power” that Voegelin 
argues lies at the heart of Machiavelli’s examinations of politics and the problems of 
political order (HPI IV, 59).  “The experience of crushing power has sharpened the 
awareness of the fact that the order of a polity ultimately is the manifestation of an 
existential force beyond good and evil,” writes Voegelin.   
 
The stronger force will break the weaker existence, however high its rank 
may be in the realm of civilizational values.  The response to this 
experience, however, is not a naturalistic nihilism that would deny the 
meaning of power and order.  The weaker order, while physically crushed, 
still is a meaningful human order and not a natural phenomenon; and the 
stronger order, while physically crushing, is not a natural catastrophe, but 
the force of organized existence.  The stronger existence, while crushing 
the weaker order, establishes itself as the power that maintains the new 
human order.  Hence, the response to the experience is a heightening of 
the human existence that destroys and creates order into a mythical 
image….  The virtù of the conquering prince becomes the source of order; 
and since the Christian, transcendental order of existence had become a 
dead letter for the Italian thinkers of the fifteenth century, the virtù 
ordinata of the prince, as the principle of the only order that is 
experienced as real, acquires human-divine, heroic proportions  
(HPI IV, 55—56). 
 
   Furthermore, the opening of the historical horizon, the breaking of the Pauline 
compromise with history had the added effect of bringing into focus the problem of 
history anew.  Voegelin argues that the emergence of the problem of Asia created a 
situation in which a “world scene of politics had opened, with a structure of its own, and 
the idea of the Christian imperium had become irrelevant.  When the meaning of history 
in the sense of Saint Augustine’s Civitas Dei disappears, the “natural” structure of 
history, in the ancient sense, becomes visible again” (HPI IV, 85).  Hence Machiavelli’s 
recourse to the ancient perception of cyclical history and natural recurrence, as they 
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appeared in Polybius, in which virtù and fortuna are the primary agents of historical 
change. 
 For Machiavelli, borrowing again from Polybius, the existence of human beings 
in society is part of the cosmic cycles governed by virtù and fortuna.  And, “The nature 
of man is for Machiavelli part of the nature of political society in history.  Hence, the 
constancy of the passions determines recurrences in the gestalt of history” (HPI IV, 61).  
And while the “great Christian orienting experience of morality, the amor Dei, has 
disappeared…that does not mean that now the amor sui has become the determinant of 
action.  The virtù of the hero is the substantive force that drives toward expression in the 
order of the republic; it is not a self-centered lust for power” (HPI IV, 64).   
 Indeed, it is the task of the prince to orient the virtù of the citizens toward the 
society and the common good, which is exactly where religion, and Christianity in 
particular, comes into conflict with the society.  Machiavelli subordinates the church not 
only because it has been an obstacle to the achievement of Italian unity, which it was, but 
also, in the words of Pocock, “on the grounds that it gives men other than civic values.”17  
In Machiavelli’s view, Voegelin writes, “The misery of Italy is caused by the decay of 
Christianity; this in its turn is caused by the degenerate papacy….  Not only is the 
corruption of religion through the papacy a problem, but the value of Christianity itself is 
in doubt” (HPI IV, 68).   
Voegelin notes Machiavelli’s famous disquisition regarding why the ancients 
loved freedom more than the moderns.18  Whereas the pagans had valued honor most 
                                                 
17 Pocock, 192. 
18 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses, ed. with an introduction by Bernard Crick, trans. Leslie J. Walker, 
revisions by Brian Richardson (Middlesex:  Penguin Books, 1970).  The standard study of Machiavelli’s 
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highly, “Christianity values humility, renunciation, and contempt of human affairs; the 
ancients valued greatness of soul, strength of body, and everything else that makes a man 
strong.  Christianity wants a man to show his strength in suffering, rather than in strong 
deeds.  This way of life has made the world weak and a prey to the rascals” (HPI IV, 68).  
However, Machiavelli is perceptive enough to know that the problem lies not with the 
faith itself, but rather with the expositors of it who have weakened it.  “Hence the false 
interpretation rather than Christianity itself is the cause of the diminished love of 
freedom” (HPI IV, 69).  This diagnosis of the problem of Christian action may be what 
lies at the heart of Voegelin’s generally positive analysis of Machiavelli’s political 
thought in conjunction with Machiavelli’s realization that the “community needs a 
sacramental bond” in order to exist (HPI IV, 70). 
 The fundamental problem with Machiavelli’s political program, however, is an 
ontological one.  In trying to create his new republic, Machiavelli called upon the wisdom 
of the ancients regarding history, and more importantly, the myth of nature contained 
therein.  The problem of course, the  
 
only flaw in this system—of which Machiavelli himself was very much 
aware—is the fact that we do not live in Hellenic Roman antiquity but in 
Western Christian civilization.  The metaphysic of cosmic force and the 
myth of virtù make sense only under the condition that the onore del 
mondo is religiously accepted as the summum bonum.  When the summum 
bonnum is placed in the beatific vision of God, then the honor of the world 
sinks to second rank in the hierarchy of values, and not the heroic, 
ordering manifestation of cosmic force but the amor Dei will become the 
orienting principle of conduct.  On this point, Machiavelli is insecure.  He 
recognizes the fact of Christianity; but his own soul is closed against it; 
the fact is dead (HPI IV, 70).  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
political thought remains Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 
1958).  Strauss’ discussion of Machiavelli and religion may be found at 225—32. 
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But the fact that Machiavelli was not “a solitary figure, something like a moral freak”  
(HPI IV, 31) is what makes him a compelling representative of what had happened to the 
notion of universal Christian order.  The attempt by Machiavelli to reestablish the order 
of society on the basis of a new paganism was doomed to failure because, to engage in a 
trite cliché, its time had passed.  Voegelin argues:  “Once Christianity is in the world and 
has formed a civilization, one cannot simply turn around and be a pagan—and a pre-
Platonic one at that.  The call has gone to all; and Machiavelli cannot be excepted.  In its 
historical place, the paganism of Machiavelli is not the “people’s myth” that Plato strove 
to overcome; it is a lack of faith in the Christian sense, a demonic closure of the soul 
against transcendental reality (HPI IV, 86).  In this respect, Machiavelli may in fact be the 
first representative of “modern man.”19 
Conclusion 
Machiavelli may have been the first modern man, however, the world itself was still 
clinging to the dream of the imperium.  Some great event would have to occur to bring 
modern man to the stage of history.  In this instance, that “event” would be a confluence 
of events called the Great Reformation. 
 
 
19 This is not to say, however, that Machiavelli had not correctly seen the shape of the future.  See, for 
example, Peter Gay, The Enlightenment:  An Interpretation, 2 vols., (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 
in which he argues that the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century represents the triumph of a new 
paganism. 
Chapter Five:  Crisis 
 
Existence in Tension 
Machiavelli had clearly seen that something was wrong, yet he lacked the spiritual and 
intellectual resources required to create a new evocation commensurate with the crisis of 
order in which he found himself.  Indeed, in large measure, Machiavelli had failed to 
fully comprehend the meaning of the crisis engendered by the collapse of the imperium.  
However, while Machiavelli himself was impervious to the pull of the golden cord, he 
did have one profound insight that must have been somewhat redemptive for him in the 
perception of Voegelin.  Machiavelli, Voegelin asserts, “understood quite clearly that 
Christianity is living by reformation” (HPI IV, 86).  With that said, however, Voegelin’s 
phrasing need explication in two important senses that are critical to an understanding of 
his approach to the problems of Christian political order. 
 In the first instance, the life lived by reformation is an understanding that is 
couched in terms of the individual existence of the human being under God.  It is an 
oblique reference to the experience of faith and the resulting metanoia, or turning, that 
occurs in the believer as a result of the call of the spirit.  It is the understanding of Saint 
Paul as expressed in 2 Corinthians, “Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, he is a new 
creation; the old has gone, the new has come!” (2 Cor. 5:17).  The experience of the 
reformed human being, the reformed personality in its contact with the transcendent spirit 
of Christ is what makes Christian homonoia possible and establishes the ground of 
cooperation between individuals toward the realization of the spiritual kingdom of 
announced by Christ and instituted by Saint Paul.   
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 The second sense of living by reformation is a reference to the political and social 
life of Christian civilization generally.  As a result of Saint Paul’s judicious compromises 
with the world and the sacramental objectification of grace through the administration of 
the sacraments in the church, Christianity had become the most powerful social force in 
history.  It had succeeded in expanding the “little world of order,” that Voegelin 
maintains is the essential function of the political idea, to encompass most of Europe, and 
with the discovery of the New World, beyond.  This expansion had been made possible, 
in large measure, as a result of the fleshing out of the compromises through successive 
reformations that were internalized within the institutional structures of the church.  
When the church began to close itself off to the possibility of reformation through the 
absorption of reform movements the tension between the kingdom of God as a spiritual 
condition of the community of the faithful and the institutional representation of that 
kingdom in the church itself became unbearable. 
 In the “Introduction” to the History of Political Ideas, Voegelin observes that in 
“any system of political ideas” there exists a “basic conflict between the character of the 
cosmion and the absoluteness at which it aims” (HPI I, 227).  The proclamation of the 
kingdom of God presented just such a conflict for the existence of human beings in the 
world.  Since the kingdom of God was not of this earth, the cosmion created by the 
Pauline compromises and the objectification of grace through the institution of the church 
was problematic to the extent that the immanent representative of the transcendent 
kingdom conformed to the spiritual understanding of the kingdom.  It was this 
understanding of the tension between the two realms that prompted Saint Augustine to 
argue that the civitas Dei was not the church itself. 
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 Instead, the institutional order of the church was itself the result of the initial 
compromises Saint Paul made with the world in the constitution of the Christian 
community.  First, Paul had welcomed into the community the people of Israel, the 
pagans, and the Christians into the community through the compromise with history that 
recognized the law of nature as it was revealed to the pagans and the law of the prophets 
as it was revealed to Israel.  Secondly, Paul had incorporated the members of the 
community into the organic construction of the corpus mysticum by which the charisma 
of Christ could be shared among the members of the community each according to his or 
her gifts.  And to make the new community adaptable to any society it might find itself, 
Paul compromised with governmental authority, recognizing that authority was ordained 
by God to wield the sword against evil-doers and those who would disturb the peace of 
the community.  Saint Augustine had contributed to the constitution of the community 
with the construction of the two cities and the bifurcation of history into sacred and 
profane.  It was through these compromises that Christianity was institutionalized and 
civilized the European continent. 
 With that said, however, the crisis of the Great Reformation was always a 
possibility that existed as a result of that tension.  Indeed, the Great Reformation itself, as 
Voegelin asserts, is really only a “phase” in “a much more comprehensive process” (HPI 
IV, 131).  Thus far we have examined the process from the perspective of the emergence 
of the Christian community around the person of Jesus himself, and the reaction of his 
followers to his death and resurrection.  In addition, we have noted the realization of the 
Christian idea of the universal empire through the evocation of the sacrum imperium as 
the organizing principle of order throughout the Middle Ages.  With regard to the 
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imperium, we have noticed the problems created by the irruption of intramundane forces 
upon the structure of the idea and the institutions intended to represent it.  More 
particularly we have examined the changing perception of immanent history with regard 
to the drama of salvation and the capacity of the institutional church to grow through 
reform.  Finally, we have discussed the actual destruction of the sacrum imperium as a 
force for order.  In large measure this was the result of changing political and social 
circumstances on the part of temporal authority, however, this does not absolve the 
institutional church for its role in the debacle.  The destruction of the sacrum imperium 
was precipitated not only by the hubris of Frederick II, but also by the decreasing 
permeability of the church as the immanent representative of the Christian dispensation 
into an arbiter of dogmatic truth that increasingly lacked the capacity to absorb spiritual 
movements. 
 In this chapter, we will examine the great political, religious, and social upheaval 
of the Great Reformation from the perspective of Voegelin’s History of Political Ideas.  
First we will examine Voegelin’s treatment of Martin Luther and John Calvin as they 
sought to usher in a new age of the spirit with disastrous results for the institutional order 
of the spirit and order generally.  Essentially, the ultimate problem with the Great 
Reformation from Voegelin’s perspective is not simply that the great reformers stood in 
opposition to the universal church—there is little pity for the church itself in Voegelin’s 
presentation—but rather in Luther and Calvin there exists the propensity to burn the 
village in order to save it.  However, Luther and Calvin are reflective of the social and 
spiritual pressures that were building in opposition to the institutional church and the 
order of civilization that it represented.    
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 The Tyconian problem has not disappeared.  Indeed, if anything, the Tyconian 
problem is the root of the general problem of modernity.  This is especially true when the 
puritanical drive of the Tyconian program is transferred to the new secular carriers of the 
spirit that will emerge as a result of the Great Reformation.  The rise of sectarian 
movements in opposition to the established institutionalization of the spirit is the great 
problem of Christian political order.  And, to the degree that this religious sectarianism is 
made manifest in a political program it can result in the wholesale destruction of order 
itself and represents an assault upon the very idea of civilization.  In the rise of the 
ideological religions of modernity, however, Western Christian civilization would find 
itself disarmed because of the privatization of the spirit through the idea of toleration 
expressed by John Locke. 
 In light of the examination of people and events up to the actualization of the 
political, religious, and social movement that comes to us under the rubric of the Great 
Reformation, the event itself is something of an anticlimax.  As we have seen from the 
study thus far, the Great Reformation is in many ways reflective of an event that had 
already occurred but had yet to crystallize into new institutions.  To use the language of 
the early Voegelin, the ideas for new evocations were there, but the institutional 
representation of those ideas had yet to emerge.  In the institutionalization of the spirit in 
history, the church had failed.  What was required was required, Luther and Calvin 
thought, was a new institutionalization of the spirit.  However, in both instances what 
occurred was not the elevation of the spiritual life of human beings through a new 
evocation of order, but rather evocations that would eliminate the life of the spirit from 
political and social existence. 
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 Machiavelli is important in understanding what was going to happen because, as 
we have argued, he was the first modern man.  But as the first modern man he was still 
the man alone.  This was true despite the fact that he was representative of the tenor of 
sentiment at the time.  In order to make modern man the determinant of history would 
require a reformulation of human existence generally and the relationship of human 
beings to the comprehensive order of reality.  Unfortunately, in making this 
reformulation, Luther and Calvin would abandon the Christian idea of human being as it 
was initially understood by Saint Paul and then later elaborated upon and expanded by 
Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas. 
 This understanding of the problem is what underscores Voegelin’s rather vitriolic 
reflections upon Luther and Calvin.  It is important to note that the fourth volume of the 
History of Political Ideas is the only volume of the series that comes with the equivalent 
of a “Surgeon General’s Warning” from the editors.  The purpose of “A Note on 
Voegelin’s Reading of Luther and Calvin,” written by David L. Morse and William M. 
Thompson, seems to be an attempt to mitigate against the potential indignation of the 
reader that might accrue from Voegelin’s interpretation of two of the founders of modern 
Protestantism.1 
 The reason such a warning was thought to be required is Voegelin’s near brutal 
assault upon Luther and Calvin.  Voegelin traces most of the social and political disorder 
from modernity and places it squarely on the doorstep of Luther and Calvin.  In large 
measure, Voegelin’s analysis is correct.  However, in many ways the very tenor of 
Voegelin’s argument mitigates against a clear understanding of the legitimate issues 
raised in the context of the analysis.  Ultimately, the reason Voegelin seemingly loathes 
                                                 
1 David L. Morse and William M. Thompson, “Editors’ Introduction,” in HPI IV, 1—21. 
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Luther and Calvin stems from the fact that they were successful in feeding the sectarian 
impulses that led to their own work.  In other words, Luther and Calvin were very 
reflective of their time and the social forces that were at work.2   
The Folly of Martin Luther 
In the case of Luther, Voegelin’s presentation is of a man who should have known 
better—and might have known but we cannot really be sure—of the implications of what 
he was trying to accomplish.3  Luther does not rise to the level of an “intellectual 
swindler,” which would be the epithet that the later Voegelin would apply to Karl Marx 
in the analysis of Marx’s ideological program.4  The first problem with Luther, from 
Voegelin’s perspective, is his willingness to throw the baby out with the bathwater in 
terms of his anti-scholasticism.  Luther’s animus toward the theological and philosophical 
history that preceded him restricted the horizon of his own work and had severe 
consequences for the general tenor and implications of what he had accomplished.  
Luther had correctly diagnosed the spiritual crisis of his time, however, he was unwilling 
to use the tools at his disposal to address it. 
 The proximate issue that thrust Luther into a position of prominence was the sale 
of indulgences by the church.  Indulgences were viewed by the church as a source of 
revenue and as the repudiation of temporal punishment imposed by the church against 
those who had sinned.  The real problem emerged from the popular misunderstanding 
that not only did an indulgence stave off temporal punishment for sinful acts; it absolved 
                                                 
2 It is important to note in this context that Voegelin himself had been baptized a Lutheran and buried a 
Lutheran.  In other words, his argument with Luther cannot be read as a polemic in favor of Roman 
Catholicism. 
3 For biographical information see Roland H. Bainton, Here I Stand:  A Life of Martin Luther (New York:  
Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950); Gerhard Brendler, Martin Luther:  Theology and Revolution (New 
York:  Oxford University Press, 1991); and Richard Marius, Martin Luther:  The Christian Between God 
and Death (Cambridge, MA:  The Belknap Press, 1999). 
4 SPG, 28. 
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the sinner generally of the guilt associated with the sinful act.  The failure of the church 
to address this popular misunderstanding and its dependence upon the sale of indulgences 
as a revenue source made the situation ripe for scandal.  Luther’s Ninety Five Theses “On 
the Power and Efficacy of Indulgences,” nailed to the door of the Castle Church in 
Wittenberg on October 31, 1517, catapulted this “star of the lowest magnitude” to 
international prominence.5  But the hammering of the nail was also the hammering of the 
final nail in the coffin of the old order as understood by the idea of the imperium.  In the 
firestorm that followed the posting of the Ninety Five Theses, a new world would be 
made. 
 The most complete political document produced by Luther was published in 1520.  
“To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning the Reform of the Christian 
Estate” is, in Voegelin’s view, “the most comprehensive statement of Luther’s social 
doctrine and program of reform” (HPI IV, 232).6  It is also, according to Voegelin, 
“probably the biggest piece of political mischief of all time” (HPI IV, 245). 
Three fundamental principles emerge from the address.  The first is the general 
priesthood of the individual Christian.  The second is that of the equality of the 
charismata of all functions within the body of the faithful.  The third principle secures the 
rank of office within the clerical office.  However, by clerical office, Luther clearly 
means to exclude the hierarchy of the church, as it was constituted under the papacy.  
This is indicated by the fact that Luther repeatedly attacks “the Romanists” as violating 
                                                 
5 Kurt Aland, “Introduction,” trans. P. J. Schroeder, in Kurt Aland, ed., Martin Luther’s 95 Theses:  With 
the Pertinent Documents from the History of the Reformation (Saint Louis:  Concordia Publishing House, 
1967), 4. 
6 Martin Luther, “To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning the Reform of the Christian 
Estate,” trans. Charles M. Jacobs, revised by James Atkinson, in Martin Luther, Works, vol. 44, ed. James 
Atkinson, general ed. Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia:  Fortress Press, 1966), 123—217. 
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the ordinances of God and acting contrary to Scripture.  As Voegelin observes, the 
consequences of the general priesthood of every Christian were seemingly never 
considered.  Voegelin writes, “it seems almost unbelievable that a man of considerable 
intellectual training could be unaware that in order to escape the procedural concentration 
of the infallibility of the church in its monarchical head, he dispersed it among the 
individual Christians, that in fact he made every Christian his own infallible pope—with 
the inevitable consequence of opening the anarchy of conflicting interpretations”  
(HPI IV, 235). 
 But this is not the end of it.  Voegelin sees in Luther’s address the ideological 
opposite of what Boniface VIII tried to accomplish in Unam Sanctum with regard to the 
charismata.  In particular, Luther argues from the same Biblical passage as Boniface VIII, 
1 Corinthians 2:15 in order to strip the charismatic authority of the papacy away from the 
pope because he “has neither faith nor the Spirit.”7 Voegelin maintains,  
 
While the fronts have changed, the structure of the attack must inevitably 
be the same; the appeal to homo spiritualis has a point only when 
somebody else is thereby deprived of his status….  The appeal was 
dangerous enough when the ruling head of the church arrogated the rank 
to himself; with the transfer of the appeal from the head of an established 
institution to the man in the street, the situation inexorably tended toward 
a Gnostic sectarianism, disrupting the organization of the church” 
(HPI IV, 236). 
 
And disrupting the organization of the church is more than simply a relatively minor 
annoyance.  In disrupting the organization of the church, as it was then constituted, 
Luther was striking at the very heart of the institutionalization of the spirit that had been 
accomplished through the Pauline compromises and the objectification of grace through 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 135 
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the sacraments.  By denying the charismatic authority of the papacy, Luther was in fact 
undoing Christian order itself. 
 But the thing that seems to amaze Voegelin is that it is apparent that Luther never 
considered the consequences of his own theoretical discourse.  In Luther, Voegelin 
argues, we see “the first major instance of a political thinker who wants to create a new 
social order through the partial destruction of the existing civilizational order and then is 
appalled when more radical men carry the work of destruction far beyond the limits that 
he had set himself” (HPI IV, 238).  Ultimately, the danger that Voegelin sees in the attack 
on the institutional order would be reflected in the psychology of the passions and the 
state of nature conceived by Hobbes as the basis for his Leviathan.  “When the order of 
tradition and institutions is destroyed, when order is put at the decisionist mercy of the 
individual conscience, we have descended to the level of the war of all against all”  
(HPI IV, 265). 
More problematic from Voegelin’s perspective is the primary area of 
disagreement with Luther concerning the spiritual anthropology of human being itself.  
For a political theorist of Voegelin’s persuasion, this is a matter of fundamental 
importance because the “problem of politics has to be considered in the larger setting of 
an interpretation of human nature” (HPI I, 231). Luther’s spiritual anthropology as 
explicated in his conception of the “justification through faith alone” is, in Voegelin’s 
view, at the very least a severe misunderstanding of human nature, at the very worse, an 
abomination.   
In Luther’s promulgation of the doctrine of sola fide, Voegelin sees the “first 
deliberate attack upon the doctrine of amicitia” as it developed by Saint Thomas in the 
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Summa contra gentiles.  Amicitia, the friendship between God and human beings, is the 
central element in Saint Thomas’ doctrine of fides caritate formata, which Voegelin 
describes as “one of the most subtle achievements in the scholastic culture of spiritual 
life” (HPI IV, 249).8  The doctrine of fides caritate formata represents, from Voegelin’s 
perspective, “the medieval climax of the interpenetration of Christianity with the body of 
Western formation.  Here perhaps we touch upon the historical raison d’être of the West, 
and we certainly touch the standard by which the further course of Western intellectual 
history must be measured” (HPI IV, 251). 
 In the Thomistic construction, the essence of faith lies in the reciprocal 
relationship between God and human beings.  As Voegelin describes the phenomena:   
 
Saint Thomas puts the essence of faith in the amicitia, the friendship 
between God and man.  True faith has an intellectual component insofar as 
loving, voluntary adherence to God is impossible without intellectual 
apprehension of the beatific vision as the summum bonnum, as the end 
toward which life is oriented; intellectual apprehension, however, needs 
completion through the volitional adherence of love “for by means of his 
will man, as it were, rests in what he has apprehended by intellect.”  The 
relationship of amicitia is mutual; it cannot be forced through an élan of 
human passion but presupposes the love of God toward man, an act of 
grace through which the nature of man is heightened by a supernatural 
forma.  The loving orientation of man toward God is possible only when 
the faith of man is formed through the prior love of God toward man….  
Saint Thomas has created a linguistic instrument for designating the 
component of supernatural formation in the experience of faith—that is, 
the penetration of the person, through infusion of grace, with the love of 
God as the spiritually orienting center of existence (HPI IV, 249—50).9 
 
It is this reciprocal relationship between the call of God and the response of the spirit that 
Voegelin sees as the characteristic that is most intimately human.  For Saint Thomas, the 
                                                 
8 Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, chap. 116. 
9 This, of course, is a parallel to the experience of Aristotelian noesis as explained by the later  
Voegelin in AN, 89—115.  
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clearest indication of amicitia was 1 John 4:  “Beloved, let us love one another; for love 
is of God, and he who loves is born of God and knows God….  We love because He first 
loved us.”  In chapter two we commented upon the fact that the experience of metanoia 
among the followers of Jesus was never forced.  The call was given and it was up to each 
individual to determine whether or not to answer.  In Saint Thomas’ formulation of 
amicitia this principle is extended although the substance is substantially the same. 
 Luther’s attack upon the Thomistic conception of amicitia is, at its root, an 
assertion of the power of the human will alone to compel salvation.  It is in essence, the 
recognition of the libido dominandi as the ordering force of the human spirit.  Voegelin’s 
line of attack follows the logic advanced in Luther’s treatise on Christian liberty, The 
Freedom of a Christian.10   Luther argues that the corruption of human nature may be 
overcome by an act of will, defined in terms of faith, alone.  To make the case, Luther 
cites Saint Paul in Romans 1:17.  This, in turn, is a quotation from the Old Testament 
book of Habakkuk (2:4):  “the righteous shall live by faith.”  Voegelin observes that in 
Luther’s citation of the relevant scripture, one term is added, “alone.”  So that the entire 
passage is rendered, “the righteous shall live by faith alone.”  Human beings, according 
to Luther’s argument, cannot, by their sinful natures, conform to the dictates of the law as 
established in the Old Testament.11  As a result, they begin to despair of their condition.  
However, it is in that moment of despair that they then reach out and “receive the 
promise…the revealed word of God….  He who adheres to it will thereby unite his soul 
                                                 
10 Martin Luther, “The Freedom of a Christian,” trans. W.A. Lambert, revised by Harold J. Grimm, in 
Works, vol. 31, ed. Harold J. Grimm, general ed. Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia:  Muhlenberg Press, 
1957), 343—77. 
11 Voegelin may be being more charitable here than Morse and Thompson give him credit for in that 
Luther’s description of the Old Testament law is rather cavalier.  “That which is impossible for you to 
accomplish by trying to fulfill all the works of the law—many and useless as they all are—you will 
accomplish quickly and easily through faith,” Ibid., 349. 
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with the word.  In this act of faith, the ‘virtue of the word’…becomes the property of the 
soul….  All the Christian needs is his faith” (HPI IV, 251—53).  
 The spiritual anthropology that emerges from Luther’s discourse on Christian 
freedom is remarkably similar to that offered by Boniface VIII and Giles of Rome.  In 
Unam Sanctum Boniface VIII had delivered the proposition that the charismata of Christ 
was the property of the ecclesiastical hierarchy.  The gifts of the spirit available to all 
human beings by nature of their spiritual existence before God as conceived of by Saint 
Paul were transformed into a justification for the apparatus of the church.  In the 
construction of Luther, the charismata is not received and experienced in the loving 
response of the soul to call of Christ, but is rather the property of the individual to assert 
against God when and where he or she wills it to happen. 
 We opened this chapter with an analysis of the meaning of “living by 
reformation” as it applied to the individual through an exegesis of Paul’s second letter to 
the church at Corinth.  Paul asserts that in the call of the spirit of Christ and the soul’s 
response to it a person is made anew.  Luther will have none of that.  As Voegelin asserts 
with regard to Luther’s justification by faith alone:  “The optimistically sounding 
exposition covers a spiritual tragedy; for the exchange of properties in the mystical 
marriage of the soul with Christ means exactly what it says.  The unburdening of sin 
through faith is no more than a vivid conviction of salvation, assuaging the despair of the 
soul; it does not redeem the fallen nature itself and raise man through the imprint of grace 
into the amicitia with God” (HPI IV, 253).12  Instead of a transformation of the individual 
                                                 
12 The text to which Voegelin is referring reads:  “The…incomparable benefit of faith is that it unites the 
soul with Christ as a bride is united with her bridegroom.  By this mystery, as the Apostle teaches, Christ 
and the soul become one flesh (Eph 5:31—32).  And if they are one flesh and there is between them a true 
marriage—indeed the most perfect of all marriages...it follows that everything they have they hold in 
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human soul in its contact with the divine being, the relationship between God and the 
individual is presented as “something that comes dangerously close to mutual trust 
between two respectable burghers” (HPI IV, 254 n. 14).  The sublime relationship 
between God and the individual person, in a specifically Christian sense as understood by 
Saint Paul and Saint Thomas, is transformed into a practical business arrangement.  “We 
are not,” in Luther’s words, “recreated.”13 
 Of course Luther was aware the justification by faith alone contained a potential 
pitfall with regard to human action.  If the soul is justified by faith alone, then it would 
seem to naturally follow that any action undertaken by the human being who has 
sufficient faith would, by definition, be good.  After all, as Luther points out, good works 
do not contribute one bit to the achievement of grace and “the believing soul by means of 
the pledge of its faith is free in Christ…free from all sins, secure against death and hell, 
and is endowed with the eternal righteousness….”14 In order to prevent a descent into 
licentiousness, Luther is forced to integrate something that approaches the amicitia of the 
Thomistic construction through the incorporation of good works done for the love of 
God. 
 However, the realization of the new Christian community in which the good 
works are realized as truly good is only possible if one adopts what Voegelin calls the 
                                                                                                                                                 
common, the good as well as the evil.  Accordingly the believing soul can boast of and glory in whatever 
Christ has as though it were its own, and whatever the soul has Christ claims as his own…. Christ is full of 
grace, life, and salvation.  The soul is full of sins, death, and damnation.  Now let faith come between them 
and sins, death, and damnation will be Christ’s, while grace, life, and salvation will be the soul’s….” 
Ibid., 351.    
13 Ibid., 360.  Jacques Maritain notes that in Luther’s description of justification by faith alone, “faith can 
exist with sin…in the sense that our nature as such remains essentially bad and accursed beneath faith and 
mercy, which nevertheless, save it without making us just from within;” and “in the sense that actual sins , 
which of themselves are excluded by faith (but which through weakness, we commit in spite of faith) do 
not, however, make us lose the faith which saves us.  Fantasies of an incurably nominalist philosophy 
which places opposites side by side.” Three Reformers (New York:  Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1940),  
176. n. 2. 
14 Ibid., 352.  See also Marius, 268. 
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“respectable eschatology” of Luther (HPI IV, 258).   The love between God and human 
beings that results in the reformation of the personality of human beings may be missing 
from Luther’s construction, but love itself is not absent.  In Luther’s vision of the 
Christian estate in which all functions are equal in charismatic gifts, the community itself 
is held together by a “love that has become world immanent” (HPI IV, 259).  No longer is 
the love of the community secured by the knowledge of the beatific vision, after all, faith, 
not love, is the justification of the human soul.  But in order for there to be good works, 
there must be a community built upon love for one’s neighbors that is fortified by the 
faith in God.  The problem, of course, is that in history, as the tenuous bonds of faith are 
loosened, the consequences are revealed.  Voegelin maintains, “With the atrophy of faith, 
the idea will degenerate in practice into the aggressive, utilitarian welfare society without 
culture of intellect and spirit that we know all too well.  And theoretically, the tenuous 
connection with Christian tradition may be dropped altogether, and Luther’s world 
immanent love will become the altruism of Comte and his positivist successors”  
(HPI IV, 259). 
 The final area of attack upon the doctrines of Luther concerns the corruption of 
Augustinian symbolism for the purposes of Luther’s attack upon the civilizational order 
of Christianity.  In 1523, Luther published On Secular Authority:  how far does the 
obedience owed to it extend.15 According to Voegelin, it is this year that marks the formal 
end of the Middle Ages because within the short pamphlet, Luther would, with the 
“hubris of a private individual,” destroy “the symbols of Western Christian public order” 
(HPI IV, 262). 
                                                 
15Martin Luther,  “On Secular Authority:  how far does obedience to it extend?, in Luther and Calvin on 
Secular Authority, ed. and trans. Harro Höpfl (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1—43.. 
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 In carrying out the destruction of the remaining vestiges of Christian public order 
in Western civilization, Luther would use the tools provided by Saint Augustine and the 
construction of the two cities.16  Voegelin notes that with the destruction already wrought 
by Luther’s writings, Luther’s position was, in fact similar to that faced by the earliest 
Christian communities.  In 1520, Luther had addressed the members of the Christian 
estate.  By 1523, there was no Christian estate as represented in the governmental 
authorities.  The evidence for this proposition is the fact that the proximate issue that 
prompted Luther to evaluate the authority of the temporal magistrate was the banning of 
his translation of the New Testament by the governmental authorities in at least three 
German territories.  If these particular magistrates were truly Christian, how could they 
object to the issuance and promulgation of the doctrine of Christ as set down by Luther?  
The fact was that between 1520 and 1523, “the individualization and privatization of 
religious experience had destroyed both the spiritual and charismatic temporal powers of 
the medieval Gelasian balance.  The faithful already had to rely on the Bible against the 
authority of the church and its councils, and now Luther had to admonish them to rely on 
it against the princes as well” (HPI IV, 262). 
 Be that as it may, Luther found himself, largely at his own insistence, in a 
situation similar to that faced by the earliest Christian communities in the Near East.  
According to Luther’s construction, all human beings belong either to the civitas Dei or 
the civitas terrena.  Those who have been justified by faith live in the realm of God, 
while those who have not belong to the world.  The power of the sword exists in the hand 
of the unrighteous ruler, though, because it provides the stability necessary to get on with 
                                                 
16 On the development of Luther’s doctrine regarding the two cities see F. Edward Cranz, An Essay on the 
Development of Luther’s Thought on Justice, Law, and Society, Harvard Theological Studies, XIX 
(Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1959), 159—73. 
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living the Christian life.  This stability is required because, although a Christian society 
would have no need of the sword, the two realms, the realm of God and the realm of the 
world are intermingled in their immanent existence. 
 The problem, of course, is that the Augustinian construction does not lend itself to 
a description of the immanent world of human existence.   Through the construction of 
the cities as offered by Luther, he is reverting “to something like their Tyconian meaning.  
The Augustinian idea of the church is destroyed through the doctrine of sola fide; 
Christianity becomes a matter of purchasing a book and using it according to Luther’s 
interpretation; if you follow the directions and trust in God you are saved, otherwise you 
are not” (HPI IV, 264—65).  And ultimately, the determination as to who is saved and 
who is not is not made by God, but rather rests in the self-assurance of the believer who 
has been justified by faith alone. 
 In the writings of Luther, Voegelin sees the strength of the man as a “vital force 
that irresistibly cuts its swath across the historical scene” (HPI IV, 245).  Unfortunately, 
the strength of the individual man was sufficient only to destroy the civilization he 
believed that he was called upon to reform.  In part, however, this was because of 
technological innovation.  The printing press had allowed the conflict on the question of 
indulgences to spread and grow with a rapidity that no one could have anticipated, and by 
the time anyone realized what was happening it was too late.  It was clear, however, in 
the aftermath of the revolution that Luther helped bring into the world, that new symbols 
of order needed to be found.  It was against this backdrop that John Calvin would 
undertake to create a new universal church to take the place of the old one that had fallen. 
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Calvin and the Spiritual Elite 
If Voegelin’s treatment of Luther was harsh, his examination of Calvin borders on the 
scandalous.17  While Voegelin describes Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion18 as 
an “overwhelmingly impressive…achievement of a precocious genius.”  And Calvin 
himself is described as “man of unusual qualities” with regard to his “intenseness of 
religious experience, by industry, by erudition, by clearness of exposition and literary 
achievement, and by intellectual clearness with regard to the problems about which” he 
“wished to be clear” (HPI IV, 271).  Voegelin also notes with regard to Calvin that there 
was a person with “a will to power without intellectual conscience” (HPI IV, 276). 
 In terms of a political program per se, the Great Reformation would lead to the 
institution of Calvin’s Geneva (or, as Voegelin calls the construction, “the Calvin of 
Geneva” [HPI V, 49]) in 1541. Calvin saw the purpose of civil government as the 
protection of the faith and the preservation of the pure doctrine of religion.  With this in 
mind, the only government that would be adequate would be one that was under the 
control of the religious authorities.  Through “Calvin’s unrivaled gift for unscrupulous 
interpretation” of scripture he was able to find what had been hidden for 1500 years in the 
Epistles of Paul—the charismatic function of the temporal ruler.  Although there can be 
little doubt that the function of rulership only extends as far as the authorities of the faith 
will allow.  There is no confusion in Calvin’s construction regarding the status of 
authority within the polity.  Calvin was intent on creating a religious polity in which the 
magistrate would answer to the authority of the spiritual divines.  Voegelin sees in this 
                                                 
17 For biographical information see T.H.L Parker, John Calvin:  A Biography (Philadelphia:  Westminster 
Press, 1975). 
18 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2 vols., trans. Henry Beveridge (London:  James Clarke 
and Co., Ltd., 1953). 
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development the potential realization of the “autonomous polity” that will emerge “when 
the voice of the people replaces the word of God,” leading to “a secular polity with a 
government that is strictly subordinated to the law as understood by the people”  
(HPI V, 49).    
 However, in Voegelin’s treatment of Calvin, the realization of the political 
program is secondary to the problem that Calvin poses for the future through the 
promulgation of his new Christian doctrine and his attempt to create a new universal 
Christianity.  Calvin’s primary mission was to seek to create a new universal church that 
would supplant the church of Rome—the detour to Geneva was only reluctantly taken.  
In undertaking this endeavor, Calvin would seek to gather up the “remnant” of the civitas 
Dei of Luther and through them create a new institutionalization of the spirit through his 
interpretation of the scriptural basis for Christian community.  But in the “foundation of a 
new universal church” Calvin would not simply play the “role…of a successor to Saint 
Peter, but of a new Saint Peter himself” (HPI IV, 277).  In a footnote, Voegelin illustrates 
his argument with a passage from the Institutes in which Calvin recounts how Paul 
created the government of the church through the creation of offices.  However, in 
building a new foundation Calvin writes, “I deny not, that afterward God occasionally 
raised up Apostles, or at least Evangelists, in their stead, as has been done in our time.  
For such were needed to bring back the Church from the revolt of the Antichrist.  The 
office I nevertheless call extraordinary, because it has no place in churches duly 
constituted.”19  Voegelin is rather impressed with the construction if not with the intent of 
the author.  “The apostolic function is secured for him; at the same time it is barred for 
others once he has constituted the true church” (HPI IV, 277 n. 31). 
                                                 
19 Ibid., IV.iii.4 (II:319; refers to volume and page number in the edition cited) 
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 There are several things that the founder of a new institutional order for 
Christianity must have in order to make a go of it.  The first thing that Calvin needed was 
some sacraments.  In order to secure the viability of the institutional framework, the new 
church cannot rely upon the doctrine of sola fide as it was expressed by Luther and 
adopted by Calvin.  With this in mind, salvation has to be related to the membership in 
the church and the willing submission to its authority.  However, the idea of 
objectification of grace through the sacraments is, in fact, in direct opposition to the 
notion of sola fide.  It is a problem that Calvin cannot adequately resolve.  However, 
Voegelin notes that in regard to the chapters of the Institutes that deal with the question 
of sacraments “he accomplishes the feat of proving, first that sacraments do not mediate 
grace and in no way touch the exclusiveness of justification through faith, and second, 
that nobody at least who has an opportunity of church membership can be justified by 
faith unless he joins” (HPI IV, 278).20  It is a remarkable achievement in literary 
legerdemain. 
 In addition to sacraments to secure the unity of the spiritual body, Calvin has to 
demonstrate why the “Romanist” church is, at the very least corrupt to the core.  At the 
most, Calvin can demonstrate that the church of Rome is really no church at all.  More 
importantly, however, and this is a point upon which Voegelin does not dwell, such an 
argument has to be made in the context of leaving nothing on the table that might come 
back to haunt the new institution.  Throughout the first chapter of Book IV, Calvin extols 
the “true” church.21  It is not until the second chapter of Book IV that Calvin brings the 
                                                 
20 The chapters dealing with the sacraments are IV.xiv—xix. 
21 Voegelin notes that by the “end of the exhortation” the reader is forced to wonder “how anybody could 
be so mean as to separate from the church and especially how Calvin himself could separate from the 
Catholic Church” (HPI IV, 279). 
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hammer of righteousness down on the church of Rome.  Calvin argues that “(i)n place of 
the Lord’s Supper, the foulest sacrilege has entered, the worship of God is deformed by a 
varied mass of intolerable superstitions; doctrine (without which Christianity would exist 
not) is wholly buried and exploded, the public assemblies are schools of idolatry and 
impiety.  Wherefore, in declining fatal participation in such wickedness, we run no risk of 
being dissevered from the Church of Christ.”22  As Voegelin observes, “When the reader 
has reached the end of this part of the argument, he wonders how anybody ever could be 
so misguided as to belong to this foul institution” (HPI IV, 279).   
 This program will successfully gather the remnant, however, the expansion of the 
church requires a mission to the reprobates, but there is an obstacle to the achievement of 
universality in the doctrine of sola fide.  Confronted with this seemingly intractable 
problem, Calvin focuses upon the doctrine of predestination as the cure for the evils that 
beset him.  The problem of predestination had existed at least since the development of 
the two cities by Saint Augustine and the idea that no one knew whom God would choose 
to be the elect to achieve salvation.  Calvin would use the ambiguity to good purpose.  
Since no one knew who God was going to take, the reprobate who had not been justified 
by faith could coexist in the church with those whose justification by faith had been 
assured.  To be sure, this raises difficulties that Calvin refused to confront directly, 
however, it was an effective device for the universality of the new church. 
 However, it is in the doctrine regarding predestination that Voegelin sees the 
greatest problems in Calvin’s new theology.  Calvin, Voegelin writes,  
 
lets God grow into the formidable proportions of the despot who, at his 
pleasure, shows mercy to a few while he metes out the just punishment of 
                                                 
22 Calvin, IV.ii.2 (II: 305).  
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damnation to the mass in order to show the majesty of his omnipotence 
and justice….  Taken at its face value, this doctrinal construction is 
usually called Calvin’s “theocentrism”; experientially, however, his 
dogmatic theocentrism is something that we may perhaps call Calvin’s 
“electocentrism,” the attempt at an immanentization of a transcendental 
God through nailing him down on his promises in the experience of the 
“call” (HPI IV, 283—84).  
 
In language reminiscent of his later work, Voegelin notes that in the creation of his 
doctrine of predestination, Calvin has taken the symbols of the theological problem of 
predestination out of their proper context and misapplied them to his doctrinal 
construction.  The essence of the doctrine of predestination is related to the timelessness 
of God for whom all time is the eternal present.  For human beings it is a speculative 
problem in that human beings do not exist in a state of timelessness, so there is no ground 
by which the question of predestination can be resolved satisfactorily for human beings.  
It exists as a theological and philosophical problem, but it cannot be reified into a 
doctrinal statement without stripping it of its meaning. 
 As a practical matter, Voegelin maintains, “Calvin’s immanentization of 
predestination in the consciousness of the elect is what today we would call the theory of 
a new elite….  Calvin’s struggle for a new universal church is no more than the struggle 
for the new elite and its authority” (HPI IV, 289).  Injected into the new universal church 
is the eschatological vision of the Old Testament and the notion of a Chosen People 
under God marching forward to victory.   What we are left with in Voegelin’s 
presentation of Calvin is an image that will be a familiar one to students of Voegelin’s 
thought: 
 
Western civilization itself is now torn asunder into the elite of the Lord 
whose march is the meaning of history, while the rest must submit, if 
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necessary, under force.  This new conception of the spiritual elite, which 
will prove itself in historical immanence, has left its indelible imprint on 
the later course of Western political history.  In the age of Calvin the elite 
was a group of predestinarian elect; with the exhaustion of the Protestant 
struggle and the discrediting of religious elites, the group became 
secularized into the enlightened intellectuals of the eighteenth century; 
after the French revolution began the systematic attempts at creating new 
intramundane elites, with the prototypical attempt of Comte, who has 
many traits in common with Calvin; and by the middle of the nineteenth 
century, arose new elitarian movements that issued into the totalitarian 
churches of our time (HPI IV, 291).    
 
 With that said, however, the revolutionary fervor of the Great Reformation would 
not have been possible had not the ground already been seeded.  As Voegelin points out, 
“A revolution…is not made by the revolutionaries; it flares up from a society that is 
pregnant with it; the guilt rests primarily with the dominant classes of the established 
institutions, not with the revolutionaries who are the product of a situation that has been 
mismanaged by the responsible authorities” (HPI IV, 285).  With this in mind, we now 
turn to the seeds of revolution that created the conditions by which the order of the world 
could be turned upside down. 
Sectarianism and the Failure of Reform 
The tension that exists between institutions as representative of order and the movement 
of people in opposition to those institutions is not a trait that is peculiar to Western 
Christian civilization.  Voegelin maintains that it is “a general trait of the civilizational 
process.”  In Western Christian civilization, though, the situation is made more 
problematic “because the Christian idea of the person in immediacy to God would prove 
a permanent irritant against the institutions.  The idea of the Christian person would 
function doubly as an agent of revolt against the institutionalization of relations between 
the soul and God and as an agent of regeneration of the institutions” (HPI IV, 132—33).  
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It is in this notion of the person as an agent of regeneration that makes the idea of 
“reformation” as it applies to public institutions a trait that is peculiar to Western 
Christian civilization. 
 The idea that institutions representing the spiritual order of human beings can be 
reformed to meet the exigencies of circumstances is made possible by the existence of the 
objective standard to which the agents of revolt against the institutions of Christian order 
can refer in order to make their case.  Through the recourse to the spiritualism of the 
Sermon on the Mount and the standards set therein, both the agents of revolt and the 
institutions that represent the spiritual order have a common frame of reference.  It is this 
admixture that makes the idea of reform distinct to Western Christian civilization.  As 
Voegelin asserts,   
 
It would seem impossible, on principle, that situations like the popular 
dissatisfaction with the empire religion of Ikhanaton, or the apolitism of 
the Hellenic schools, or the Chinese “associationism” in conflict with the 
Confucian public order could arise in a Christian civilization.  As a matter 
of fact, situations of this particular kind do not arise; the tensions assume 
specifically different forms.  For the designation of this specific difference 
we may appropriately use the term reformation.  The movement of the 
spirit has become institutionalized in the church; hence, the spiritual 
movements from the bottom of society cannot be in generic opposition to 
the institutions.  The oppositional movement is intimately related to the 
spirit of the institution itself and must express itself in a call for reform. 
 
Because of this peculiar interrelationship between the movement of the spirit from the 
bottom of society and the institutional representation of the spirit in the church, “(t)he 
answer to a spiritual movement from the bottom need not be a collapse; it can be a 
reformation of the institution.  The category of reformation, thus, becomes an idea that 
distinguishes medieval and modern Western civilization from the Hellenic” (HPI IV, 
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134).  And this idea of “reform” is, in turn, made possible by the recourse to the standards 
set in the Sermon. 
By Voegelin’s analysis, Western Christian civilization had been created upon the 
basis of the compromises of Saint Paul and Saint Augustine and the resulting realization 
of an institutional order for the community through the church.  In the instance of Paul, 
his compromises had created the primary conditions by which individuals could become 
part of the community and the community itself could expand into the world in which it 
emerged in accommodation with the human condition itself.  However, the compromises 
by themselves would have been an inadequate foundation upon which to build a 
civilization.  The creation of a sacramental organization in the church had important 
consequences and stood as a necessary precondition for the realization of Western 
Christian civilization.  Voegelin maintains,  
 
The mediation of grace through the sacraments makes grace objective.  
The state of grace cannot be obtained through religious enthusiasm or 
through the efforts of heroic saintliness; it must be obtained through 
sacramental incorporation into the mystical body of Christ.  The 
development of the sacerdotal office with its administration of grace 
through the sacraments and the objectivity of the priest’s administration 
that makes grace effective independently of his personal worthiness are 
the decisive organizational steps without which the compromises with the 
natural and historical order of society could not have fully unfolded their 
potentialities.  The church as divine-human organism is the social body of 
the God-man; and the sacramental Christ renews the union of God and 
Man when the priest celebrates the sacrament.  Through the administration 
of the sacrament, the Incarnation is continued objectively in the historical 
medium (HPI IV, 141). 
 
However, the very objectification of grace through the creation of the sacramental 
organization is problematic.  In many ways, the success of Christian civilization is also 
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the reason for its failure.  As Voegelin notes, “The civilizationally magnificent merger 
with the ‘world’ is the cause of the sectarian reaction” (HPI IV, 142). 
 This merger had been made possible by the compromises of Paul and the 
sacramental objectification of grace.  Indeed, by Voegelin’s account, Western Christian 
civilization itself is the result of these two factors taken together.   
 
The compromises, together with the sacramental objectification of grace, 
are the basis for the civilizing function of the church.  Through its 
compromises the church is enabled to accept the social structure of a 
people as a whole, with its occupations, habits, and legal and economic 
institutions, and to inject into the social body the spiritual and ethical 
values of Christianity with such gradations as are bearable for the average 
human being at the time.   No revolution is required, no eschatological 
upheaval that would establish the realm of Christ within the generation of 
the living.  The tension of eschatological expectation is toned down to the 
atmosphere of a civilizing process that may take its good time; in slow and 
patient work it may extend over centuries.  By virtue of its compromises 
the church can operate on the masses; it can utilize the wealth of natural 
gifts and slowly ennoble them by giving them direction toward 
supernatural aims.  Moreover, the grace that is objectively with the whole 
body of the community allows a very important socialization of the 
individual gifts for the Christian life (HPI IV, 141—42). 
 
But, the problem still existed as to how to incorporate the individual experience of faith 
in the soul of the believer into the institution of the church.  The fact that a sacerdotal 
institution existed did not mean that of necessity all were going to conform to its dictates.  
We have already noted that church and sect are both legitimate expressions of the 
spiritual impulse in Chapter three.  However, this represented a quandary for the 
institutional authorities.  If there could only be one true faith, then the sectarian impulses 
had to either be absorbed or put down.  With the passage of time, the latter increasingly 
became the recourse of first resort. 
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There is a prima facia case to be made whenever a sectarian movement arises 
against a given institution that something has gone wrong in the interplay between the 
evocative idea and the institutionalization of it.  Thus Voegelin asserts, “When a popular 
movement of mass relevance is forming in opposition to an institution, this formation is 
the definite proof that the institution has somehow failed in handling the problems 
entrusted to its care; to this extent, the idea of vox populi, vox Dei is golden wisdom.”  
Yet while it may be proof that something is wrong, that is not, in itself, evidence that the 
movement, or movements, in question offer real solutions to the problems that led to the 
initial demands against the institutional order.  “The formation of such a movement,” 
Voegelin writes,  
 
is never a proof that the direction in which it is moving is endowed with 
any intrinsic value.  The movement may represent a drive toward the 
social realization of spiritual values; but this drive may be no more than a 
nucleus that is surrounded by wide fringes of destructive hatred against the 
institution that has failed with regard to a specific task.  From this 
possibility arise peculiar dangers of the tensions between institutions and 
movements….  The legitimate grievances of a spiritual movement, its call 
for reform in the Christian sense, may be accompanied by a hostile 
attitude toward civilizational values.  This admixture of civilizational 
hostility is a practically inevitable feature of movements from the bottom 
of the social scale; the resentment against intellectual and aesthetic values 
realized by the upper class will supply a good deal of motive power in the 
call for reform.  The cry for spiritual reform is typically coupled with 
demands for a “burning of the books,” for the suppression of literary and 
artistic culture, and for the abolition of the prevalent property order  
(HPI IV, 134—35). 
 
 In large measure, prior to 1300, the church had been able to absorb sectarian 
movements into the larger body of the church.  Voegelin observes, “It was clear to the 
thinkers of the high Middle Ages that the church preserved its spiritual effectiveness 
through a series of renovations.  It was, furthermore clear that the social carriers of the 
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successive renovations were the orders.  The Benedictine reform and the Cluniac reform 
were the main events in this series; and a new lease on life was given the church through 
the absorption of sectarian tendencies into the mendicant orders” (HPI IV, 149).  The 
reforms reinvigorated the church and reduced the need for competitors to arise in order to 
challenge the virtual spiritual monopoly of the universal church.  
 However, the absorptiveness of the church declined precipitously after 1300.  The 
doctrinal hardening of the church had led to the unenviable circumstance that even 
legitimate questions of reform had to be classified as heretical since the church had lost 
permeability.  The institutional capacity of the church to absorb the movements was lost.  
Thus,  
 
the movements of the so-called pre-Reformation were fought down by 
violence….  The same inability of coping with the new problems is 
revealed in the increasing national influences on the schismatic papacy, in 
the failure in creating an international constitution for the church, in the 
withdrawal into an absolute form of church government, and in the 
creation of the new legal form of the concordat for dealing with national 
governments.  
 
Voegelin puts his finger on the real difficulty at the heart of the increasing pressure upon 
the institutional of the church which was “the problem of developing Christian doctrine 
further through a differentiation of mystical culture from the symbolism of dogma as well 
as the problem of reinterpreting the meaning of dogmatic symbols in light of active 
religious experience” (HPI IV, 137).  In other words, the church was finding it 
increasingly difficult to “keep up” with the differentiations within the spiritual 
community of which it was supposed to be representative. 
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 This potential problem is further exacerbated by the cycle of the call for reform 
and the reaction of the institution to the call for reform, especially in light of reformist 
demands that extend beyond the strictly spiritual reforms of the institution and touch 
upon the values of the civilization itself.  Voegelin notes that in many cases, the  
 
legitimate grievances of a spiritual movement, its call for reform in the 
Christian sense, may be accompanied by a hostile attitude toward 
civilizational values.  This admixture of civilizational hostility is a 
practically inevitable feature of movements from the bottom of the social 
scale; the resentment against the intellectual and aesthetic values realized 
by the upper class will supply a good deal of motive power in the call for 
reform. 
 
This, in turn, is problematic because to the extent that a sectarian movement is focused 
upon hostility toward the civilizational values themselves, it creates a justification on the 
part of the institution to seek to simply crush the movement itself.  Voegelin asserts that 
the assault on civilizational values generally “lends legitimacy to the institutional 
resistance against the movements:  the anticivilizational elements in movements become 
the excuse for the ruling groups not to satisfy legitimate grievances, and the momentary 
victory of the institution may become, as a consequence, the cause of even worse 
outbreaks in the future” (HPI IV, 135).   
In Voegelin’s account, this is a matter of profound implication for Western 
civilization generally in that it creates a spiral of reform and reaction that inevitably ends 
in disaster.  The “cumulative effect of resistance against legitimate calls for reform,” 
Voegelin writes, 
 
has especially grave consequences in a civilization of the Western 
Christian type.  If the reforms are not forthcoming, the resentment that 
always is easily directed against the civilizational values embodied in the 
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institutions may turn against the spiritual values themselves.  The process 
that has started with movements for spiritual reform may end with 
movements against the spirit.  This has, in fact, been the course of the 
movements in Western civilization:  the course begins with movements of 
the Albigensian type; it ends with movements of the Communist and 
National Socialist type.  The development is without parallel in history.  
Western Christian civilization has a peculiar vulnerability and shows 
peculiar problems of decline:  while in Greco-Roman civilization the 
tension of the decline was caused by movements that represented an 
advance of the spirit, in Western Christian civilization the tension of the 
decline is cause by movements that are spiritually regressive in nature 
(HPI IV, 135). 
 
We have seen the reactionary impulse within the institution of the church through the 
adoption of dogmatic positions and the failure to respond to the reformist impulse.  
Furthermore, we have noticed the increasing tendency to label all sectarian movements as 
heretical per se.  The end result was a feeding of the cycle that led to the great outburst of 
sectarianism that is known as the Great Reformation. 
With the linkage of the spiritual and temporal authorities under the rubric of the 
Gelasian doctrine, the sectarian assault upon the sacerdotal offices of the church and 
“against the ecclesiastical monopoly of mediating grace through the sacraments” 
constituted a threat not only to the church, but created a political problem as well.    
During the Investiture Controversy, the Norman Anonymous had asserted the general 
priesthood of every Christian.  This became a familiar assertion in the sectarian 
movements afterward.  But, as Voegelin attests, “Lay Christianity was a deadly threat to 
the sacerdotal and sacramental institution of the church; but was a threat not only to the 
church itself.  Spiritual and temporal power were closely integrated in the order of 
imperial Christianity; the institution could not be attacked on principle without destroying 
the charismatic rulership in the Christian order” (HPI IV, 143).   
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Indeed, as we have seen, it was the idea of charismatic rulership in the imperial 
order that succumbed first in the eclipsing of the imperial idea.  Once the idea of 
temporal authority was transferred from the imperial idea to the concept of the individual 
realm, it was largely a matter of time before universal Christianity itself would collapse 
under the weight of the sectarian impulse.  Thus, Voegelin characterizes the “struggle 
between the church and the sectarian movements” as “a reversal of the process in which 
the church” had “overcome the eschatological, sectarian beginnings of Christianity.”   
Furthermore, the struggle itself is characterized by Voegelin as “an unraveling of the 
compromises” by which Christianity had accomplished its civilizational mission  
(HPI IV, 143). 
The objection to the sacerdotal function of the church itself and the mediation of 
grace through the sacraments, of course, extends further back in history.  In the 
explication of the Tyconian problem we noticed that the primary issue, the ultimate cause 
of the schism was the Donatists’ position that the sacraments were not “objective.”  The 
proper administration of grace required the purity of those who would administer the 
sacrament.  The primary objection was against the administration of the sacraments by 
the priest who had committed apostasy under threat of persecution.  But, of course, the 
Tyconian problem also illustrated what would happen in the willingness of the Donatists 
to use violence to compel others to accept their version of religious and spiritual truth.  It 
was this tendency that Luther inadvertently fed through his promulgation of the doctrine 
of sola fide and the subsequent corruption of Augustinian symbolism. 
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Ultimately, the problem with the institutionalization of the spirit turns on the 
problem of apolitism that we addressed in Chapter four in the context of the historical 
background of the relationship of the church and the nations.  Voegelin notes,  
 
Apolitism is a problem in every political culture.  Institutions can do no 
more than stabilize and order the field of social forces that exist at the time 
of their creation; even the best institutional creation is not perfect; there 
will always be groups and individuals who are dissatisfied with the 
settlement of the historical moment; and as time goes on and 
circumstances change, new causes of dissatisfaction will arise.  An 
institution must be constantly engaged in the process of restabilizing itself 
through the solution of problems that would destroy its value and meaning 
if they remained unsolved.  If the ruling group of an institution fails in 
such adaptation, an increasing number of persons will feel “left out.”  If 
the number of such persons becomes large enough in a given society, and 
if they express their sentiments and ideas in a philosophy of conduct 
suitable to persons who live with their “bodies” in a community but do not 
participate in it with their “souls”…then we have given the phenomenon 
of apolitism on a socially relevant scale.  If, furthermore, such persons 
form communities and organize themselves for political action, then the 
situation is ripe for a revolution (HPI IV, 133).  
 
Seen from this light, the Great Reformation was not the result of Luther’s tinkering with 
the institutional order, but rather Luther’s tinkering had the effect of releasing social 
forces that had been pent up since the end of the imperium.  The church’s retreat from the 
compromises of Saint Paul had made revolution almost inevitable.  To be sure, the 
possibility continued to exist for internal reforms within the body of the church, but that 
is somewhat problematic given the history of the church.  Voegelin hints at the problem 
in his assertion “that the age of Saint Paul’s elementary faith was gone” (HPI IV, 227).   
 In the end, however, Voegelin argues that the “most important victim” of the 
Reformation, “the symbol of the church from its beginnings” as the institutional order of 
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the spirit, became a victim because of its own “failure of coping with the historicity of 
Christianity.”  Voegelin continues: 
 
For the early church, the genius of Saint Paul had found the great 
compromise with history through the interpretation of Pagan and Hebrew 
civilization as preluding the revelations of divine law.  In the period of 
Roman Christianity, the problem of a plurality of Christian civilizations 
had been solved, after a fashion, through the wranglings of the early 
councils about Christology; but the possibility of a split between Western 
and Eastern Christianities had become visible.  Within Western 
Christianity, after Charlemagne, the schismatic situation could be decently 
covered by the relative provincialism of the Western development.  But 
this period of relative dormancy of the problem came to its inevitable end 
with the enlargement of the historical horizon toward the East and the 
domestic complications of the West.  The evocation of the Roman 
summepiscopate was intimately connected with the unchallenged 
evocation of the Western empire.  With the disintegration of the imperial 
evocation through the internal and external changes of the historical scene, 
the Romanitas of the spiritual power could not remain an unchallenged 
symbol as if nothing had happened.  With the finality of the imperial idea, 
the finality, not of Christianity, but of its Roman ecclesiastical form would 
pale.  With the historical relativation of the imperial idea, the Romanitas 
of Christianity would become a historical accident.  And the leadership of 
the church would be faced with the task of spiritualizing the idea of the 
universal church in such a manner that it would become independent of 
the Roman accident (HPI IV, 224). 
 
Voegelin’s presentation seems to create an air of inevitability to the destruction of the 
universal church that militates against his outright condemnation of the men who would 
bring the end to the experiment in capturing the essence of the Christian experience in an 
institution. 
The Forces Unleashed and the Privatization of the Spirit 
The first and most obvious result of the Great Reformation was the plunging of Europe 
into the age of the religious wars.  As Voegelin argues, “The dissociation of Christianity 
into a plurality of creed communities became a cause of political disturbance and of 
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religious wars.”  This was largely because the “new communities continued the medieval 
idea of the church as the spiritual branch of public order, to be maintained in this position 
by the temporal authorities whose primary function was the defense of the church” (HPI 
V, 21).  Furthermore, since it is the nature of Christian communities generally to be 
proselytizing communities this was bound to engender conflict.  It was as if the Donatists 
had multiplied and each different sect of the reformed Donatist church believed it had a 
duty to crush the unbelievers in an attempt to bend them to the will of the true church. 
 But the conflict between the creed communities had two very important effects 
upon the future development of the West both politically and spiritually.  In the first 
instance, the violence brought on by the wars tended to discount the notion of the 
charismata as vested in the temporal authority of the civil government.  This was true 
despite the fact that many of the new creed communities were able to attach themselves 
to kings and princes and realms in order to secure their lives.  In the second instance, 
Voegelin writes, “The violent disorders caused by the contending spiritual movements 
had the general result of a contraction to public order and of a reduction of politics to the 
essential of preserving peace in the material sense.”  Thus “the sixteenth century does not 
begin, as is conventionally phrased, a separation or differentiation of politics from a 
religious context; what actually begins is the elimination of the life of the spirit from 
public representation and the corresponding contraction of politics to a secular nucleus” 
(HPI V, 23). 
 This creates a problem insofar as the spirit of human beings cannot be excised 
from the life of human beings generally.  As Voegelin puts it, one cannot eliminate the 
life of the spirit from society any more than one can the biological constitution of man” 
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(HPI IV, 22).  Prior to the nineteenth century, the contraction of public order into a 
secular realm would be understood as a problem because the order of the soul has been 
understood from the time of Plato as a necessary precondition for the order of a society.  
However, the attempt at “substituting humanistic substances of one variety or the other 
for the historical Christian order…have only makeshift character; the stabilizations of the 
movement are followed by a renewed realization of the actual disintegration of 
substantive order, until, in the nineteenth century, the revolt begins to find its 
complement of substance in totalitarian eschatologies” (HPI V, 34). 
 The question of temporal authority is also problematic in light of the Great 
Reformation.  Throughout the sacrum imperium, as a result of the Gelasian doctrine, the 
temporal authority was understood to be representative of transcendent order to the extent 
that the authorities temporal and spiritual were themselves manifestations of the 
transcendent kingdom of God in history.  With the crossing of the Rubicon that was the 
Great Reformation, there was no turning back to the old evocation.  It would be more 
than a hundred years before the seed of popular sovereignty planted by Salamonius 
would begin to bear fruit in the aftermath of the English Revolution (HPI IV, 42—44). 
 In the emergence of the new entities of the nation-states new problems arose with 
regard to the relations between the new autonomous units.  Voegelin observes with 
regard to the emerging nation-states a pattern that would play itself out in the history of 
international relations, first under the rubric of the Christian idea of a crusade and then in 
terms of the secular religions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  According to the 
pattern, within a state there is a rise of a spiritual movement with the tendency to 
transcend borders.  This is followed by the attempt to suppress the movement that might 
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lead to wars of intervention and counter-intervention.  Finally, peace is secured through 
the achievement of a temporary stabilization.  Voegelin identifies four movements of this 
type beginning with the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation and ending with 
World War II (HPI V, 110).  It is problematic, in light of the sudden implosion of the 
Soviet Union whether or not this same categorization will continue to hold true.  It is 
possible to define the war against fundamentalist Islam in these terms, although the 
outcome of that conflict remains to be seen. 
 The most influential attempt to harness the spiritual forces unleashed by the 
destruction of the Christian political order was undertaken by John Locke   In Locke’s 
development of the idea of toleration there is an attempt to privatize the sphere of the 
spirit.  Voegelin observes,  
 
The break of the great compromise by the Reformation expressed itself in 
the sectarian insistence on a purified church sphere and in a corresponding 
neglect of the secular arm.  The result was not the desired subordination of 
the secular sphere to the ecclesiastical organization, but on the contrary the 
liberation of the secular sphere from the restrictions that the religious 
compromise had imposed.  The Reform began with a program of 
submitting the secular sphere to the control of the saints and ended with 
the relegation of the saints to a corner of “a free and voluntary society” 
(HPI VII, 142). 
 
As a practical matter, the consequences of this movement are not well understood.  In 
Voegelin’s estimation, by privatizing the movement of the spirit, the remnant of Christian 
civilization deprived itself of the necessary tools by which to combat the new gods of the 
ideological mass movements that emerged in the French Revolution into the twentieth 
century.  It is all well and good to argue that the institutionalization of the spirit is private 
matter, but it is also problematic to the degree that leaves the field open to the forces of 
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the ideological faiths that Voegelin defines as “Gnostic” in the context of The New 




In the analysis of the problem of Christian political order the thread that runs throughout 
is the retreat from the compromises with the world that made the institutional order of the 
spirit possible and the danger posed by the Tyconian problem.   
 Voegelin’s History of Political Ideas is his most comprehensive look at the 
problems of Christian political order as it emerged in the first community that gathered 
around Jesus in life, and expanded based upon the revelatory experience of the disciples 
in the days following his death on the cross.  Saint Paul faced a serious political problem 
in constituting a community of the faithful that would live on but, through a series of 
compromises with world, he was able to create a constitution of the community that 
would result in the expansion of Christianity throughout the world.  Furthermore, Paul 
had created the germ of an idea that would serve as a force for spiritual order throughout 
the Middle Ages in the sacrum imperium.  However, the destruction of the imperium, and 
the withdrawal for the compromises with the world by both the universal church and 
ranks of the sectarian Christians led to the excision of the life of the spirit from the 
institutional order of the new nation states. 
 The destruction of both political and spiritual orders was so complete that 
Voegelin characterizes the state of political theory at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century as “a wreck” (HPI VII, 47).   In place of the comprehensive idea of community 
that encompassed the immanent and spiritual life of human beings, the new political 
orders would generally follow Locke in the privatization of the order of the spirit and the 
life oriented toward the summum bonnum as the beatific vision of the transcendent God 
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would be replaced by the new gods of science and progress.  And the carriers of the spirit 
would be the new creeds of sectarianism in the gnostic ideological mass movements. 
  For the moment, the forces of ideological sectarianism in the distinctly Christian 
sense have been quieted.  And with the destruction of the Soviet Empire, the threat of an 
ideological mass movement in the future was thought to have passed.  However, in 
keeping with the notion that evil never disappears, it merely changes its form, the new 
ideological threat to Western civilization has emerged in the form of militant Islam.  But 
there is still an open question with regard to the “crisis of civic consciousness” that 
Sandoz and others see permeating American society in particular and the Western 
democracies generally.  In part, this is caused by the closure of the realm of the spirit and 
the failure of the institutions of the “state” to recognize it as legitimate. 
 With that said, however, there is a modicum of hope.  In a footnote to Volume IV 
of the History of Political Ideas, Voegelin asserts with regard to the tension of decline 
that are caused by spiritually regressive movements, “this peculiarity of Western 
civilizations should make historians hesitate to indulge in predictions with regard to the 
further course of Western decline.  Under such conditions catastrophes of disorder 
without parallel are possible, while on the other hand recuperative forces without parallel 
are immanent to the civilization” (HPI IV, 135 n. 2).  It is to be hoped that this analysis of 
Voegelin’s study of the problem of Christian political order can be a small contribution to 
the recuperation of civilization. 
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